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In the last few decades, there has been a considerable effort, mainly from Western liberal 
States, to create and develop an internationally harmonized counter-terrorist financing 
regime through international treaties, soft laws and Security Council resolutions, and to 
diffuse this regime into domestic laws. Aimed at preventing terrorism, this regime has 
introduced two types of measures: financial measures which involve financial institutions 
in the fight against terrorism, and penal measures which rely on criminalization, freezing 
and confiscation tools. This thesis examines the penal measures, the notions on which these 
measures are based, their scope and structure, the human-rights implications arising from 
their implementation and their consistency with the principles of criminal law. The main 
idea behind the adoption of these penal measures is to prevent any terrorist activities at 
early stage and before they are actualized. So, the measures have been designed to target 
any financing activities that contribute to, or facilitate, the preparation or commission of 
any terrorist act, or the activities of those involved in terrorist activities even when there is 
a tenuous or no link between the financing acts and an actual terrorist act. But there are two 
challenges that this regime faces: defining what is terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist 
groups, the financing of which should be tackled, and whether and how far criminal law 
should be justifiably expanded to criminalize financing of terrorism or confiscate terrorist 
funds when there is no connection between acts of financing or funds and actual terrorist 
acts. This thesis illustrates how the lack of consensus on the definition, scope and elements 
of terrorism (terrorist acts, terrorist groups) has resulted in the adoption of different 
definitions of terrorism in contradiction with the principle of legality. This also raises 
doubts as to the effectiveness of the regime in terms of the enforcement of a harmonized 
counter-terrorist financing measures (although their effectiveness is not discussed here). 
The thesis argues that the expansion of the reach of criminal law to suppress activities 
which are not clearly and reasonably closely connected to the commission or preparation 
of terrorist activities is vague and unjustifiable in terms of the rule of law (especially values 
of legal certainty) and principles of the criminal law of Anglo-American States which have 
played a significant role in adoption and development of the regime. The implementation 
of these measures is in gross violation of some of the basic human rights and values that 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon,1 since the end of World War II, there 
has been widespread concern over the “intensity and urgency” of attacks on 
civilians or civilian property, carried out with the purpose of frightening ordinary 
people or states or international organizations into acting in a particular way or 
desisting from action.2 To deal with this phenomenon called terrorism, the United 
Nations has created a global system of counter-terrorism treaties. The aims of these 
treaties are to target specific threats such as hostage taking3 or hijacking4  regarded 
as terrorist acts without defining or applying the term terrorism.5 Using the 
traditional principles of criminal law, these treaties consist of a set of provisions 
defining the offences sanctioned by these treaties.   
The only exception to this approach is the adoption of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (hereinafter Terrorist Financing 
Convention).6 The Convention requires the criminalization of terrorist financing as 
an independent offence in spite of the facts that such criminalization requires an 
agreement on a generic definition of terrorism, the financing of which should be 
criminalized, and in spite of whether traditional criminal law can accommodate 
terrorist financing, a preparatory conduct dealt with by the law of complicity or 
inchoate offences, as an independent offence.  
The introduction of the Terrorist Financing Convention should be regarded as a 
shift to a pre-emptive approach adopted by some Western liberal States in their 
                                                 
 1 See Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2007). 
2 Micheline Calmy-Rey in Mark Pieth, Daniel Thelesklaf and Radha Ivory Countering Terrorist 
Financing: The Practitioner's Point of View (Peter Lang, Bern, 2009), at vii. 
3 The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages  (New York, 17 December 1979). 
4 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft  (the Hague, 16 December 
1970). 
5 Although the term “terrorist” is used in the title of the convention on bombings, the term terrorist 
bombing is not used anywhere in the text. See UN International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings  (New York, 15 December 1997), (hereinafter the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention).   
6 UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (New York, 9 
December 1999), (hereinafter the Terroist Financing Convention). 
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domestic law to “criminalizing acts that have never happened to deal with threats 
that are not yet and may never be”.7 Advocating the necessity of a shift to this 
approach in “the war on terror”, the former US president, George W Bush argued 
that  
for much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines 
of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new 
threats also require new thinking. Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation 
against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation 
or citizens to defend. … If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have 
waited too long. … We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and 
confront the worst threats before they emerge.    
This argument was a driving factor in the formulation of the Terrorist Financing 
Convention proposed a few years before September 2001 by some of the Western 
States which intended to internationalize the use of a pre-emptive approach in the 
fight against terrorism. As will be explored, a call for the adoption of measures to 
counter terrorist financing was officially issued in G7/8 ministerial meetings in 
1995.8  In 1999, a draft of a convention on terrorist financing, a French initiative at 
a G8 summit,9 was proposed to the United Nations.10 The draft regarded terrorist 
financing as “a matter of grave concern to the international community”,11 which it 
thought needed to be tackled independently. After two weeks of negotiations, the 
Terrorist Financing Convention was adopted by consensus and the offence of 
terrorist financing was introduced as an autonomous offence. However, until 
                                                 
7 McCulloch, J. “Precrime: Imagining future crime and a new space for criminology”, in M. Segrave 
(Ed.), Conference Proceedings: Australian & New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference 2009, 
Australia: Criminology, School of Political & Social Inquiry, Monash University, at 151 
8 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism: 
P-8 Ministerial Conference on Terrorism (Ottawa, Canada, 12 December 1995). See also U.S. 
Department of State Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, Paris, France; July 30, 1996 (Paris, 
1996)). For more information about the role of the G8 in the fight against terrorism, see Andre 
Belelieu “The G8 and terrorism: what role can the G8 play in the 21st century?” (2002) 
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/governance/belelieu2002-gov8.pdf>. 
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan Foreign Ministers' Progress Report: Denver Summit of the Eight 
(Tokyo, 1997). 
10 UN Doc Letter dated 3 November 1998 from the Permanent Representative of France to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-general (A/C.6/53/9,4 November 1998).   
11 The Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, Preamble.   
3 
 
September 2001, only four states had ratified the Convention. The Convention now 
has 132 signatories and 188 parties. 
The 9/11 attacks, nevertheless, created an opportunity for pushing through this pre-
emptive approach reflected in the Terrorist Financing Convention, but it was never 
welcomed by most states. Therefore, substantial efforts have been taken to assure 
that this approach is adopted by states in the fight against terrorist financing. The 
Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter the FATF), an inter-governmental body 
established by the G7/8 in 1989 to counter money laundering, agreed to set out 
specific recommendations for dealing with terrorist financing.12 Since 2001, the 
United Nations Security Council has also been dealing with the issue of terrorist 
financing by adopting some quasi-criminal law measures. Assuming that terrorism 
is closely and heavily connected to criminal (organized) activities, these 
international organizations (the United Nations, the FATF, and the UN Security 
Council) created and perpetuated a regime of measures to counter terrorist 
financing. This regime, relying on a pre-emptive approach, provides two types of 
preventive measures: 
a) Financial measures: Emphasizing a risk-based approach, these preventive 
measures centre on the role of financial institutions in preventing terrorist financing 
from occurring in the first place. These measures will not be discussed by this thesis.  
b) Penal measures: These aim at the enforcement of the criminal law in relation to 
the acts of financing of terrorism. The two main penal legal devices used in the fight 
against terrorist financing are criminalization of financing terrorism and the 
freezing and confiscation of terrorist funds.  
There has been a great deal of analysis of the effectiveness of domestic measures 
against terrorist financing, but not of the international regime created by the 
Convention itself. In this thesis, I will only examine the penal measures 
(criminalization and confiscation) closely and exhaustively.  
                                                 
12 Financial Action Task Force FATF guidance: crimialising terrorist financing (Recommendation 
5) (October 2016), at [1]. 
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1.2 The notion underpinning the penal measures  
Under the Convention (and the guidance of the FATF’s recommendations), states 
are asked to criminalize terrorist financing and confiscate terrorist funds without a 
link to, or the existence of, a terrorist act.13 The underlying idea on which this pre-
emptive approach is based is that, because terrorism is a serious offence which relies 
heavily on the funds derived from criminal (organized) activities, it should be 
tackled at a very early stage before it is actualized. This seems to be the main 
justification for the enactment of a wide range of terrorism-related offences, 
including terrorist financing, which criminalize preparatory conduct, as a stand-
alone offence, even in the absence of the connection between the alleged 
preparatory conduct and terrorist activities. However, in the absence of such a 
connection, the main difficulty is identifying the origin of the criminality of the 
impugned conduct. As will be discovered, the offense, in its current formulated 
form, relies heavily on its mental element to remedy this ambiguity—that is, it is 
the mental element of a terrorist financing offender, which is the basis of the 
imposition of criminal liability or confiscation sanctions.14 This approach has 
expanded the boundary of the criminal law to enable it to include activities and 
associations that are not normally criminalized as independent offences under 
conventional criminal law, due to their preparatory nature or because the connection 
to the possible subsequent offences for which they are carried out is vague.  
As explained, the adoption of this approach by the Terrorist Financing Convention, 
FATF and the UN Security Council has been defended on the grounds of the 
heinous and catastrophic effects of terrorist attacks. In other words, the counter 
terrorist financing measures’ purpose is to prevent terrorist attacks pre-emptively 
by disturbing and dismantling the financial capabilities of terrorists, terrorist groups 
and their supporters long before their resources turn into catastrophes. There is no 
doubt that law should be used not only to deal with harmful and wrongful conduct 
such as terrorism, but also with conduct that falls short of causing actual harms but 
which contributes to or facilitates the commission of potential terrorist attacks. 
                                                 
13 See Article 2 of Terrorist Financing Convention. Financial Action Task Force “International 
standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism & proliferation” February 
2012, at 11. 
14 Marja Lehto Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts: Redefinition of the Concept of Terrorism 
Beyond Violent Acts (M. Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, MA, 2009), at xxxiv. 
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Indeed, criminalization of attempts is a well-rationalized subject of criminal law 
which has its own rules and boundaries. As Antony Duff argues “a law that 
condemned and punished actually harm-causing conduct as wrong, but was utterly 
silent on attempts to cause such harms and on reckless risk-taking with respect to 
such harms, would speak with a strange moral voice”.15 But the question is how far 
criminal law can (or should) be stretched to fulfil this task? Does criminalizing 
terrorist financing, which fits neatly into the category of the law of attempt or 
inchoate offence, as an independent offence without a link to any terrorist act push 
criminal law beyond its limits?  
My main purposes in this thesis are to examine the justifiability of the adoption and 
development of this approach to criminalising terrorist financing and confiscating 
terrorist funds as well as identifying the legal issues and challenges that arise from 
its implementation. It should be noted that my purpose in this thesis is neither to 
question the basic need for countering terrorist financing nor to provide a lesson in 
the arcane history of the laws on terrorism; instead, it is to draw attention to the 
actual and potential dangers which may be inherent in counter-terrorist financing 
measures. In addition, I will not examine whether the regime has been effective in 
terms of cutting off terrorists’ funds; instead, I will examine whether it has been 
based on a theoretically and conceptually correct foundation in such a way that 
these laws’ implementation does not harm (innocent) citizens, violate their rights 
or pervert the criminal law.  
1.3 Research questions  
To achieve the purpose of the research, I shall seek to answer the following 
questions:  
1. What is terrorist financing? And how has it been dealt with? 
2. What is the basis of criminal liability when there is no connection between 
financing and any criminal (terrorist) activity? Does the terrorist financing offence 
extend criminal liability based on mens rea vaguely and unjustifiably?  
                                                 
15 Antony Duff “Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law” in Antony Duff and others (eds) 
The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2010), at 91. 
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3 Are the criminalization and confiscation of terrorist financing in the way that 
international treaties have been adopted and diffused understandable, justifiable, 
and consistent with the accepted principles of criminal law and the principle of 
legality?  
1.4 The main hypotheses  
The main hypothesis of the thesis is that this extension is untenable in terms of 
existing principles of criminal law. This breaks down into the following arguments:  
1- A distinctive effort has been forthcoming from the international community to 
push the idea that terrorism and organized crimes are closely connected, so an 
approach similar to that taken to counter organized crimes and money laundering 
can be taken to address terrorist financing. It is the submission of the thesis that the 
counter-terrorist financing regime which relies on this idea is fundamentally flawed 
partly because basic facts about the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing 
have been ignored. 
2- Criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence, in the way 
drafted in the Terrorist Financing Convention and diffused by the UN Security 
Council and FATF, stretches out the boundaries of criminal liability beyond the 
principles of criminal law and beyond the limits of existing limits of preventive 
measures around ‘attempts’ which penalise conduct preparatory for crimes. Such a 
poorly-defined and vague offence can result, as will be explored, in massive 
variations in its application (criminalization and confiscation), in the violation of 
the principle of legality and of some of the principles of criminal law.  
3- The incorrect conceptualization and criminalization of terrorist financing pave 
the way for the inaccurate use of freezing and confiscation tools. Obviously, the 
aim of freezing or confiscation is to enhance the effectiveness of criminal justice 
systems in the fight against any type of profit-driven (or high cost attempted) crime. 
However, the appropriateness of the asset freezing and confiscation measures 
defined under the terrorist financing regime in the fight against terrorist financing, 
where the money might not be the fruit of crime or not connected to any terrorist 
act, can be challenged in the light of human rights limitations. This may also 
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challenge the asset-freezing regime adopted and developed by the UN Security 
Council, which can be argued as insufficient to address these human rights 
concerns.  
1.4.1 Vagueness and the rule of law 
Based on the “traditional understanding of the rule of law doctrine”,16 this thesis 
claims that the penal measures on terrorist financing are unjustifiably vague and 
therefore in contradiction with the rule of law. Under this thesis, a law is vague 
when it fails to offer “guidance as to what the law is in relation to particular 
issues”;17 vague laws grant discretion “without standards for its exercise”,18 or 
without access to any “methodological tools” for its interpretation.19 Standards or 
methodological tools may “be available outside a law e.g. on the basis of general 
principles”.20 Sometimes, the context of a law determines its meaning and 
application.21 Therefore, a law is not vague if the law takes an open form, but at the 
same time its “context” can be determined by existing standards and 
methodological tools, or by reference to its context. For example, the law that 
requires driving ‘reasonably’ is not vague,22 although it has an open form, if the law 
offers “a definite interpretation of the word reasonable”,23 or provides guidance on 
how its vague form shall be filled, i.e. “how discretion is to be applied”.24  
The terrorist financing penal measures, however, do not fall within any of these 
exceptions. They pose two types of vagueness in the sense defined above (granting 
discretion without offering methods and standards for their exercises): ‘structural 
vagueness’ which refers to the vagueness of the structure of the terrorist financing 
offence under which it is not clear and determinable, when there is no terrorist act 
                                                 
16 Lutz-Christia  Wolff “Law and Flexibility - Rule of Law Limits of a Rhetorical Silver Bullet” 
2011 11 Journal Jurisprudence 549, at 559. 
17 At 551. 
18 P. S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers Form and substance in Anglo-American law : a comparative 
study of legal reasoning, legal theory, and legal institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987), at 74. 
19 Wolff, above n 16, at 556. 
20 At 556. 
21 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) at 112. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 
(1988), at 332. 
22 Robert S. Summers “How Law Is Formal and Why It Matters” 1997 82(5) Cornell Law Review 
1165, at 1218. 
23 Wolff, above n 16, at 557. 
24 Lutz-Christia Wolff “Flexible Choice-of-Law Rules: Panacea or Oxymoron?” 2014 10(3) Journal 
of Private International Law 431, at 434. 
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planned, attempted or committed, where the criminality of financing activities can 
be derived from. Although the offence relies on the mental state of the accused in 
imposing criminal liability, in the absence of the existence or preparation of a 
terrorist act, what a financer should know or intend to be held criminally liable is 
not specified. Even if one finds a meaning for it, as will be argued in chapters 7 and 
8, such an approach to criminalization is unjustifiable in terms of existing principles 
of criminal law, as will be discussed in chapter 9. 
This structural vagueness also leads to confusion over the certainty and determinacy 
of the meaning and application of each elements of the offence. This vagueness is 
called by the thesis ‘definitional vagueness’. For example, as chapter 6 points out, 
it is not clear, in the absence of a connection between financing or funds and a 
terrorist act, whether and how providing legal advice to a terrorist group constitutes 
the terrorist financing offence.  
The jurisprudential question is if vague law is permissible. To put it another way, 
how can the values of the rule of law be maintained when a law is vague? This is a 
very controversial topic of jurisprudence and it is beyond the scope of this research 
to include a comprehensive discussion on this jurisprudential matter. But it is 
important to clarify the stance of the thesis on this matter.  
The debate around the permissibility or justifiability of vague laws has received 
significant attention mostly from Anglo-American realists since the first half of the 
last century.25 Representing this school of thought, H.L.A. Hart, an English legal 
positivist, argues that  
[w]hichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of 
standard of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of 
ordinary cases, will at some point where their application is in question, prove 
indeterminate. They will have what has been termed open texture. … Uncertainty 
                                                 
25 See Karl N. Llewellyn The bramble bush : on our law and its study (Oceana Publications, New 
York, 1951); Karl N. Llewellyn “Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound” 1931 
44(8) Harvard Law Review 1222. Felix Cohen “The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism” 1931 41(2) 
The Yale Law Journal Andrew  Dickinson “Third-Country Mandatory Rules in the Law Applicable 
to Contractual Obligations: So Long, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu?” 2007 3(1) Journal of 
Private International Law 53.  
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at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in 
any form of communication concerning matters of fact.26 
Going further, some argue in the favour of the benefits of vague law. 27 It is argued 
that there are some occasions when vague laws are needed; for example, when law 
makers intend to regulate “a diverse pattern of human conduct”28 in a general way 
(e.g. the offence of driving in dangerous manner).29 It is pointed out that the 
advantage of such a vague law is that it can be “interpreted reasonably when they 
are applied to situations and to types of problems that their authors did not foresee 
or could not have foreseen.”30 However, the argument of this kind does not deal 
with the question of how vague laws and the rule of law should interact.   
The formation of vague law is also regarded as a natural response to our current 
“social environment characterized by rapid economic, social and technological 
change”.31 Under this view, such a change in modern-late societies has resulted in 
“deep existential feelings of insecurity [in citizens], which are rooted in an unstable 
fluid, globalized capitalist world that glorifies a society of consumers presumed to 
be capable of endless reshaping and recreating their individual selves”.32 This 
condition of contemporary societies is argued to 
provoke uncontrollable anxieties emanating from the experience of uncertain 
future and insecure present. These feelings, because of their undetermined and 
uncontrollable nature, are easily transformed into more palpable and controllable 
fears, fears related to the safety of one’s own body, family, home and possessions.33  
                                                 
26 H. L. A. Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, London, 1972), at 128. 
27 See for example Adam  Gearey, Robert Jago and Wayne  Morrison The Politics of the Common 
Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes, Institutions (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008). Roscoe  Pound An 
introduction to the philosophy of law (Yale University Press, 1922). Ofer Raban “The Fallacy of 
Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism and Liberalism” 2010 
19(175) Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 175.  
28 Timothy Endicott “Vagueness and Law” in Geert Keil and Ralf Poscher (eds) Vagueness and 
Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2016), at 178. 
29 Land Transport (Enforcement Powers) Amendment Act 2009 (New Zealand), Article 12.3 
30  Brian Bix Law, language, and legal determinacy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), at 8. 
31 Mark Fenwick, Mathias Siems and Stefan Wrbka The Shifting Meaning of Legal Certainty in 
Comparative and Transnational Law (Hart Publishing, London, 2017), at 2. See also Hart, above n 
26, at 126. 
32 Michal Krolikowski and Erik Claes “The Limits of Legality in the Criminal Law” in Erik Claes, 





This has shaped a new pattern of thinking and reacting to threats, called a “culture 
of control”.34  A culture of control aims “to respond to and control risks that poses 
a threat to safety”.35  In other words,  
A ‘culture of control’ is not just a series of practices that try to respond to the 
insecurities of contemporary life, it is also a complex of collective strategies 
through which original, existential anxieties are “recycled into panic–arousing 
threats to safety” and are subsequently managed through a broad range of social 
and political habits.36 
It is concluded that the emergence of a culture of control has resulted in cutting off 
“many legislators from their sense of legality and its guarantee-providing role”.37 
The example of this is the proliferation of new criminal offences which criminalize 
preparatory conduct which may criminalize a risk of harm even in the absence of a 
link to an actual criminal conduct. Many of these offences expand the scope of 
criminal law beyond its traditional boundaries by relaxing “the requirement of 
precisely formulating” a criminal offence.38   
Admitting vagueness is a potential or intrinsic component of law, some seek to 
resolve the issue of vagueness and indeterminacy of laws during the process of their 
application. According to this view, vague laws remain vague until they are applied 
to an individual case in particular circumstances.39 Hart places a great emphasis on 
the role of legal “officials” (especially courts) in determining the meaning of a 
vague law.40 He argues that  
[t]he open texture of the law means that there are, indeed, areas of conduct which 
must be left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of 
                                                 
34 David Garland The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001). 
35 Krolikowski and Claes, above n 32, at 94.  
36 At 95. 
37 At 96. 
38 At. 
39 Wolff, above n 16, at 565. 
40 Hart, above n 26, at 125-126. Jeremy Waldron “Vagueness in Law and Language: Some 
Philosophical Issues” 1994 82(3) California Law Review 509. Andrew  Altman “Legal Realism, 
Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin” 1986 15(3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 205. Günter  
Frankenberg “Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and Reason” 1989 83(I & 2) Northwestern 
University Law Review 360. Ronald Dworkin A matter of principle (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass ; London, 1985).  
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circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from case to 
case.41   
However, Hart does not clarify how his theory of “open texture” corresponds with 
the rule of law requirements, specifically legal certainty.42      
There are others who seek to reconcile the rule of law and what they regard as law’s 
potential vagueness. For example, Neil MacCormick, who emphasizes what he calls 
the “dynamic aspect” of laws, argues that  
[t]here is a risk of misunderstanding the ‘Rule of Law’ as an ideal taken in isolation. 
Then, perhaps, we stress its more static aspects, centring on legal certainty and 
security of legal expectations. But it has a dynamic aspect as well, centring on 
rights of the defence, and the importance of letting everything that is arguable be 
argued. In this dynamic aspect, the arguable [or vague] character of law is no 
antithesis of the Rule of Law, but one of its components.43  
Similarly, Jürgen Habermas, associated with the Frankfurt School, admits that “all 
norms [laws] are inherently indeterminate”.44 He argues that in the application of 
(vague) laws, that “procedural rights guarantee each legal person the claim to a fair 
procedure that in turn guarantees not certainty of outcome but a discursive 
clarification of the pertinent facts and legal questions”.45 Nonetheless, these 
approaches towards reconciling vague laws and the rule of law are criticized for, in 
the case of MacCormick, failing to “explain what this exactly means for the rule-
of-law doctrine”,46 or for, in the case of Habermas, equating “procedural certainty 
and certainty vis-a-vis substantive law” which “stands in the centre of the traditional 
rule of law doctrine”.47 
                                                 
41 Hart, above n 26, at 135. 
42 Wolff, above n 16, at 556. 
43 Neil MacCormick Rhetoric and the rule of law : a theory of legal reasoning (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005), at 31. Similarly, Tamanaha argues that “when ambiguities and doubts exist in 
a given situation of rule application, they are resolved through reasoned analysis”. See Brian Z. 
Tamanaha On the rule of law : history, politics, theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
New York, 2004), at 88.  
44 Jürgen Habermas Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1966), at 217 
45 At 220. 
46 Wolff, above n 24, at 440. 
47 Wolff, above n 16, at 557. 
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For similar reasons, this thesis rejects any other arguments seeking to establish and 
justify a relationship between vagueness and the rule of law. In fact, a law cannot 
be made vaguely. Any vague law is inconsistent with the underlying values of the 
rule of law, especially those of legal certainty explained below. “Dismissing the 
notion of legal certainty would … affect the rule of law doctrine at its core and 
nobody has convincingly explained why and how this could be justifiable”.48   
Defining the minimum requirements of acceptable and genuine laws, Lon L. Fuller 
regards legal certainty as “one of the most essential ingredients of” the rule of 
law”,49 which embodies the “absolute supremacy of predominance of regular 
law”.50 Fuller argues that failing to comply with any of the underlying values of the 
rule of law, including legal certainty, “does not simply result in a bad system of 
law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all”.51   
Legal certainty requires law to comply with some legal values such as 
“predictability, learnability of law, fair notice, the dignity and efficiency of citizen 
self-direction under law, equality before the law, [and] freedom from official 
arbitrariness”.52 In other word, legal certainty requires: 
1- The conceptual content of a law be “specific and immediately intelligible”53; 
thus, “those subject to the law must know what the law is so that they can abide by 
it and plan their lives accordingly”.54 
                                                 
48 At 560. 
49 Lon L. Fuller The morality of law (Yale University Press, United States of America, 1964), at 63.  
50 Albert Venn Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th Revised edition 
ed, Liberty Fund Inc, 1982), at 202. 
51 Fuller, above n 49, at 39. 
52 Summers, above n 22, at 1216. 
53 At 1217. A US court, in United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008), at [1846], held 
that a law is vague and therefore void when it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously 
discriminatory enforcement”. 
54 James R. Maxeiner “Legal Certainty and Legal Methods: A European Alternative to American 
Legal Indeterminacy?” 2007 15(2) Tulane Journal of International and  Comparative Law 541, at 
549. See also Takis Tridimas The General Principles of EU Law (2 edition ed, Oxford University 
Press, 2006), at 242. 
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2- A law must be “factually realisable”55 in the sense that the facts on which it turns 
“are easily and readily determinable”.56 It should “exclude other substantive 
considerations that could operate at point of application”.57 
3- A law should not call upon citizens to make judgment on their own as to what 
law may forbid or permits. “Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far 
wider of the unlawful zone than [they would] if the boundaries of the forbidden 
areas were clearly marked.”58 
4- A law should accord citizens “the dignity and efficiency of self-direction without 
official intervention”;59 such official intervention “would diminish the dignity and 
efficiency of citizen self-direction under law”. The concept of legal certainty is 
strongly linked to the main notion of the liberal jurisprudence according to which 
people should be able to predict the consequences of their action and therefore 
maximize their freedom of choice. 
5- A law should promise equality before the law and still more freedom from 
official arbitrariness by reducing “the opportunities for officials to treat similar 
cases differently”.60           
Under such values, vague laws have no place in a rule of law-based legal system.  
In fact, a law which is not predictable, learnable, which does not give fair notice to 
citizens, or respect their dignity and efficiently of citizens self-directions, and which 
does not safeguard their equality before the law, and freedom from official 
arbitrariness is perhaps arguably void. 
This thesis similarly rejects the position of those who attempt to bypass the-rule-of-
law issue of vague laws by arguing that certain degrees of vagueness, or certain 
                                                 
55 Robert S. Summers The jurisprudence of law's form and substance (Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999). 
56 Summers, above n 22, at 1217. 
57At. 
58 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) at [109]. See also Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 
(1948), at [9].  
59 Summers, above n 22, at 1217. 
60 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).   
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degrees of certainty within vague law are permissible.61 As Lutz-Christian Wolff 
points out:  
[t]he reference to degrees of flexibility [or vagueness] is, however, misleading. 
This is because the relationship between legal certainty and flexibility is a mutually 
exclusive one. Either there is legal certainty or there is rule-inherent flexibility. It 
is logically impossible to allow both at the same time, as legal certainty will 
necessarily disappear with the introduction of the tiniest element of flexibility. 
Moreover, allowing degrees of flexibility would in practice require the 
quantification of those degrees of flexibility that are allowable. And such 
quantification would be practically impossible.62 It also follows that the often 
quoted tension between flexibility and legal certainty does simply not exist. In fact, 
it cannot exist. Legal rules are either flexible [vague] or they provide for legal 
certainty. Rule-inherent flexibility is nothing else but an oxymoron.63 
Wolff elsewhere argues that  
the requirement of legal certainty is absolute and does not allow bits of it to be 
sacrificed without giving up the concept altogether. In other words, legal certainty 
with some flexibility is not possible. It is either all or nothing.64  
Relying on the jurisprudential basis set out here, the thesis will test the penal 
measures on terrorist financing against the underlying values of the rule of law, 
especially those of legal certainty mentioned above. The discrepancies between 
these measures and the values of rule of law will be regarded as shortfalls of the 
counter-terrorist financing regime and consequently unjustifiable. 
                                                 
61 See for example, MO Chibundu “Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the 
Periphery” 1999 7(1) diana Journal of Global Legal Studies 79; Symeon C. Symeonides “The 
American Revolution and the European Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons” 2008 
82(5) Tulane Law Review 1741; Edoardo Vitta “The Impact in Europe of the American ‘Confl icts 
Revolution” 1982 30(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
62 Wolff, in another paper, revisits this point. He argues that “in order to achieve a balance between 
flexibility [vagueness] and legal certainty or to allow (only) certain degrees of flexibility it is 
necessary to identify those factors which determine if and when flexibility and legal certainty are 
balanced. In other words, it must be established which degrees of flexibility are allowable and why. 
This is an impossible task in practice and nobody has consequently ever been able to explain how 
degrees of flexibility can be quantified. See Wolff, above n 24, at 439.     
63 See also Kirby. Joseph Singer claims that liberal legal theory requires substantial determinacy to 
satisfy the requirements of the rule of law. 
64 Wolff, above n 24, at 439. 
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1.5 Literature review and contribution of the thesis 
Terrorist financing, adoption of effective measures to stop it and the implications 
that arises from the implementation of these measures have become increasingly 
attractive topics for many scholars of different fields. This research, nevertheless, 
will make reference to those legal studies whose focus is on the suppression of 
terrorist financing through criminal law.  
There are numerous works on the nature and characteristics of the phenomenon of 
terrorist financing and its nexus with other crimes.65 Also, there are detailed studies 
on the penal measures, introduced by the Terrorist Financing Convention, its 
diffusion and implementation.66 Many of these works provide an explanation of the 
nature of the regime, its measures and their importance in maintaining safety and 
security. However, not much research has been undertaken to examine the 
credibility of the notions that the regime is based on; nor are there many works 
examining the criminalization or confiscatory measures in terms of their nature, 
scope and their clarity.  
One of the few scholarly works which extensively details the creation, and 
substances of the offence of terrorist financing is conducted by Marja Lehto. She, 
in a chapter of her book titled indirect responsibility, seeks to decipher the meaning 
of the elements of the offence, introduced by the Convention, by making reference 
to the Rome Statute.67 Although she brilliantly identifies how the “heavy reliance” 
on the mental element of the terrorist financing offence extends the scope of the 
notion of criminal liability accepted by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, her research lacks specific discussion on what is the precise basis 
of criminality liability when there is vague, or no, connection between financing 
                                                 
65 See for example Jodi Vittori Terrorist Financing and Resourcing (Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, NY, 2011). Daniel Byman Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Rand, Santa 
Monica, CA, 2001). Bruce Hoffman Inside Terrorism (Rev. and expanded ed, Columbia University 
Press, New York, NY, 2006).  
66 See for example Jae-Myong Koh Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 
(Springer, Berlin, 2006). Or Neil Boister An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK, 2012), Chapter 6. Pierre-Laurent Chatain Preventing Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Practical Guide for Bank Supervisors (World Bank, 
Washington, DC, 2009). Roberto Durrieu Rethinking Money Laundering & Financing of Terrorism 
in International Law: Towards a New Global Legal Order (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2013). Ilias 
Bantekas “International Law of Terrorist Financing” 2003 97(2) American Journal of International 
Law 315. 
67 Lehto, above n 14, chapter 6. 
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and an actual terrorist act. There are other shorter research projects (in the format 
of journal articles) undertaken; 68 however, similar to Lehto’s research, they have 
missed the discussion on how the ambiguous, poorly-defined elements of the 
terrorist financing offence is perceived by states and implemented in their domestic 
law. They also did not identify the inconsistency of these measures with principles 
of criminal law, nor the human rights implications that arise from the 
implementation of the offence at national level; and they fail to examine the 
compatibility of these measures with the human rights and basic principles of 
criminalization.  
With regard to the confiscatory measures, no research, to the best knowledge of the 
author, has been undertaken. However, there has been extensive research on asset-
freezing regime created and developed by the UN Security Council.  
This project seeks to bring out a unique study that has a fresh angle on the topic. It 
seeks to examine the notions on which the penal measures are based, the elements 
of the offence of terrorist financing, their meaning, and their application in domestic 
laws. It also seeks to identify the inconsistencies of these measures with principles 
of criminal law and the human rights issues that arise from their implementation in 
domestic jurisdictions. Relying on the basic and accepted principles of 
criminalization, at the heart of the research is the investigation on why the 
imposition of these measures have gone so wrong.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of fourteen chapters, including chapter 1 (Introduction) and 
chapter 14 (Conclusion).  
The first three chapters are concerned with the background to the issue of terrorist 
financing. Chapter 2 explores the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing, 
terrorists’ and terrorist groups’ needs and the way their needs are met and their 
                                                 
68 See for example, Roberto Lavalle “The International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism” 2000 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
491. Anthony Aust “Counter-Terrorism - A New Approach; The International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” 2001 5 Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 
285. Mark Pieth “Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism” 2006 4(5) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 1074.  
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activities are funded. The exploration in this chapter of how terrorists meet these 
needs provides a footing for the examination, in the rest of the thesis, of the 
credibility and reliability of the concept that underpins the expansive approach and 
broad legal measures taken to counter terrorist financing, with a very tenuous link 
to actual acts of terrorism. 
Chapter 3 examines in detail the background of the Terrorist Financing Convention, 
the ideas on which the Convention was drafted and the nature of the negotiation 
discussions which led to its adoption. This entails an examination of how the 
drafters of the Convention encountered two main challenges: first, how to define 
terrorism, terrorist acts, terrorist purposes and terrorist groups, the financing of 
which would be criminalized; second, the precise scope of the offence, in particular, 
how to define the preparatory acts of financing as an independent offence. Chapter 
4 examines the FATF’s recommendation that terrorist financing should be 
criminalized as a predicate offence of money laundering. The FATF is of the 
opinion that due to the link and nexus between terrorism and organized crime, 
terrorist financing can be adequately targeted under already existing measures (anti-
money laundering measures) established to prevent the financial aspect of 
(organized) criminal activities. This chapter will assess whether it is reasonable to 
legislate to prevent terrorist financing on the basis of analogies with money 
laundering.69  
The four chapters that make up the central part of the thesis scrutinize the elements 
of the introduced offence in great detail, engaging in a critique of its foundational 
elements. Chapter 5 examines the definition of terrorism, terrorist and terrorist 
group. The main question it confronts is whether the counter-terrorism financing 
regime provides a solid platform for a better understanding of what is terrorism, a 
terrorist act or a terrorist group financing of which is the subject matter. Chapter 6 
will explore the actus reus of the offence, which consists of the collection and 
provision of funds. It will examine a very important question: when there is no 
connection between acts of financing or funds and an actual (or planned) terrorist 
                                                 
69 This question has been also examined by Armand Kersten from a “methodological” perspective. 
See Armand Kersten “Financing of Terrorism - A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering?” in 
Mark Pieth (ed) Financing Terrorism (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002) 49-56. 
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act, whether, and if at all, and how, the actus reus of the offence should be 
interpreted in order for its criminalization to be justified.  
Chapters 7 and 8 illustrate the key role of the mental element of the offence of 
financing terrorist acts defined by the Convention, FATF and the UN Security 
Council in imposing liability. They will discuss that the heavy reliance on poorly-
defined and ambiguous fault elements (knowledge and intention) without linking to 
any (planned) terrorist act undermines the case for principled criminalization. 
Chapter 9 discusses the important question of how such criminalization has gone 
wrong. It examines the justifiability of the terrorist financing offence with regard to 
the principles and values that liberal criminal law is based on. The values of liberal 
criminal law are used as a yardstick because, as explained, the idea of 
criminalization of terrorist financing was proposed and developed mainly by 
Western liberal States. The diffusion of these criminalization measures has been 
overwhelmingly supported by those states or by the inter-governmental or 
international organizations backed by those states. It is apt, therefore to engage in a 
normative analysis of this offence against the values said to underpin liberal 
criminal law. For purposes of convenience, the chapter limits the scope of 
discussion of the issue to the context of Anglo-American criminal law.  
The rest of the thesis examines the freezing and confiscation of the gathered funds, 
specific measures adopted by parties as a result of obligations in the Terrorist 
Financing Convention, the effective implementation of which depends on the way 
in which the offence is defined, the subject of preceding chapters. The UN Security 
Council has also adopted a number of resolutions which deal with freezing terrorist 
funds. The underlying question is how, in the presence of so many ambiguities in 
the definition of the terrorist financing offence, how are funds or property 
determined as terrorist funds, for the purpose of the application of these measures.  
In order to understand the complexity and function of modern forfeiture law, special 
attention needs to be devoted to the history of English law which has had a 
significant influence on the existing (now being globalized) laws on confiscation. 
For this reason, chapter 10 looks briefly at the historical concepts on which modern 
forfeiture law are based. It argues that the basis of current forfeiture laws is 
unfortunate reconstruction of some long abolished ancient concepts. Chapters 11 
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and 12 will discuss the human rights issues that arise from the adoption and 
implementation of seizure and confiscation provisions in the context of the 
European Union (EU). The EU and some of its Member States’ approach towards 
seizure and confiscation of terrorist funds is used as a case study because the EU, 
as a value-based or human rights-based community, appears to have a strong 
commitment to fight against terrorism while maintaining fundamental principles, 
such as respect for the rule of law, good governance, fundamental freedoms and 
promoting human rights and democratic values. In addition, many of the EU’s 
Member States have supported and are still supporting the creation and diffusion of 
the counter-terrorist financing regime.  
Chapter 13 will examine the response of another regional community to the terrorist 
financing measures, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
It does not examine why ASEAN or its Member States adopted and implemented 
the measures in a certain way, nor does it analyse the political or legal factors that 
shape their response to the measures. The main purpose in this chapter is to 
investigate and identify the possible problems that may arise from the application 
of the counter-terrorist financing measures introduced by the Convention, and 
diffused by FATF and its Western states’ supporters in a non-Western environment.  
Finally, chapter 14, the Conclusion, sums up the key findings of the thesis and the 
foundation for the thesis’s hypothesis that the approach to criminalizing terrorist 
financing and confiscating terrorist funds irrespective of whether they are 
connected to any actual terrorist act is not only a deviation from principles of 
criminal law but also results in the violation of human rights and the miscarriage of 
justice.   
1.7 Methodology  
This thesis is a critical conceptual analysis of international and domestic laws on 
the criminalization of terrorist financing and confiscation and seizure of terrorist 
funds. It belongs to the category of doctrinal research as it is involved in identifying 
and analysing facts about terrorist financing (chapters 2 and 4), clarifying the law 
on terrorist financing (chapters 3 and 10), and determining human rights issues 
arising from its implementation (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13). This is 
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carried out “by a distinctive mode of analysis to authoritative texts that consist of 
primary and secondary sources”,70 and by understanding of rules and principles 
governing criminal liability, and by adopting “reasoning methods borrowing from 
philosophy and logic”.71 The thesis also engages in the interpretation of 
international law and recommendations on terrorist financing. This interpretation 
is, of course, limited by the rules of interpretation provided by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Article 31 of this convention states that a 
“treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose”. The thesis heavily relies on the supplementary means of the 
interpretation indicated by Article 32 the Vienna Convention;72 in particular, the 
thesis reviews the preparatory work of, and negotiations and discussion made by 
the State Parties on, the drafts of the Terrorist Financing Convention in order to 
determine the meaning of provisions at issue.  
In addition, to show how the counter-terrorist financing regime has been diffused, 
the thesis examines states’ and regional parties’ subsequent practice when 
implementing the Convention particularly through the FATF and the Security 
Council as an interpretive tool. It specifically examines the approach of two 
influential regional communities, namely EU and ASEAN, to the adoption and 
implementation of the counter-terrorist financing measures (Chapters 10,11,12,13). 
As mentioned, the EU has been chosen because it is a value-based community 
which has a significant emphasis on the human rights and democratic values not 
only within the Europe but also in its dialogue with other states or regional 
communities. ASEAN has been chosen because its members are often accused of 
being authoritarian and not being in compliance with the human rights.   
                                                 
70 Michael McConville and Wing Hong Chui Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University 
Press, Edinburgh, 2007), at 4. 
71 Terry Hutchinson “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming 
the Law” 2015 8(3) Erasmus Law Review 130, at 131. 
72 Article 32 requires “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to 
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Finally, the thesis also relies on the scholarly literature in interpreting the counter-
terrorist financing measures and particularly the discussions on the conceptual 
underpinnings of criminalization of the terrorist financing as an independent 
offence. It examines the justifiability of these underpinnings with regard to the 
principles of liberal criminal law as recognised in Anglo-American states (chapter 
9). It relies on the principles and values of liberal criminal law as a yardstick 
because the criminalization of terrorist financing was proposed and developed 
mainly by Western liberal States and are being diffused by the inter-governmental 
or international organizations backed up by them. It is apt, therefore, to engage in a 
normative analysis of this offence against the values said to underpin Anglo-
American criminal law. 
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Chapter Two: What is terrorist financing?  
2.1 Introduction 
Before examining the legal tools adopted to counter terrorist financing, it is 
essential to understand, from a factual perspective, the nature and characteristics of 
terrorist financing as a transnational phenomenon. First, the process of terrorist 
financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of terrorists and 
terrorist groups, the sources of funds, and the methods and tools that terrorists use 
to raise, move and store their funds. Part 3 will address terrorism typologies on the 
basis of the strategies that terrorists apply to finance their activities. This chapter 
will not discuss the legal definition of terrorist financing, terrorism, terrorist acts or 
terrorist groups. 
The discussions provided in this chapter will help to examine, in the following 
chapters, the credibility and reliability of the idea that underpins the approach and 
legal measures taken to counter terrorist financing, which does not require a link to 
the preparation or commission of specific acts of terrorism. As will be pointed out 
in chapter 3, a distinctive effort has been made by the international community to 
push this idea, although it is the submission of the thesis that it is fundamentally 
flawed partly because of ignorance of basic facts about the nature and 
characteristics of terrorist financing. 
2.2 The financial needs of terrorists and terrorist groups 
The first step in identifying the flow of funds to what is regarded as terrorists is to 
understand the funding requirements of terrorists.73 Terrorists’ requirements can be 
explained with regard to their activities or the nature of their needs.  
In terms of terrorist activities, terrorists’ financial needs can be divided into two 
categories. Terrorists need “operational resources” associated with conducting 
specific terrorist attacks; these include the costs of attacks, the salaries of individual 
operatives, communications, training, travel and logistics. Terrorists, in the case of 
a large group, also require resources for their “broad organizational requirements” 
                                                 
73 Financial Action Task Force “Terrorist Financing” (29 February 2008) <http://www.fatf-
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to create, maintain and develop a terrorism infrastructure.74 Evidence shows that 
while the current operational costs of terrorist attacks are often very low relative to 
the damage they cause,75 organizational costs are significantly higher.    
Regarding the nature of funding requirements, terrorists’ resources are classified 
into three categories: money and financial instruments, tangible and intangible 
resources.76 “Money” and other negotiable and financial instruments are the most 
important resources required by terrorists.77 Terrorists needs money “to buy 
weapons, bribe local officials, pay operatives, write propaganda, provide a social 
network that builds a popular base and otherwise fill a myriad of purposes”.78 It is 
also a convenient means of storing wealth.    
Tangible resources are also needed by terrorists.  At the very least, terrorists need 
four types of tangible goods to carry out their operations.79 “Life’s necessities” 
including food, accommodation, clothing, travel cost and so on are the basic needs 
of members of terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups also need human resources: 
members and “personnel” to carry out their activities. In addition, terrorists need to 
have an effective communication system such as access to media, internet, cell 
phones and so on to communicate with each other, disseminate their information, 
justify and advertise their ideology and send their messages to their victims.80 
Tangible goods also include “operational resources”, which are required to commit 
violence.81 They range from simple knives to very high-tech weapons, depending 
on the complexity of the terrorist operations and groups.     
Terrorists also require “intangible instruments”.82 “Operational space” or sanctuary 
is the time and space needed to plan, train for, and execute terrorist attacks.83 A 
sanctuary can be a small house at the centre of a big city or a big camp or farm far 
from any prying eyes. “Operational security” resources are also needed to enable 
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terrorists to keep security forces from discovering their location, plans and the 
people involved in terrorist activities.84 Furthermore, terrorists need “intelligence” 
to plan how, where and when they execute their terrorist activities. How much 
information is needed depends on the scope and complexity of operations.85 
Terrorist groups also need “publicity” to promote their ideology, to justify their 
violent actions and to encourage people to join them.86 Without effective 
“leadership”, all of the resources might be useless; so, “command and control” 
mechanisms are needed to help terrorists to plan, coordinate and execute their 
attacks.87 In essence then, it is obvious that terrorists do require different forms of 
support to carry out terrorist acts.  
2.3 The sources of terrorist financing 
Terrorists meet their funding needs in different ways, depending on the type and 
purposes of groups, the inherent capabilities of groups, the “opportunities at hand” 
and the types of resources needed.88 Also, terrorists can be self-financing or 
sponsored by states or private actors, individuals, companies and organizations.89 
In either situation, funds can be derived from legal or illegal sources, or both.   
2.3.1 Illegal sources 
It is believed that because of the dramatic decrease of state-sponsored terrorism, 
terrorists have turned to alternative sources of funding, including criminal activities 
such as arms trafficking, extortion, credit card fraud, smuggling, robbery, cheque 
fraud, racketeering, kidnap-for-ransom and most importantly, drug trafficking or 
the sale of oil and gas.90  
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Drug trafficking is the most important and attractive source of funds for large 
terrorist groups.91 This phenomenon, called “narcoterrorism”, involves terrorist 
groups cultivating, refining and distributing narcotics across the world.92 This trend 
has been apparent since the 1990s. It usually takes place in countries where such 
groups control territories.93 Evidence shows that, for example, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia, the Peruvian Shining Path, Taliban, Al-Qaida and 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan all used drug trafficking as an important source 
of terrorist funding.94 The United Nations Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions 
Monitoring Team’s assessments reported that, out of the total 2011-2012 budget of 
the Taliban of USD 400 million, “one third was raised from the poppy trade”.95 
Also, a 2007 United Nations report declared that the total value of the export of 
drugs from Afghanistan stood at around 4 billion USD divided up among 
insurgents, warlords and drug traffickers.96 Opium production in Afghanistan has 
been rising in the last few years.97 Although it is not clear how much those groups 
such as Taliban designated as terrorist groups “profit from the drug trade, but 
whether they do isn’t up for serious debate”.98   
2.3.2 Legal sources 
Terrorism may be financed with considerable support and funding from and through 
legal sources, including donations and investment in legitimate businesses.  
2.3.2.1 Donations and the role of non-profit organizations   
Donations, which may come from individual donors or from charitable 
organizations, are a common means of terrorist funding.99 An individual donor can 
be a wealthy person who directly donates huge sums of money to a terrorist group. 
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A very famous example of a wealthy donor is Osama Bin Laden, who spent his 
estimated 20-30 million USD inheritance on funding Al-Qaeda. Also, it is claimed 
that Shad Sunders, a rich Tamil living in California, donated 4 million USD to the 
Tamil Tigers.100  
Donations can be also solicited from those who donate as part of their religious 
obligations such as Islamic “Zakat”. Zakat is 2.5 percent of one’s accumulated 
wealth, which is an example of donation. It might be collected by some Islamic 
charity organizations that are in contact with terrorism.101 Donations may be raised 
by diasporas who seek self-determination. Tamil diaspora was a noteworthy 
example of “as a people with common national origins who lives outside a clamed 
or an independent country”.102 Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas across the world provide 
and transfer considerable amount of money and materials to the Tamils people in 
Sri Lanka. It was high likely that while it existed, some part of the funds provided 
went to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam group, designated by some states such 
as the United States, the United Kingdom and EU as a terrorist group, which fought 
for Tamil self-determination against the Sri Lankan Government.       
Donations are usually collected through non-profit organizations such as charities. 
Enjoying public trust, having a global presence that provides a framework to 
operate internationally and being subject to lighter regulatory requirements than 
other financial institution are characteristics of these organizations which make 
them attractive to terrorists.103  
Charities can be abused in different ways. Terrorists may take over an entire charity 
and use it as a front organisation. In such a case, called a “sham charity”, terrorists 
use the charity as a vehicle to perpetrate fraud against donors in order to raise and 
disguise funds for terrorism.104 Terrorists may also infiltrate an established charity 
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by taking over some branches of a large charity and diverting some portion of the 
donations collected for humanitarian purposes to terrorists. For instance, in 2003, 
the Chief Executive Officer of the Benevolence International Foundation, an 
Illinois-based charity in the US, was convicted of diverting of US $ 315,000 of 
charitable donations to terrorist groups.105   
Non-governmental organizations can also provide facilities for terrorists, such as a 
“shipping address[es], housing, employment, identity cards, [or] a recognized 
reason to be at a particular location”.106 For example, Al-Qaeda members confessed 
that they received identification cards from the Kenya-based Mercy International 
Relief Organisation as they plotted the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi.107   
The role of non-profit organizations, companies and “sympathetic financial 
institutions” in transferring funds or logistical resources to terrorists is also 
considered important.  For example, those entities can use their bank accounts to 
collect funds or to transfer those funds to any destination required.108            
2.3.3 Investment in legitimate business  
Legitimate businesses are a complex and “versatile tool” for the financing of 
terrorism.109 In its simplest form, terrorists can establish a local business and use its 
income for their purposes. They can also invest in stocks, bonds, real estate, 
construction companies, honey shops, tanneries, banks, agricultural commodity 
growers and brokers, trade businesses, bakeries, restaurants, and bookstores … 
indeed in any business, local or international, open to such investment. Evidence 
shows that large terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have invested in the past in various 
businesses such as wood and paper industries in Norway, hospital equipment in 
Sweden, real estate in London, and newspaper ink and honey in Middle East.110  
Like non-profit organisations, such businesses and front companies can provide 
other facilities such as access to bank accounts and postal addresses. Furthermore, 
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the right sort of business can provide cover for the purchase and acquisition of 
explosives and chemicals needed for terrorist attacks.111 
Terrorism, in some cases, can also be financed by small amounts of funds, involving 
family or other non-criminal sources.112 The amount of money to launch small 
attacks can be acquired by individual terrorists or their supporters “using savings, 
access to credit or the proceeds of businesses under their control”.113 An example 
of such financing is the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London transport system. The 
official report in this regard stated that “there is no evidence of external sources of 
income. Our best estimates are that the overall cost is less than GBP 8000. The 
bombs were homemade, that the ingredients used were all readily commercially 
available and not particularly expensive”.114 
To sum up, it should be noted that there is no accurate data or evidence as to whether 
terrorists rely more on one of these sources than another.115 Resort to any of these 
sources depends on the type, size and purposes of groups, the opportunities at hand 
and the types of resources needed. For example, Al-Qaeda has at least five financial 
resources: investments and inheritances of Osama Bin Laden, funding from wealthy 
Arab supporters, contribution through charities, income from investments in legal 
businesses and criminal activities.116 Table I categorizes the sources of terrorist 
financing, mentioned above, in regard to their origin.  
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                         Table I: The lawful and unlawful financial sources of terrorists. 
 
2.4 Methods and means of moving and storing terrorist funds   
The literature on terrorist financing highlights the great “adaptability and 
opportunism” that terrorists or their supporters exploit to move and store their 
funds.117 In general, there are three main known methods by which terrorist funds 
are moved: formal and informal financial systems, physical movement of funds and 
value, and the international trade system.118    
2.4.1 Financial System 
The formal financial system is an attractive channel for the financing of terrorism 
because of the provision of services and products by which terrorists can move their 
funds, and the “speed and ease” with which funds can be transferred “efficiently 
and effectively between and within jurisdictions”.119 Money and value operations 
through formal financial systems enable terrorist financers or terrorists to make an 
amount of money available to terrorists at another financial institution. The 9/11 
Commission Report made clear that “wire or bank to bank transfers” were one of 
the main tools that Al-Qaeda used to fund the hijackers in the US.120      
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 Formal financial institutions can also provide cover for terrorists to conduct 
transactions or conceal the origin of their funds. In the case of Al-Qaeda, it was 
discovered that Osama Bin Laden, while he lived in Sudan, opened different 
accounts under fake names in different countries, which guaranteed his privacy.121     
In addition to formal financial systems, informal value transfer systems (IVTS) are 
deployed for financing terrorism.  An informal method of money and value transfers 
refers to a trust-based mechanism through which money is ensured to be transferred 
to another geographic location by “using a series of informal, and often unlicensed, 
money exchanges”.122 In this mechanism, there may be no actual movement of 
cash; instead, value is transferred between two locations. Such financial 
arrangements, which are very well known in South Asia, the Middle East and parts 
of Africa, are known by different names: for example  hundi in India, fei chi’ien in 
China, phoe kuah in Thailand and hawala in Muslim countries.123 Hawala for 
example operates as follows:  
1- [The] Originator gives currency to the Hawaladar [the agent] in Country A. 
2. The Hawaladar in Country A provides the Originator with a payment code. 
3. The Hawaladar in Country A notifies his counterpart in Country B by phone, fax 
or email of the transaction amount to pay the beneficiary, as well as the payment 
code. 
4. The Originator contacts the beneficiary (in Country B) and provides the payment 
code to him/her. 
5. The beneficiary goes to the Hawaladar in Country B, gives [them] the payment 
code and picks up the specified [amount] sent.124 
Informal methods are attractive to criminals, including terrorists, for their 
convenience, level of anonymity and rapidity.125 Also, it is a reliable means to 
transfer money especially in countries with poor, corrupt or nonexistent banking 
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systems.126 Furthermore, such systems are subject to generally less strict regulatory 
control. It is reported that Hamas, the Jemaah Islamiya organization, and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, as designated terrorist groups, either received or 
continue to receive funds through hawala.127  
2.4.2 Physical movement of funds 
Terrorists may also use the traditional money laundering method of smuggling cash. 
Cash smuggling is attractive because smuggled money is completely fungible, 
anonymous, and more importantly, easy to convert into any other resources needed. 
Cases highlight that smuggled money can be transported either to where terrorist 
operations are to take place, or to where the cash can be deposited into financial 
systems with less risk.128 
Due to some of the disadvantages of cash smuggling, such as difficulties in 
concealing large quantities of cash or the danger of being detected or having the 
cash stolen, terrorists and their supporters may use precious metals and stones such 
as gold and diamonds, antiques or any other expensive items to move and store 
terrorist funds. While maintaining their value and liquidity, they are easy to conceal 
and untraceable.129 These items can be converted into cash whenever needed. Al-
Qaeda and Hezbollah are believed to have been active in this field.130 Also, it has 
been reported that donations to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from Saudi wealthy 
donors were made in gold.131  
2.4.3 Trade system 
The international trade system provides an opportunity for perpetrators to transfer 
value and goods through legitimate trade flows. This is the area in which enormous 
wealth can cross borders without raising suspicion “as the paperwork and shipments 
may look completely legitimate to outside inspection”.132 Over- and under-
invoicing practices133 are commonly used by launderers to transfer value across 
                                                 
126 Vittori, above n 65, at 46. 
127 Passas, above n 88, at 29. 
128 Kiser, above n 100, at 91. 
129 Koh, above n 66, at 30. 
130 Douglas Farah Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (1st ed. ed, Broadway 
Books, New York, NY, 2004), at 23, 47 and 55.   
131 Douglas Farah “The Use of Gold, Diamonds and Other Commodities in Terrorist Finances” 
(March 18, 2004) <http://www.douglasfarah.com/presentations/use-of-gold.php>. 
132 Passas, above n 88, at 31. 
133 Financial Action Task Force Trade Based Money Laundering (Paris, 2006), at 4. 
33 
 
borders. It is possible, although it has not been confirmed,134 that terrorists or their 
supporters also use such methods to finance terrorism. For example, by selling and 
shipping a commodity at a lower rate than the actual value, a seller, as a terrorist 
financer, can provide funds for the buyer who sells the products at a higher price 
and keeps the difference for terrorist purposes.135   
2.5 Financing of terrorism and terrorism typologies 
There are many different categories of terrorism. These categorises help to 
differentiate terrorist groups according to specific criteria related to a specific 
field.136 On the basis of the strategies that terrorists use to finance their activities, 
terrorism can be divided into seven groups: state sponsored, state sponsoring, shell 
state, franchise, bundled support, transnational corporation, and lone wolf.137  
A state-sponsored group receives substantial supports from a state which seeks 
particular political or ideological objectives. The state may find numerous ways to 
support terrorists such as supplying them with false documentation and passports, 
allowing them to travel safely within the nation or to other countries, and providing 
them with sanctuary and weapons.138 The autonomy of groups in this category 
depends on how integrated they are into a particular state’s command and control 
structures.139 Terrorists may usefully receive support from states as long as that aid 
does not disturb their independence to pursue their own agendas. However, state 
sponsors may place requirements on groups for receipt of support in order to guide 
them in a specific direction. In such a case, in what are called “state-directed 
groups”,140 the groups exist as long as they are worthwhile for the sponsor states.   
A state sponsoring terrorist group is one that is capable of providing facilities for a 
state sponsor in return for receiving support from that state.141 For example, the 
government of Sudan let Al-Qaeda have training camps in Sudan in exchange for 
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money and building infrastructure.142 It is believed that terrorist-sponsoring groups 
have to have achieved a high level of capability to attract state sponsor attention.143  
In the case of “shell states”,144 terrorists take control of a geographical area and 
exploit it for sanctuary and their needs.145 An area can be as small as a few 
neighbourhoods or as large as a huge area in a country. The example of this type of 
terrorism is narcoterrorism, explained above. The Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant were other examples, which met their financial needs largely through 
“proceeds from occupation of territory, such as bank looting, extortion, control of 
oil fields and refineries, and robbery of economic assets and illicit taxation of goods 
and cash that transit” and so on.146   
In the franchise category, terrorist groups receive a large percentage of their support 
from one source, but their resources are diversified enough to remain 
independent.147 In this case, if sponsors stop supporting them, although terrorist 
groups may weaken, they do not face extinction. For example, it is claimed that 
Hamas and Hezbollah are franchisees of Iran, from whom they receive much of 
their support,148 but they also maintain their own network of charities, front 
companies and criminal networks to sustain their activities.149   
In the “bundled support” category, terrorists do not rely on one or few sponsors; 
instead, they receive a number of tangible and intangible resources from numerous 
non-state contributors.150 The phenomenon of diaspora support, in which terrorists 
receive support from dispersed donors of the same ethnicity or nationality, is the 
prominent example of this category. Many small contributions from different 
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contributors give terrorist groups more autonomy than a state sponsored terrorist 
group. However, they receive support only so long as their actions satisfy their 
supporters.151   
In the transnational corporation model, extensively used to describe Al-Qaeda, 
terrorist groups act on a global scale without any specific national identification. 
These groups, utilizing globalization,152 are highly sophisticated and complex in 
resourcing, membership and geographical operations.153 Groups within this model 
are experts at using formal and informal financial systems, front companies, 
charities, money laundering and other criminal activities. They also have a high 
level of autonomy as they have access to various financial resources.        
Lone wolf terrorism is carried out by terrorism groups (or individuals) which are 
not essentially involved in collective, organized activities.154 Lone wolf terrorist 
groups are individuals or small groups which are identifiable by a particular 
ideology or grievance, and which carry out actions in support of their radical 
beliefs.155  Unlike other types, lone wolf terrorist groups are small in size with few 
financial requirements, and limited capabilities. They are self-contained, free to 
choose their targets and tactics. Terrorism in this form is very cheap; but the impact 
can be significant. It is claimed that there is a considerable trend indicating the 
increasing frequency of lone wolf attacks by individuals with little or no 
connections to formal organizations.156 Terrorist attacks in Germany in March 
2011157, in France in March 2012 and April 2017,158 in Norway in July 2012,159 and 
England in May 2017 are recent examples of lone wolf terrorism.    
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This chapter has explored the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing. 
Terrorist financing can most narrowly be interpreted to mean financing planned, 
attempted or completed terrorist acts. In a broader sense, the terms financing 
terrorism, or financing terrorists or terrorist groups can be used to include any 
activities carried out to finance the activities of these individuals or groups. Action 
to finance these activities can include raising, moving and restoring funds allocated 
to carry out these activities.  
Techniques and methods to raise, move and restore funds are also not necessarily 
carried out through illegal activities; In other words, terrorists and their activities 
can be funded by any means, legal or illegal, and by anyone, terrorists or non-
perpetrators. Due to these particular nature and characteristics, it seems that the 
terroristic criminality of these financing activities can be only derived from their 
connection with terrorism or terrorist acts. Obviously, these features of terrorist 
financing should be taken into account in the adoption and implementation of any 
counter-terrorist financing measures. In the rest of the thesis, I seek to examine how 
the international community has responded to terrorist financing and whether its 




Chapter Three: History of criminalisation of terrorist financing 
3.1 Introduction:  A brief history of efforts to adopt a convention on terrorist 
financing 
It is difficult to determine precisely when and how the idea developed that 
countering terrorist financing could play a central role in the fight against 
terrorism.160 Prior to the adoption of Terrorist Financing Convention, some Western 
states had adopted laws that deal with terrorist financing in a similar manner that 
Terrorist Financing Convention does. For example, in the US, the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 prohibits “provision of material support 
or resources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of 
material support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out” specified offences regarded as terrorist 
activities.161  
Internationally, the idea of expanding the scope of criminalisation to include 
terrorist-related activities seems to be around in 1994 when the UN General 
Assembly encouraged State Members to “to review urgently the scope of the 
existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination 
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there 
is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter”.162 It 
appears that the idea of countering terrorist financing through the adoption of 
international measures originated in the G7 (now G8), which decided to take a 
leading role against terrorism. In 1995, its members declared that “we are 
determined as a group to continue to provide leadership on this issue to the 
international community, using bilateral and multilateral measures and agreements 
to counter terrorism”, and it seems that the first call for the adoption of measures to 
counter terrorist financing was officially issued at that meeting in Ottawa where it 
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was agreed “to pursue measures aimed at depriving terrorists of their sources of 
finance”.163 
Following the G8’s statement of its interest in depriving terrorism of funding, in 
December 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 51/210, 
establishing an ad hoc committee to “address means of further developing a 
comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international 
terrorism”.164 Using identical wording to that used in the G7/8 Agreement on 25 
Measures for Combating Terrorism made at its meeting in Paris in July 1996, the 
General Assembly Resolution, also, called on all States to take steps to counteract 
terrorist financing by taking  
steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the 
financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct 
or indirect through organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, 
social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in unlawful activities such as 
illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing and racketeering.165   
The Resolution additionally emphasized the prevention of  
the exploitation of persons for purposes of funding terrorist activities, and in 
particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to prevent 
and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist purposes 
without impeding in any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to 
intensify the exchange of information concerning international movements of such 
funds.166 
In the autumn of 1998, a draft of a convention on the suppression of the financing 
of terrorism,167 a French initiative at a G8 summit,168 was proposed to the United 
Nations. At the request of the UN General Assembly,169 that draft was considered 
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at a meeting of an ad hoc committee170 and then a Working Group of the Sixth 
Committee.171 After an evaluation and some amendments to the proposed 
convention (the content and origins of which will be discussed in following 
chapters), the Sixth Committee recommended that the General Assembly adopt the 
proposed convention.172 On 9 December 1999, the Terrorist Financing Convention 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly and regarded as a significant 
contribution to the fight against terrorism.173 The purpose of the Convention is set 
out in its preamble where it notes that “the financing of the terrorism is a matter of 
grave concern to the international community” and the international community is 
“convinced of the need to enhance international cooperation among States in 
devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of 
terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of 
its perpetrators”.  
In general, the Convention followed the structure and standard provisions of the 
UN’s previous counter-terrorism conventions particularly the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (hereinafter the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention).174 The notable example of this structural similarity is Article 
3 of the Terrorist Financing Convention, which limits its application to the cases 
involved with a transnational element.175 The Convention is also inapplicable to a 
situation involving armed conflict, except for a situation when a terrorist attack is 
carried out against a civilian, or against any other person not taking an active part 
in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict.176 Similar to the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention, Article 20 of the Convention emphasizes that it must be applied “in a 
manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity 
of States, and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States”, while 
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Article 22 reaffirmed the exclusivity of the territorial jurisdiction of the State 
Parties.177   
The Convention provided a list of measures directed at terrorist financing, many of 
which were drawn from the 40 anti-money laundering recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter the FATF178).179 It is not surprising that 
the United Nations, under the influence of G7/8 which conceived of the idea of 
counter-terrorist financing, adopted such an approach. From early in the 1990s, 
G7/8 had continuously emphasised the possible link between terrorism and 
organized crime, particularly drug trafficking.180  
However, the drafters needed to define the offence of terrorist financing in such a 
way that could be justifiable to, and implementable by, prospective State Parties. 
This chapter will present the arguments that arose during the negotiation on draft 
of the convention; it will give some examples of how states have been implementing 
it. It seems that unlike the wording of the Convention and the insistence of the 
FATF, which focuses on the promotion and development of policies aimed at 
countering money laundering and terrorist financing, some countries have resisted 
adopting the offence as an independent offence, probably because it is not 
compatible with their criminalization principles.   
3.2 Negotiations on the structure of the offence of terrorist financing 
Although the draft Convention was proposed with the intention of addressing 
terrorist financing independently, some doubted as to whether and, if so, how an 
ancillary act of financing could become the crime of terrorist financing. Three 
approaches were proposed and discussed during the negotiations on the draft 
convention: 1) to treat terrorist financing as an ancillary form of participation in the 
offence of terrorism, 2) to criminalize only the acts of financing of terrorist groups, 
3) and to consider terrorist financing as an independent crime. While the drafters 
adopted the third approach, other approaches have been favoured when the 
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Convention has been applied at national levels. These three approaches will be 
discussed in this part. 
3.2.1 Terrorist financing as an ancillary offence 
During the first and second reading of the draft Convention, reservations were 
expressed as to whether it was necessary to separately and independently 
criminalize terrorist financing. It was argued that having an ancillary nature, the 
financing of any of the existing offences defined by the previous counter-terrorism 
conventions called ‘sectoral conventions’181 would constitute participation or 
complicity in that offence, and the provisions on accomplices in the sectoral 
conventions were enough to cover such financing.182 The aim of the sectoral 
conventions is to target specific threats, such as hostage taking or hijacking, 
implicitly regarded ‘terrorist’, without attempting to define or even apply the term 
terrorism.  Using the traditional principles of criminal law, these treaties consist of 
a set of provisions defining the scope and elements of these offences by referencing 
specific types of acts (e.g. hostage taking or hijacking). In other words, creation of 
an independent offence of terrorist financing was argued to be unnecessary because 
of general provision for complicity in criminal law could serve the same purpose of 
providing a means to repress actions of helping in the commission of a terrorism 
offence by financing it.  
This reservation was not taken into account by the drafters of the Convention. 
However, similar reasons have been given by some jurisdictions to refuse to 
establish an independent offence of terrorist financing. Aruba, for example, 
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expressed the view that “several parts of the terrorist financing offences” as required 
by the Convention could be covered by the various existing provisions on 
accomplices in Aruba law.183 In addition, it was argued that a separate and 
independent offence might overlap with some of existing crimes under its law. 
Aruba has since amended its law to satisfy the FATF’s requirements and introduced 
a new independent offence of terrorist financing.184  However, it is not clear how 
Aruba addresses the overlap issue (a separate and independent offence might 
overlap with some of existing crimes under its law).  
A slightly different objection related to the use of general principles of inchoate 
criminality to serve the same function of reaching terrorist financiers. In some 
jurisdictions, terrorist financing may be considered as coming close to the notion of 
an inchoate crime in the sense that its criminality is not dependent on the completion 
of a subsequent offence. Unlike the law of complicity which targets conduct which 
helped, in some way, the principal to commit a crime, the law of inchoate crime 
aims at reaching earlier acts, in the sequence of events, which do not necessarily 
have an effect on the actual crime of terrorism. In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
financing of a terrorist act used to be prosecuted as “preparation of an offence” 
under Article 46 of the Dutch Penal Code.185 The Dutch Supreme Court in a ruling 
defined ‘preparation’ as “an incomplete form of a criminal offence”. Widening the 
scope of the law on attempt, the court also ruled that “punishable preparation is 
further away from the completed offence than attempt … but involves acts in which 
perpetrator … intentionally fabricate[s] or ha[s] at his disposal means that are … 
intended for the commission of the criminal offence he has in mind”.186 In the case 
of terrorist financing, it seems that the financing of specific terrorist acts used to 
include the situation where the act financed or intended to be financed has not been 
attempted yet.187 However, in spite of these objections, the Netherlands amended 
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its law in 2013 to meet the FATF’s requirements by criminalizing the financing of 
terrorist acts as an autonomous offence.188  
I will revisit this matter further and in close detail in chapter 9 where I discuss, from 
a criminal law perspective, whether it is justifiable to criminalize terrorist financing 
as an independent offence.   
3.2.2 Criminalization of financing terrorist organizations 
A minority of delegations tried a different approach which was not adopted in the 
Convention but has had some subsequent impact, and thus deserves more detailed 
treatment here. They tried to restrict the scope of the offence of financing only to 
terrorist organisations.189 They argued that a mere preparatory act cannot be 
criminalised as an independent offence, unless the act is of a “particularly 
dangerous nature”. According to these delegations, in the context of the 
Convention, a “particularly dangerous” act should include “only” the financing of 
terrorist organizations. In fact, it was argued,  
it is this aspect of organisation, which typically includes long-term planning, 
continuity of purpose, and division of labour and particular difficulty of detection, 
which renders entities and their activities so dangerous that criminalising the 
financing of mere preparatory acts justifiable.190  
They expressed that a similar rationale could not apply to the financing of terrorist 
individuals as it would simply be a participatory offence (as discussed above) which 
falls within the scope of the sectoral conventions listed to the Convention. However, 
they did not provide reasons as to how reliance on the dangerousness of a terrorist 
group could justify criminalization of financing of that group when the connection 
between financing or funds and terrorism, from which the criminality of the 
financing is derived, may be tenuous. I will discuss this matter in greater detail in 
chapter 5.2 and chapter 9.     
Such a reference to terrorist organisations also caused a further problem; it required 
the introduction of precise and detailed elements for the definition of 
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‘organization’.191 Most of the proposed definitions of ‘organization’ emphasized 
the hierarchical structure of a group of persons with common objectives,192 and the 
drafters began to raise doubts over the usefulness of defining ‘organization’.193 The 
Convention was finalised and the drafters avoided including a definition of 
‘organisation’ on the view that the definition of ‘organization’ may vary from one 
case to another.194  Thus the minority position that sought to link terrorist financing 
to terrorist organisations had no impact on the Convention itself. 
Even the UN Security Council, which has engaged in the suppression of the 
financing of groups associated with Al-Qaida and Da’esh, as another method of 
countering terrorist financing, has failed to define a ‘terrorist organization’ or 
provide legal guidelines for identifying terrorist groups. Instead, it has adopted an 
“operational” or listing and de-listing approach to the issue.195 What the Security 
Council has done is that it has identified groups (so far Al-Qaida and Da’esh) 
regarded by it as terrorist groups. The Security Council in Resolution 1267 (1999) 
established a committee,196 namely the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and gave it 
a mandate to create and update a list individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
regarded to be associated with them. These designated individuals and 
organizations are subject to severe sanctions: states should freeze all of their assets, 
“prevent their entry into or the transit through their territories” and prevent the 
supply, sale and transfer of arms and weapons or technical advice and assistance 
related to military activities.197 The Security Council in Resolution 2253 (2015) 
provides a list of activities, (such financing, supplying arms to, or recruiting for 
these groups) indicating “an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated” 
with identified groups.198  
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Having regard to the information provided by the Member States and regional 
organizations,199 the committee, which consists of the Security Council Member 
States, is obliged to make a decision (by “consensus of its members”) on whether 
an individual or organization proposed is eligible to be designated as terrorist or 
delisted from the list.200 However, the inclusion of a group on the list provided by 
the UN Security Council is not always considered as “conclusive evidence” of the 
terroristic nature of that group. In this regard, an Italian court argued that the list 
has merely “an administrative value”, which does not “override the principle of the 
free assessment of evidence by an independent judge”.201   
Designating an individual or group as terrorist without instituting criminal 
proceedings has also been adopted by some States. For instance, in the US, a group 
may be designated as a terrorist group by the Secretary of State in consultation with 
the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury.202 The main criterion used 
to designate a group as terrorist is that the group engages in terrorist activity or 
“retains the capability or intends to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism”.203 This 
approach, however, is subject to criticism because of the lack of a certain legal base 
and procedure for designating individuals or groups and freezing their assets.204 In 
fact, this approach reduces the degree of judicial control of the designation process, 
and, instead, risks politicizing the targeting process,205 which in turn increases the 
risk of failure to abide by fundamental principles including the right to a fair 
hearing, “due process, right to property and freedom of association”.206 This 
approach will be examined in great detail in chapter 12.  
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The absence of a definition of a terrorist group or legal requirements for identifying 
terrorist organizations has resulted in disagreement among states and international 
organizations about which organizations or individuals should be listed or de-
listed.207 In this regard, it is instructive to compare the list of states’ and 
international organizations’ blacklist of terrorist organizations since “there are 
notable omissions”.208 
The importance of addressing the organizational character of the offence of 
terrorism, however, has been highlighted by the European Council through its 
establishment of terrorist group offences. The EU Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism in Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision 
requires the Member States of the European Union to criminalize “directing a 
terrorist group” as well as “participating in the activities of a terrorist group 
including by supplying information or material resources or by funding its activities 
in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the 
criminal activities of the terrorist group”.209 Similar to the definition of “organized 
criminal group” provided by the 2000 United Nation Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter the Palermo Convention),210 the 
Framework Decision defines a terrorist group as a “structured group of more than 
two persons which [has been] established over a period of time and [is] acting in 
concert to commit terrorist offences”.211 A ‘structured group’ means “a group that 
is not randomly formed for immediate commission of an offence and that does not 
need to have formally defined role for its members, continuity of its membership or 
a developed structure”.  
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The Framework Decision is applied by EU Member States, but using somewhat 
different interpretations.212 For instance, the financing of a terrorist organization in 
the Netherlands comes close to the notion of inchoate crime213 but it does not merge 
into the category of a preparatory offence in the sense that a direct relation between 
the act of financing and a specific planned or completed terrorist act is not 
necessary.214 In other words, the Netherlands criminalized the financing of a 
terrorist group as “participation” in the group under Article 140a of the Penal Code. 
In general, participation in a group whose aims are to commit offences was regarded 
as “the preparatory acts of entering into and maintain a long-lasting collaboration, 
which is aimed at commission of the crime”.215 In the case of terrorist financing, 
Article 140a does not require that the funds collected and provided be used for the 
commission of a specific act, or are intended to be used for such an offence. The 
requirement is that the funds should be collected or provided for the “benefit” of a 
terrorist organization.216 According to the Dutch case law, an ‘organization’ was “a 
structured and lasting form of collaboration between two or more persons”. 
Spain criminalizes the financing of a terrorist group as “belonging” to the group.217 
According to the article 571(3) of Spanish Criminal Code, terrorist organizations 
are those groups which 1) are formed by a large number of persons, 2) possess 
weapons or dangerous instruments and 3) have the particular purpose of “subverting 
the constitutional order or seriously breaching public peace”. The financing of such 
a group under the article 576 (1) of the Spanish Criminal Code is considered as an 
act of “collaboration with the activities or the purposes of a terrorist organisation”. 
Collaboration, in article 576 (2), is defined as the provision of “information on … 
or use of accommodation or storage facilities; concealment or transport of 
individuals related to terrorist organisations or groups; … and, in general, any other 
equivalent form of co-operation, aid or mediation, economic or of any other kind 
whatsoever, with the activities of those terrorist organisations or groups”. Unlike 
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the approach taken by Spain, some Ibero-American countries do not establish an 
independent offence of terrorist financing. Argentina, for example, classifies 
terrorist financing as “illicit association” to a terrorist organization (Article 210 of 
the Argentine Criminal code).218 Colombia, in Article 340 of the Colombian 
Criminal Code, treats terrorist financing as an agreement to commit crimes,219 
which is similar to the concept of conspiracy in common law countries.  
Such a reference to “association” or “agreement” definitely requires the proof of a 
stronger connection between acts of financing or funds and terrorism from which 
the criminality of the terrorist financing offence must be derived. Such a 
requirement was not, however, added to the proposal of the delegations who asked 
for limiting the scope of the terrorist financing offence to financing terrorist 
organizations, nor to the recommendations provided by FATF.    
The FATF recommends the criminalization of the financing of any kind to a 
terrorist group as an independent offence. It provides a wider definition of terrorist 
group in the sense that it does not require of a terrorist organization some measure 
of structure or existence for a particular time.220  The FATF reduces the concept of 
terrorist groups to broadly cover  
any group of terrorists that: (i) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by 
any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully; (ii) participates as an 
accomplice in terrorist acts; (iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts; 
or (iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the 
aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the 
group to commit a terrorist act. 
3.2.3 Terrorist financing as an independent offence  
Despite the above-mentioned approaches, the tendency in the negotiations on the 
draft convention was towards retaining an independent offence of terrorist 
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financing.221 The idea that the provisions on accomplices in the sectoral 
conventions were sufficient to cover all aspects of terrorist financing was rejected. 
It seems that the drafters were determined to give the new offence a broad scope 
which covers “the financing of any and all crimes” defined by or annexed to the 
Convention.222 It was argued that the financing of commission or preparation of a 
terrorist act, in and of itself, is as serious an offence as the actual terrorist act.223 
This notion is based on the assumption reflected in the preamble of the Convention: 
“the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the 
financing that terrorists may obtain”.224  
In other words, the injurious and dreadful consequences of terrorism served an 
important function in the construction of terrorist financing as an independent 
offence.225 It is argued that terrorist offences are “multi offensive” in that they 
endanger many “protected values” such as “life, physical integrity, property, 
freedom and national security”.226 As terrorist financing allows terrorism to become 
real, the act of financing terrorism poses ex ante threat to those values too.  It is also 
argued in the scholarly literature that terrorist financing should be considered to 
constitute “a separate primary harm rather than an ancillary harm” since “reliable 
financing” can change the conventional harm of terrorism from “sporadic and local” 
and give it a “continuous and broader nature” by enabling terrorists to expand the 
scale and scope of their influence across vast areas and to expose various people.227 
The argument goes that solid resources enable terrorist groups such as the FARC 
and Al-Qaeda to recruit members, to supply themselves with adequate weapons and 
to launch and expand their activities anywhere in the world. So, it was concluded 
that the financers of terrorism should be treated independently (even in the absence 
of a link to a terrorist act) and punished as severely as those who commit 
terrorism.228 The application of this approach can be seen in Australia where the 
penalty for the commission of terrorism financing is equal to the one which applies 
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to the preparation or commission of terrorism.229 But the question that this thesis 
seeks to answer is: whether, and how far, criminal law can (or should) be stretched 
to accommodate the terrorist financing offence whose criminality is derived from 
terrorism to which it does not need to be linked? 
3.2.3.1 Criminalization of terrorist financing by analogy with organized crimes 
But before examining this question, it is worth noting that criminalization of 
terrorist financing should be regarded as a part of “a larger shift in criminal justice 
from an offender-oriented towards a proceeds-oriented” approach”230 specifically 
developed in the fight against organized crime because of producing large profits 
for criminals. The main justification for the adoption of this approach is its “possible 
deterrence value”.231 It is believed that attacking the root of all economically 
motivated crimes would remove the incentive of perpetrators to commit those 
crimes.232 At an organizational level, “going after the money” is assumed to 
incapacitate criminal organizations by taking away their financial lifeblood, 
eliminating their capacity to trade and reducing their attractiveness to recruits.233 
The criminalization of money laundering is considered the key component of this 
approach since criminals may hide the proceeds with third parties234 or give them a 
legitimate appearance to the extent that confiscation is not possible.235 So, for the 
sake of the confiscation of such proceeds, criminalizing laundering can provide a 
legal tool for law enforcement authorities to tackle suspicious assets either in the 
hands of third parties or those of  the real owner236 without requiring the prosecution 
to prove the guilt of the criminals of the predicate crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.237 That is, confiscation is possible by proving the charge of money 
laundering conduct or the “ownership” of the proceeds. In addition, the fight against 
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money laundering is considered as a means of collecting evidence against the 
higher-level criminals who stay aloof from criminal activities, but who do come 
into contact with the proceeds derived from the criminal activities.238 This contact 
provides a paper trail of records which constitute the involvement of the top 
criminals in the criminal activities (predicate crime) from which the proceeds are 
derived. 
Regardless of how effective the application of this approach has been in the fight 
against organized crime,239 the question is whether the logic of this argument fits 
the case of terrorist financing; or whether, terrorism and terrorist financing are 
equivalent to organized crimes and money laundering to the extent that the same 
approach can be adopted to counter them? Although the examination of these 
questions falls outside the scope of this research, it is worth addressing them very 
briefly here and in the next chapter, because the approach taken by the Terrorist 
Financing Convention and developed by FATF and UN Security Council to counter 
terrorist financing independently of terrorism is heavily reliant on an analogy with 
organized crimes and money laundering. However, this analogy is inaccurate and 
may be ineffective for the following reasons.  
Firstly, it should be noted that terrorism is not a crime necessarily committed for 
the purpose of monetary gains. It is a “politically motivated act of violence”240 with 
two distinctive financial characteristics: 1) terrorists need less operational money to 
commit, or prepare to commit, terrorist acts than those criminals who seek to 
maximise their financial gains;241 2) terrorist funds are derived from legal and 
illegal sources. Taking these facts into account, it seems implausible to argue that 
going after terrorists’ funds undermines their incentive simply because funding 
terrorism is “a product of an ideology”.242 As long as there is a desire for politically 
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or ideologically inspired people to seek their purposes through violence, they will 
discover a way to do so. 
In terms of an impact on the organizational capacity of terrorist groups, while drying 
up terrorists’ funds may have disruptive effects on the potential of the groups to 
recruit and conduct operations on the scale of the September 11, it does not 
necessarily result in deterring or resolving “terrorism risks”.243 Michael Levi argues 
that  
Terrorists need and want less money than do those who seek to maximize economic 
gains. Furthermore, profit-seeking criminals will usually come around gain and 
their individual crimes will make little impact upon levels of criminality, creating 
more incentives to patient investigation of nodal figures. By contrast, the aim of 
anti-terrorist policy is to minimize the chances and consequences of violence on 
every possible occasion, so patience is more costly. However, if they have any 
effect at all, controls on licit sources of finance may displace terrorist finance from 
legal into illegal channels. Without verifiable evidence on how many attacks were 
prevented, it seems plausible that tighter financial and precursor controls ultimately 
reshape rather than resolve terrorism risks, reducing the capacity to cause 
spectacular harms in jurisdictions that are more expensive to reconnoitre. As in 
organized crime, it then remains moot whether it is better or worse to have a widely 
distributed set of independent [for example] al-Qa idah-inspired attacks compared 
with a more centrally regulated and perhaps more individually damaging set of 
attacks. 244              
Therefore, the amount of money these groups would seek “would be much smaller; 
the means used to raise them would vary widely and depend on the local 
conditions, … there would be much less need for fund transfers and the 
communication among groups … would be minimal”.245 The US 9/11 Commission 
report makes a valid point that if a terrorist group is “replaced by smaller, 
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decentralized terrorist groups, the premise behind the government’s efforts that 
“terrorists need a financial support network” may become outdated”.246  
Lastly, by criminalizing money laundering techniques, the freezing and 
confiscation of the proceeds of criminal activities can be facilitated, attacking 
terrorist finance as a tool “to starve of funds can be “problematic” and 
“premature”.247 The main problem in this regard derives from the fact that the nature 
of terrorist financing conduct is “the inverse of the structure of the money 
laundering offence”.248 While money laundering offences are premised on predicate 
offences like drug trafficking having already taken place, the principal offence of 
terrorist financing in most cases is not committed or even attempted yet if the 
financing itself is prosecuted as a separate offence. As will be discussed in chapter 
7 and 8, criminalisation thus depends on a hypothesis of future criminal activity. In 
addition, freezing such funds appears to be much more difficult than freezing funds 
in money laundering cases as the law enforcement agencies again need to establish 
a hypothetical link between the suspicious funds and a possible terrorism 
connection, rather than relying on an existing or supposed connection with an 
existing predicate offence.  
In the absence of an actual and clear connection between financing activities/funds 
and terrorist activities, it makes more sense to prosecute the financial criminal 
activities of terrorists, terrorist groups or their supporters as “various forms of 
transnational crime” addressed by conventions on money laundering and organized 
crimes.249 It is worth noting that the effectiveness of these conventions in the fight 
against money laundering and organized crimes are questioned.250   
3.3 Conclusion 
Terrorist financing was adopted as an independent crime globally through the 
Terrorism Financing Convention. The drafters of the Convention were determined 
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to introduce an offence with a very broad scope to the extent that it includes 
financing of activities which may not be connected to preparation or commission 
of any terrorist act. But the question is whether and how far criminal law can 
justifiably be expanded to include such an offence. This is the question that this 
thesis seeks to answer in chapters 5 onwards.  
It has been argued that the counter terrorist financing measures including 
criminalization and confiscation measures have been adopted by a close analogy 
with the measures adapted to counter organized crimes and money laundering. 
Regarding the nature and characteristic of terrorism and terrorist financing, such an 
adoption is inaccurate and seems to be ineffective. Although this thesis is not 
designed to examine the effectiveness of the expansion of anti-organized crimes or 
anti-money laundering tools to counter terrorist financing, the examination of some 
of the notions on which this analogy is based seems to be important as they play a 
significant role in justifying the idea that terrorist financing can be addressed 
independently. For example, relying on the notion that terrorism and terrorist 
financing is so closely connected to organized crimes and money laundering, FATF 
recommends the criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence 
and a predicate crime of money laundering. The following chapter will examine 
this recommendation, which has had a considerable role in the diffusion of the 
criminalization approach adopted by the Terrorist Financing Convention.     
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Chapter Four:  Is terrorist financing a predicate offence of money 
laundering?   
4.1 Introduction 
Following the adoption of the Terrorist Financing Convention, the FATF now 
emphasizes the criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence; but  
referring to “the close connection between international terrorism and, inter alia,  
money laundering”,251 it additionally pushes countries to criminalize terrorist 
financing as a predicate crime to money laundering.252 Examination of this 
recommendation provides a convenient way to analyse some of the assumptions 
built into terrorist financing, and how certain ideas appear to have been borrowed 
from the theory of anti-money laundering.  
The recommendation suggests (although it is difficult to prove) that the underlying 
approach of the FATF’s policy makers may have been to resolve the problem of 
terrorist financing by analogy with their existing solutions to money laundering. 
Whether or not this is the case, there are, nonetheless, some uncertainties about the 
scope of this FATF’s recommendation. Practically, it is not clear what the reference 
to the link between terrorism and money laundering implies. Does it mean that 
terrorism is a crime which generates proceeds which need to be laundered? There 
is no doubt that some terrorist acts such as hijacking or hostage taking, criminalized 
by UN conventions annexed to the Terrorist Financing Convention, may generate 
money which needs to be laundered. But terrorism in its generic sense refers to the 
use of violence against civilians which results in bodily injuries for the purpose of 
intimidating or coercing.253   
Does the recommendation imply that financing of terrorism is another form of 
money laundering, which can be included by the anti-money laundering regime? It 
is the submission of this chapter, that terrorist financing logically does not fit into 
the money laundering scheme. This chapter will examine whether it is reasonable 
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to legislate to criminalize terrorist financing on the basis of analogies with money 
laundering. It is argued that while terrorist funds can be processed by the same tools 
used by launderers, none of those elements involved in money laundering by 
organized crime are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. Even 
if terrorist financing is involved in money laundering, labelling them as terrorist 
financing without linking it to terrorism or terrorist activities is problematic.    
4.2 The role of money laundering in terrorist financing 
Money laundering is internationally defined as the process of conversion or 
transfer, concealment or disguise, and possession or use of any income or property 
derived from illegal activities (hereinafter “predicate crimes”).254 The origin of the 
term money laundering arose in the US in 1920s when mafia groups owned and 
used launderettes to gain a legitimate appearance for “proceeds” generated from 
their criminal activities.255 Later, with the explosion of drug trafficking in 1980s, 
money laundering became an important part of any serious criminal enterprise, 
especially “organized crime” activities, from which huge profits are generated.256 
The main purpose of money laundering operations is twofold: to hide the predicate 
(often organized) crimes from which the proceeds are obtained, and to guarantee 
that criminals can enjoy their proceeds by using or investing in the legal 
economy.257    
To fulfil these goals, launderers use various and complex techniques to launder their 
proceeds. These techniques very briefly may include using financial institutions as 
deposit-taking institutions, “non-bank financial institutions”, non-financial 
institutions, or other informal methods such as the purchase of art treasures and 
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jewellery, techniques of illegal money importation, techniques of smurfing or 
nominal partnerships, gambling, techniques of overpayment on tax accounts, 
techniques related to real estate, the buying of gift vouchers, assuring real estate 
credit, establishing fictitious business organisations, fictitious transactions, creating 
a cover company, techniques of over-or under-charging, methods of acquisition and 
selling of companies, acquisition of sports clubs, gold purchase, barter trade 
systems and so on.258 
The involvement of these techniques in laundering is too complex to explain in 
detail here. However, it has become common to illustrate the process of laundering, 
especially those involved with drug money, by utilising a three-stage framework:259  
1- Placement stage:  proceeds at the first step need to either enter a financial 
system or be used to buy an asset.260  
2- In the “layering stage” a launderer, through some financial transactions, 
tries to conceal and disguise the source of the money. This step can be done 
by breaking down the money to small amounts and transferring it to 
different financial institutions.   
3- In the final stage, ‘integration’, the money is assimilated along with all other 
assets in the system in order to make the money appear as if it were obtained 
legally.  
Regarding the nature of the crime, money laundering can be described as a 
“legitimisation-oriented concept”261 which contains the following features: 
• The money involved in the process of money laundering is, in all cases, 
derived from illegal activities.  
• Money laundering is a derivative crime or an output of predicate crimes.  
• The main purpose in money laundering is to disguise the origin of proceeds 
in order for criminals to enjoy their ill-gotten gains.262    
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• Money laundering takes place when principal crimes (predicate crimes) 
have already been committed. The necessity of laundering makes detecting 
criminals by chasing the proceeds of their illegal activities more possible. 
However, in regard to financing terrorism, there is a different story. Terrorist 
financing can be divided into “a framework with three levels”: activities done to 
make and raise funds for terrorist purposes,263 strategies used to move the funds 
whence they have been collected to where they need to be held, and methods used 
to move funds to frontline terrorists.264 It seems that terrorist financing is a 
phenomenon which begins with fund-raising and ends by distributing the funds to 
terrorist cells.      
The emphasis, in such a case, is not on the legitimization and accumulation of funds, 
but making funds available to terrorist cells; so, terrorist funds do not inevitably 
need to go through those money laundering stages by which the proceeds of 
organized crime are processed. However, money laundering can be a part of 
terrorist financing process in some cases, as illustrated in Diagram II.  
Regarding the nature and characteristics of terrorist financing, terrorist funds can 
be processed under three scenarios:  
Scenario one: when the funds have been derived from legal sources, nothing 
appears illegal except the future use of the money. The funds, in this case, can 
be transferred by non-criminal individuals or legal entities like charities and 
front companies, and through the legal financial system.   
Scenario two: terrorists are involved with criminal activities in order to 
generate funds for their terrorist purposes. So, they may need to launder the 
proceeds of their crime if they wish to invest proceeds to produce regular 
revenue. If the funds come under scrutiny at this stage, there may be no 
connection with terrorist activities. Also, after having been laundered, the 
disguised origin of money might not be identifiable because the connection 
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between the funds and their illegal source has already been interrupted; as a 
result, the funds have a legitimate appearance.    
 Scenario three: the proceeds of crime are directly (without being laundered) 
used by terrorist cells. In this case, terrorists do not need to launder the money, 







Diagram II. illustrates how terrorist financing can be processed.265    
 
In comparison with money laundering, the main characteristics of the terrorist 
financing process are:  
• Unlike money laundering the subject matter of which is money derived 
from the commission of crime, in terrorist financing “funds” is defined 
very broadly. They include “assets of every kind, whether tangible or 
intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal 
documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, 
evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, 
bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, 
securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit”.266    
• Terrorist financing involves preparing funds for the commission of 
another crime. So, it is an input into terrorism, and preparatory in its 
nature. 
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• When terrorist financing occurs the principal crime (terrorism) has not 
been committed or even attempted yet; so, the relationship between the 
funds and terrorist activities may or may not be identifiable.  
• The purpose in terrorist financing is not accumulation, but distribution. In 
result, the amount of funds on the move may often be very small.267  
• The attempt in terrorist financing is to hide the destination of the funds.  
4.3   Discussion on the relationship of terrorist financing and money laundering  
There has been a continuing argument about whether the measures provided to 
counter money laundering are able to prevent and counteract terrorist financing. 
Those who support the integration of terrorist financing into anti-money laundering 
measures base their argument on two inaccurate assumptions: the link and nexus 
between terrorism and criminal activities,268 and the involvement of terrorist 
financing in money laundering.269  
4.3.1 Terrorists’ involvement in criminal (organized) activities 
The first assumption, which emphasizes and exaggerates the involvement of 
terrorists in criminal (especially organized) activities as the main source of terrorist 
financing,270 considers terrorism as a criminal activity potentially resulting in 
proceeds in regard to which money laundering may occur. From a logical 
perspective, this approach assumes that terrorism as a criminal activity, which 
produces proceeds, precedes money laundering.271 The reflection of this argument 
can be explicitly seen in the Council of the European Communities Directive of 10 
June 1991 on prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering where it provides that 
Since money laundering occurs not only in relation to the proceeds of drug-related 
offences but also in relation to the proceeds of other activities (such as organized 
crime and terrorism), the Member States should, within the meaning of their 
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legislation, extend the effects of the Directive to include the proceeds of such 
activities, to the extent that they likely to result in laundering operations justifying 
sanctions on that basis.272 
This assumption is to some extent based on reality. Regarding the evidence and 
studies on terrorist financing typologies mentioned in chapter two, it has been 
proved that terrorist groups, in some cases, are involved in criminal activities such 
as hostage-taking for ransom. However, complete reliance on the assumption to 
justify the inclusion of terrorism into the instruments related to repression of 
organized crime (and as result, inclusion of terrorist financing into anti-money 
laundering measures) can be problematic for the following reasons.  
First of all, it is a category error to presume that terrorism is a crime for the purpose 
of making money. Terrorists are generally motivated by ideology greater than 
personal impulses or material benefits.273 Their engagement in crime to fund their 
activities needs to be considered as an instrumental purpose.274 This feature 
distinguishes it from other criminal acts, especially organized crime, which are not 
afforded any kind of excuse as criminals seek personal or financial gains.275  More 
importantly, terrorist funds can be acquired from legal sources. This considerably 
differentiates terrorist financing from organized criminal activities. 
In addition to the distinct motivations, terrorists measure their conduct against the 
standards and “codex” of the ideology that they follow.276 So, even though an act is 
unlawful according to the law of a state or to international law, it might be legitimate 
and appropriate from the terrorists’ perspective. Emphasizing the significant 
consequence of this feature, some argue that “standard criminology” cannot apply 
to the case of terrorism since “the notion of deterrence is largely irrelevant, with the 
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language of terrorists often entirely divorced from that of the normal criminal 
offender”.277   
Moreover, it is impossible to estimate the extent and spread of terrorists’ 
involvement in criminal (organized) activities.278 In 2003, in the US, it was reported 
that 14 of the 36 groups designated as terrorist organizations on the US Department 
of State list were engaged in drug trafficking.279 This fact was applied to argue that 
the war on drugs and the war on terrorism need to continue to be linked. However, 
this conclusion was correctly criticized as “there are hundreds of terrorist 
organizations and drug trafficking groups, but it is usually the same dozen or so 
groups that get identified as being involved in both types of activities”.280 
From an international law perspective, the inclusion of the concept of terrorism 
within the scope of international instruments relating to organized crime is also 
problematic. The problem lies in the nature and definition of terrorism. While there 
is not a consensus on a concrete definition of terrorism, and on the designation of 
groups as terrorist groups, certain characteristics of organized crime have been at 
least identified over the course of time.281 With regard to this fact, the inclusion of 
terrorism in instruments related to organized crime has the potential to “divide 
parties to a treaty and make it unworkable”.282 It might be the reason why the 
authors of the Palermo Convention avoided the inclusion of terrorist acts in the 
definition of organised crime283 in spite of acknowledging the involvement of 
terrorists in criminal activities.284 This will be discussed in great detail in chapter 5.   
By exemplifying the practices of few terrorist groups, it is also argued that “terrorist 
groups are now turning gradually into a big business … and enjoy the unexpected 
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fruits of their way of life”.285 However, regarding the paucity of available data, it 
does not make sense to claim that such transformation is a typical or common 
pattern for all terrorist groups.286 Moreover, from a criminal law perspective, if a 
terrorist group is transformed into some sort of a criminal organization, it can no 
longer be considered as a terrorist group.  
To end this, it is worthwhile to note the result of the questionnaire administrated by 
the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UN Terrorism Prevention Branch) 
indicating that287  
Terrorist groups are frequently involved in other crime, particularly illegal drug 
trafficking, smuggling of migrants, falsification of illicit travel and identity 
documents, trafficking in firearms and other exploitation of illicit markets. 
However, the responses did not provide strong evidence of organizational links 
between terrorist groups and organized criminal groups. There was no indication 
either that criminal groups were becoming more involved in terrorist acts.288  
Even if there is a strong link between terrorist groups and organized criminal 
groups, why are not they prosecuted under ordinary criminal law? Why is it so 
important to make a doctrinal link between terrorism and in some way amalgamate 
those activities? 
4.3.2   Terrorists’ involvement in money laundering   
Unlike the first assumption which emphasises inaccurately and exaggeratedly the 
illegal sources of terrorist funds, the second assumption focuses on the tools and 
methods which terrorists use to conceal the flow of their funds.289 This assumption 
acknowledges that although terrorist funds can be derived from both legal and 
illegal sources, terrorists process their funds – “that is, move them from the source 
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to where they will be used” – in the same way that non-terrorist criminals launder 
funds.290   
In other words, terrorists are involved in either money laundering or “reverse money 
laundering”.  If terrorists are involved with criminal activities, they need to use the 
same methods as criminals to conceal the origin of proceeds. If terrorist funds have 
a legitimate origin, then terrorists must engage in “reverse money laundering”,291 
which is the application of the same methods and tools used by launderers to hide 
the destination of funds. In this regard, it has been noted that:  
Terrorists use the same professional money network, they use the same convoluted 
transactions to hide the location of the money or where it’s going. They can use 
the same clandestine shipment of cash to avoid paper-trails. They can engage in 
the same international shell games as they move money from this account to that, 
disguised as legitimate funds for some lawful purpose when it really is to finance 
new crime and new criminal enterprises … The source of the money doesn’t 
matter, it is the deadly purpose the money was intended to fund.292     
As a result of this analogy, it is concluded that there is significant room for anti-
money laundering measures to deal with the phenomenon of terrorist financing. 
Therefore, terrorist financing is considered as a sub-category of money laundering, 
or a predicate crime to money laundering which potentially can be detected, 
investigated and prevented by the already existing measures.293  
The logic of this assumption is not compelling for the following reasons. Most of 
all, it is questioned whether money laundering counter-measures can be a ‘one size 
fits all’ solution for all crimes in which offenders may use the same money network 
as launderers use to conceal the origin of their funds. The point is that these 
measures have been designed to prevent drug offences or offences294 whose 
purposes are the legitimization and accumulation of a huge amount of money 
generated from criminal activities. However, in regard to terrorist financing, none 
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of these elements are necessarily involved. While cloaking money may be 
important, transmission to point of use is a much more pressing need for terrorists. 
With regard to the accumulation element, while the basic requirement in money 
laundering operations is to launder and accumulate a large amount of money, not 
only does terrorist financing end by distributing funds to terrorist cells, but also 
“terrorism can, and does, operate on a shoestring”.295 This affects the volume of the 
money circulated in terrorist-related transactions. The 9/11 Commission Report 
provides an interesting insight into how easy it was for the 11 September hijackers 
to carry out their transactions. For example, it is reported that they mainly operated 
through wire transfers, using sums not exceeding $10,000 each time. The members 
of groups were on student visas and appeared to be receiving money from their 
parents or in the form of grants for their studies.296 It is also emphasised that none 
of the hijackers’ transactions were “extraordinary or remarkable”.297          
In terms of the legitimization element, when terrorists are involved in crime to 
finance their activities, the quick response is that they are involved in money 
laundering. Of course, terrorists wish to hide the illegal sources of their funds.298 
However, regarding the fact that the purpose in terrorist financing is to make funds 
available to terrorists on the ground, not to integrate funds into financial systems,299 
the question is whether the funds necessarily need to go through those complex 
money laundering stages and processes to become usable. The answer is positive if 
terrorists intend to invest proceeds to produce regular revenue.  
Looking at the evidence, it is argued that while the movement of “terrorist-related 
funds” and transactions does not generally resemble normal transactions, it does not 
include complex processes used in money laundering.300 In addition, the result of a 
study on money laundering activities in the East and Southern African Anti-Money 
Laundering Group countries shows that although it was more likely that terrorist 
                                                 
295 For example, the cost of two current terrorist attacks, 9/11 US attacks and the Madrid bombings 
in 2004, cost $ 500,000 and $10.000 respectively. Peter Lilley Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth 
About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (2nd ed, Kogan Page, London, 
UK, 2006), at 129. 
296 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Kean and Hamilton, above n 
120, at 237. 
297 At 528. 
298 Dandurand and Chin, above n 274, at 14. 
299 Lilley, above n 295, at 150. 
300 Bantekas, above n 66, at 321. 
66 
 
funds in this region originate from illegal sources rather than legal sources, no 
indication as to the link between money laundering activities and terrorist groups 
had been found.301       
What radically challenges the assumption of the inclusion of money laundering 
counter-measures to terrorist financing is the fact that proceeds derived from 
criminal activities are not the main source of funds for terrorists.302 As mentioned 
earlier, terrorist funds may have a legal origin. In such a case, if terrorists, for 
whatever reason, try to conceal funds or their origin, it does not mean that they are 
engaged in money laundering.303 Even if they apply similar tools and methods used 
by criminals to move and transfer their money, they do not necessarily involve 
laundering in the normal sense of the word.304 In fact, unlike money laundering, 
where terrorist financing takes place there is no crime that precedes the endeavour 
to conceal the origin or movement of funds from scrutiny.305 Of course, there is 
criminal intent, but it does not make sense to deem the funds intended to be used 
for terrorist purposes “as the proceeds of that criminal intent”.306    
4.4 Conclusion 
Terrorism is not a crime committed for money; however, terrorists need resources 
to sustain their activities. This gives terrorist financing a multivariate nature; that 
is, terrorism can be financed by any means, legal or illegal, and by anyone, terrorists 
or non-perpetrators. This feature also considerably differentiates terrorist financing 
from all those (organized) crimes which end in money laundering. The role and 
purposes of money laundering are to gain a legitimate appearance for the proceeds 
derived from illegal (often organized) activities, and to accumulate them into the 
legal economy. This necessitates that criminal activities from which proceeds are 
derived precede money laundering.  
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None of these elements are necessarily involved in most terrorist financing cases as 
the financial flows in terrorist financing go in a different direction. Terrorist 
financing begins with the gathering of funds and ends by distributing funds to 
terrorists. In such a process, there is no need for legitimization especially when the 
funds have a legal origin. Even if terrorist funds have an illegal background, money 
laundering cannot play a leading role because the purpose in terrorist financing is 
not the accumulation of funds in financial systems. 
Similar to money laundering in which the attempt is to conceal the origin of 
proceeds from detection, the effort in financing terrorism is to hide the funds and 
their origin devoted to pursuing terrorist activities from scrutiny. This similarity has 
been used to draw an analogy between money laundering and terrorist financing, 
reasoning that terrorists and their supporters resort to similar tools and techniques 
to those used by launderers in organized crime to move terrorist funds.307 
Nonetheless, where terrorist financing takes place, there often is no criminal offence 
that precedes the endeavour to hide the movement of funds from detection.308 
Although there is criminal intent, it is not reasonable to consider the funds “as the 
proceeds of that criminal intent”.309   
To sum up, FATF claims that because “there is a close connection between 
terrorism, inter alia, and money laundering”, terrorist financing should be 
criminalized as a predicate money laundering.310 The analysis of this chapter, 
however, indicate that the crime-terrorism nexus assumption is not accurate as there 
are fundamental differences between terrorism and organized crimes, and between 
terrorist financing and money laundering. This raises serious doubt as to the 
effectiveness of the expansion of anti-money laundering measures to counter 
terrorist financing (although as noted the examination of such an expansion is 
beyond the scope of this research).     
But relying on the crime-terrorism nexus assumption seems to have paved the way 
for the diffusion of the Terrorist Financing Convention’s approach that has an 
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emphasis on treating terrorist financing independently of terrorism. In other words, 
while this approach to countering terrorist financing, preparatory in its nature, is not 
tenable in terms of in terms of existing notions of criminalisation, the emphasis on 
the assumption that terrorist financing is closely and heavily involved in criminal 
activities has provided a more convincing, but inaccurate, argument in support of 
criminalizing terrorist financing as an independent offence even when there is no 
link between terrorist financing and an actual terrorist act for which financing is 
carried out. In the following chapters, the implication of this approach to the 
criminalization of terrorist financing will be examined.  
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Chapter Five: Ambiguity in the definition of terrorism 
5.1 Introduction  
In the absence of an international consensus on the definition of terrorism, it seems 
that the effectiveness of the convention depends, among other things, on a common 
understanding of what constitutes terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist groups, the 
financing of which should be countered. In other words, unlike other counter-
terrorism conventions in which certain classes of terrorist-type conduct such as 
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking or hijacking are addressed without need to define 
or even apply the term terrorism, the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention 
could not define the new crime of terrorist financing without precisely clarifying 
the scope of the definition of terrorism. The aim of this chapter is to examine 
whether the counter-terrorism financing regime provides a solid platform for 
understanding who should be considered terrorists or what constitutes terrorism, 
terrorist acts and terrorist groups. The reason for such an examination is self-
evident: the financing of terrorism is the subject matter of the counter-terrorism 
financing regime, and it rests on the definition of terrorism.  
In the next section, the peculiarities of the nature of terrorism will be illustrated. In 
section 3, the attempt of the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention to define 
the elements of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist groups will be examined. The 
main argument of this chapter is that, with the exception of certain classes of 
offences regarded as terroristic, there is a difficulty with the nature of the concept 
of terrorism in relation to criminal law, which makes a consensus of opinion as to 
what it means unlikely. Even the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention and 
others such as the FATF and the UN Security Council involved in the fight against 
terrorist financing have provided a poor basis for a shared understanding of what is 
terrorism. In other words, they have left vague311 all of those controversial aspects 
of terrorism which hinder reaching an agreement on a convention on terrorism. This 
may jeopardize the purposes that the convention has in view as there is no common 
or clear understanding of, or guidance on, whose money or, more accurately, 
financing for what purpose should be countered.  
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5.2 The peculiarities of the nature of the concept of terrorism 
Logically, without defining terrorism, terrorist offences or terrorist groups, it is 
impossible to address terrorist financing. Nonetheless, there are some peculiarities 
about the nature of terrorism which have made not only all attempts to reach an 
agreement on the definition of terrorism, until now, impossible, but also the 
criminalization of terrorist financing controversial. That is, there is no agreement 
on what types of conduct, in what circumstances and when, against whom (targets 
or victims) and with what intention or motivation constitute terrorism.   
In terms of the objective element, the actus reus of the offence of terrorism is 
defined by scholars as the “underlying act” which is an offence in itself: murder, 
hijacking, kidnapping and so on.312 The less-discussed question is whether the 
underlying act of terrorism encompasses any unlawful conduct, including violent 
conduct, “repressive acts”313 and even minor criminal conduct like vandalism. 
While some believe that the underlying acts of terrorism only (need to) include 
serious offences or “violence”,314 in providing a generic definition on terrorism, 
some regional agreements even go so far as to include “any act which is a violation 
of the criminal laws of a State Party”. 315 This seems to cover all kinds of criminal 
conduct. The UN draft Convention against Terrorism enumerates the underlying act 
of causing “death or serious bodily injury …, serious damage to public or private 
property … resulting or likely to result in major economic loss”.316 “One may 
wonder when serious damage (rather than non-serious damage) to a place of public 
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use occurs”.317 The question can be also raised as to whether lawful conduct which 
may terrorise people can be an underlying act.    
The most peculiar feature of terrorism, as the (in)famous dictum ‘one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ indicates, is that “the same kind of 
action … will be described differently by different observers, depending on when 
and where it took place and whose side the observer is on”.318 That is, terrorism, 
unlike other transnational crimes, is not an act inherently and always recognized as 
criminal. Its criminality can be circumstantial. There are some circumstances, such 
as struggles for self-determination, attempts at national liberation, rebellion and 
duress or necessity, on which there is no agreement whether terrorist-type of 
conduct or the use of violence are unlawful and unjustifiable but excusable, or 
unlawful but justifiable, or even lawful.319 Although these circumstances might be 
regarded as exceptional, ambivalence about the use of terrorism in these 
circumstances has plagued agreement on a generic definition of terrorism.320 In 
some regional agreements, however, some of these circumstances have been taken 
into account by being exempted from the definition of terrorism.321 Nonetheless, 
what law should govern such exempted acts,322 or whether these acts ought to be 
covered by the international humanitarian law or the “law of international criminal 
defences” has not been clarified either regionally or internationally.323  
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To solve the problem of how to label terrorist-type conduct, especially in those 
exceptional circumstances named, one may assume that specifying the targets or 
victims of terrorism can help to identify which acts constitute terrorism. But, the 
peculiarity of terrorism also confuses the recognition of the targets of terrorism. 
Terrorism is a “compound offence” which needs both a mens rea in relation to its 
underlying act and a special intent in regard to the terrorism itself. So, there are two 
types of victims: the target of the underlying act and the “real target” at which the 
underlying act has been aimed.324  
With regard to the targets of the underlying offence, there is a critical controversy 
about whether acts against non-human targets can be labelled as terrorism. A 
“British-inspired definition of terrorism”325 includes various forms of damage to 
property and interference with or disruption of essential utilities and 
infrastructure.326 Others restrict this definition by requiring that such property 
damage needs to be “likely to endanger human life”.327 In some regional 
agreements, an act falls within the scope of terrorism if it is taken with the intention 
of destabilizing or destroying “the fundamental political, constitutional, economic 
or social structure of a country or an international organization”.328 Although the 
property damage element is included in the UN Draft Convention definition of 
terrorist acts,329  it is neither in the list of the acts drawn by the Resolution 1566 of 
the Security Council on the condemnation of terrorism,330  nor consistent with the 
meaning of terrorism advocated by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
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terrorism.331 The concern expressed is that while such inclusion can capture conduct 
of a terrorist nature, it is likely to target “conduct with no bearing at all to 
terrorism”.332  A protest against the WTO, for instance, would be a terrorist act if it 
resulted in property damage.333 
With regard to the special intent of terrorism, the League of Nations regarded 
terrorism as a criminal act with the intention of creating “a state of terror in the 
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public”.334 In this 
definition, it is not clear whether intimidation is the primary purpose of the terrorists 
or whether it is a means to an ulterior end. A number of recent definitions broaden 
the element by (relying on the British approach) requiring that the purpose of an act 
of terrorism must be “to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.335 The difficulty 
is that it is not clear what degree of intimidation or compulsion needs to occur for 
an act to be considered terrorism:336 mere intimidation337 or serious intimidation?338  
In addition, the concern has been expressed that none of these elements are easy to 
prove because terrorists do not necessarily make their specific demands or make 
openly public the purpose of their action.339 In the Boston marathon bombings in 
2013, for example, it has not been plainly announced what the perpetrators intended 
to prompt the US government to do or to abstain from doing. 
What complicates defining the subjective element of terrorism is the question 
whether intimidation of the public or coercion of a state constitutes terrorism if it is 
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motivated by personal impulses or by material gain such as in blackmail, extortion, 
revenge or personal hatred. While some propose that even acts of violence for 
personal gain should constitute terrorism,340 others exclude any terrorist-type 
conduct with a private motive from a definition of terrorism.341 They argue that “if 
a definition of terrorism is to reflect the real nature of the harm that terrorism inflicts 
on the political process”, public motives, including political, ideological, religious, 
ethnic, or philosophical motives, must be distinguished from “private violence”.342 
It is argued that setting fire to a building motivated by non-political, non-religious 
or non-ideological cannot be regarded as terrorism but arson as a public motive is 
lacking.343 Similarly, an aggravated bank robbery may end with killing or hostage-
taking, but if done in order for the bandits to flee unharmed, the intimidating of the 
public and coercing the police not to take any action against the bandits cannot be 
regarded terrorism as this action has not be done for advancing an ideological, 
political or other public cause (there are of course a range of common crimes suited 
to deal with such situations).344 
From a criminal law perspective, it is again controversial whether while motive is 
irrelevant to criminal culpability, the existing criminal law needs to be expanded so 
as to include motive as an element of the crime of terrorism. The proponents of such 
inclusion believe that requiring motive as a mental element “allows the criminal 
law to more finely target, stigmatise and deter what is considered by society to be 
especially wrongful about terrorism” “which is not inherent in a physical act of 
violence alone”.345 This may also help “satisfy public indignation”, “better express 
community condemnation”, “placate popular (but reasonable) demands for justice” 
and send “a symbolic message that certain kinds of violence cannot be tolerated in 
plural, secular democracies”.346  
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On the other hand, the opponents of this definition of the offence built around the 
motive of the offender insist on retaining as many of the principles of criminal law 
including the general requirement for the proof of fault as possible.347 Criticizing 
the inclusion of motive requirement imposed by some states,348 they correctly argue 
that motive should not excuse terrorism nor constitute part of the crime of terrorism 
because such inclusion would result in detrimental consequences: infringement of 
basic human rights such as freedoms of conscience, belief, religion, thought, 
expression and association by targeting and prosecuting on political, religious or 
ideological grounds,349 arousing and disseminating “suspicion and anger” of 
anyone who seems to belong to a religious, ideological or political group connected 
to a terrorist act,350 and “politicizing the investigative and trial process” by requiring 
intelligence agencies and trials to provide extensive evidence about the true 
meaning of a motive by which a terrorist act might be induced.351 Alternatively, 
they believe that a definition of terrorism will be less controversial and more 
acceptable if it relies more on the essence of terrorism, “namely the intentional 
murder and maiming of innocent civilians”, rather than on motive.352 The difficultly 
with this approach is that if motive is not part of the definition of terrorism, why 
not simply call it murder or assault? As a solution, this also seems deficient as it is 
not clear what after all is the definition of ‘innocent civilians’ in peacetime or 
wartime. It is argued by some that the use of violence against non-innocent civilians 
is justified, in what is so-called “terrorism for humanity”.353      
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Israel domination.  Honderich compares and analogizes Palestinian action with intentionally atomic 
bombing of the innocent in the Second World War by the US.      
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5.3 The Terrorist Financing Convention and the definition of terrorism 
The impossibility of reaching an agreement on a generic and authoritative definition 
of terrorism, until the adoption of Terrorist Financing Convention, had led initially 
to the adoption of a “thematic approach” to condemn and suppress terrorist acts.354 
Accordingly, international conventions were negotiated on certain classes of 
offences implicitly regarded “terrorist”, without attempting to define or even apply 
the term terrorism or imposing a special intent or motivation.355 Although setting 
aside the intent element in the favour of “sharply narrowed and highly elaborated” 
material elements made the inclusion of these sectoral conventions possible,356 the 
criticism has been expressed that the acts criminalized by the conventions  miss the 
unique characteristic of terrorism as these agreements implicitly include acts 
committed for personal and material causes.357  
Unlike the sectoral conventions, the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention 
felt they could not define the new offence by simply reference to a particular type 
of act;358 rather, they would need to define terrorism, the financing of which the 
Convention was going to criminalize. So, the Convention adopted a “two-fold” 
approach:359 a listing of offences and “a mini definition of terrorism”.360 With 
regard to the former, the Convention prohibits the financing of those acts within the 
                                                 
354 Cryer, above n 312, at 285. 
355 These conventions are : Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at 
The Hague on 16 December 1970, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971, Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973, International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on 17 December 1979, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at 
Vienna on 3 March 1980, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988, 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done 
at Rome on 10 March 1988, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988, International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 15 December 1997, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism New York, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 April 
2005. 
356 Levitt, above n 339, at 101. 
357 Cryer, above n 312, at 237. 
358 Aust, above n 68, at 291. 
359 UN, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, A/C.6/54/L.2, 26 October 1999, Annex III, 
at 62. 
360 Aust, above n 68, at 291. 
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scope of the sectoral conventions and any further ones.361 With regard to the latter, 
it was also argued that it was necessary to include a generic definition on terrorism 
for the purpose of the Convention since “not all terrorist offences were covered” by 
the sectoral conventions.362 It seems that the establishment of an independent 
offence of terrorist financing was to some extent superfluous because all those 
sectoral conventions have provisions which address aiding and financing of the 
criminal conduct addressed by the conventions.    
Despite the support for the deletion of any definition of terrorism,363 the Convention 
defined terrorism as an 
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, 
when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act.364  
Although this definition was endorsed for the purpose of the Convention and for 
defining a new offence of terrorist financing,365 not all aspects of terrorism are 
clearly and comprehensively reflected in the definition; nor have all those 
international concerns discussed above been properly addressed. First of all, the 
Convention does not clarify whether if it is to be considered terrorism, the use of 
violence should be only against people as the generic definition indicates, or 
whether an act against property can be terroristic as it is inferred from the 
Convention’s reference to the sectoral conventions, some of which criminalise acts 
against property.366  
The Convention’s identification of people as the victims of terrorism is also not 
compelling since it has been couched in vague terms. Unlike the first draft of the 
                                                 
361 Article 2 (1)(a). 
362 UN, Report of Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 
December 1996, A/54/37, 5 May 1999, Annex IV, para 23.  Also see UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, 26 October 
1999, Annex III, at [6]. 
363 A/C.6/54/L.2, 26 October 1999, Annex III, at  [81]. 
364 The Terrorist Financing Convention, Article 2 (1)(b). 
365 Aust, above n 68, at 298. 
366 For example, Article II (1)(b) of Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, above n 355, covers acts which “destroy[s] or 
seriously damage[s] the facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in 
service located thereon or disrupts the services of the airport”.  
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Convention which did not even employ the term armed conflict on the grounds that 
the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict are understood under 
international humanitarian law,367 in a revised version of the draft Convention, a 
provision was added to the definition of terrorism, prohibiting “[a]n act designed to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any other person, other than 
in armed conflict … ”.368 The retention of the added provision was supported on the 
understanding that it was necessary for the Convention to cover not only civilians 
but also those who are not civilians “but were not engaged in armed conflict either”, 
such as “off-duty military officers”.369 However, the comment was made that the 
added provision implied that “civilians did not take part in hostilities, which was 
considered not to be always the case”.370 Instead, it was proposed that the provision 
be amended to protect any person, whether civilian or not, not “taking an active 
part” in hostilities. Although this proposal was not taken into account in 
reformulating the final draft, the qualifier “not taking an active part” was inserted 
in the definition of terrorism to include “any act intended to cause death or serious 
bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict” within the scope of terrorism.   
Such a reference to armed conflict can be problematic for the following reasons. 
Generally speaking, while the lack of consensus on the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of the use of violence in some circumstances of armed conflict such as self-
determination or national movements is one of the main obstacles to reach a 
universal agreement on a definition of terrorism, the Convention evades the issue. 
This evasion increases “a possibility of legal dispute when the [Convention] is 
applied to a real case” 371 because some may insist on excluding the use of violence 
in those circumstances from being labelled as terrorism.372 
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Working document submitted by France on the draft international convention for the suppression of 
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In addition, it is not clear what the phrase “any other person not taking an active 
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict” excludes from the definition.  
This could “give rise to disputes of interpretation, i.e., as to whether a particular act 
constituted terrorism, or was undertaken during armed conflict”.373  The United 
States, for example, interprets this phrase to include an assault on off-duty military 
personnel in time of armed conflict.374 In this regard, it might be controversial as to 
how to deal with combatants of various kinds, either as terrorists or combatants. 
It is also significant to note that the Convention is silent on what the definition of 
‘civilian’ is. There remains a great deal of controversy over the questions of whether 
Israeli settlers in Palestinian occupied lands, Pied-noirs in Algeria or white South 
Africans in the time of apartheid are or were, for instance, ‘innocent civilians’, and 
whether the use of violence against police officers or government officials who 
implement the oppressive policies of a government are acts of terrorism.375  
The attempt of the authors of the Convention to specify the intention or purpose of 
the crime is also subject to criticism for its breadth. According to the definition, it 
may suffice for an act to be classified as terroristic if it is determined that the 
purpose of the act, “by its nature or context”, is either to intimidate people “or” to 
coerce a government or international organization to act.376 While the former is very 
broad to the extent that it can apply, for example, to those gangs’ activities 
committed with the conscious objective of intimidating, the latter partly signals the 
political aspect of terrorism. However, coercing a State in itself is wide enough to 
include acts which have no political, religious or ideological rationale,377 such as 
the assassination of a judge carried out by the mafia to compel a State to abandon 
investigations or prosecutions. It seems that the drafters were reluctant (or found it 
                                                 
373 At. 
374 United States President (1993-2001: Clinton) and United States Congress. Senate. Committee on 
Foreign Relations International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism: Message 
From the President of the United States (U.S. G.P.O., Washington, DC, 2000), at VII. 
375 Michael Walzer Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (3rd ed, 
Basic Books, New York, NY, 2000); see also Thomas M  Franck and Scott C Senecal “Porfiry's 
Proposition: Legitimacy and Terrorism” 1987 20(2) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 195.  
376 During the negotiation on the Convention, concern was made that “there could be other reasons 
for committing a terrorist act”. See UN, Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 
A/C.6/54/L.2, 26 October 1999, above n 359, at [87]. 
377 Aust, above n 68, at 298. 
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controversial) to rely on motive to differentiate private from public violence378 and 
they preferred to stick with the traditional criminal principle that “no motive can 
excuse an intentional crime”.379 Article 14 of the Convention  reflects this where it 
provides that, for the purpose of extradition, a terrorist act shall not be viewed “as 
a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an 
offence inspired by political motives.” 
5.4 Conclusion  
Unlike many other crimes, terrorism is not an easy concept to define. It is mainly 
because the concept of terrorism is elusive and subject to different 
understandings.380 As a result, a number of international conventions were agreed 
on certain classes of offences implicitly regarded as terrorist offences without trying 
to define or even apply the term terrorism. While this approach seems to be 
successful in addressing terrorist-type conduct, the emphasis on tackling terrorist 
financing required the provision of a clear definition of what constitutes terrorism, 
terrorist acts and terrorist groups the financing of which needs to be tackled. 
Unfortunately, the counter-terrorist financing regime has failed to define precisely 
the scope of the elements of terrorism. This may endanger the implementation of 
the counter-terrorist financing measures simply because those actors engaged in the 
fight against terrorist financing do not have a clear or common understanding of 
whose money or what financing they are expected to look for. More importantly 
and in contradiction with the values of the rule of law discussed in chapter 1.4.1, 
citizens are left struggling to define what kinds of activities or what groups they 
should not support financially on pain of prosecution. This matter will be revisited 
in the following chapters.  
 
                                                 
378See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes Guide for the legislative incorporation and 
implementation of the universal ati-terrorism instruments (2006), at [31]. 
379 Roach, above n 325, at 42.  
380 George P. Flercher “The indefinable concept of terrorism” 2006 4(5) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 894. 
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Chapter Six: The material elements of the offence  
6.1 Introduction  
There are four elements to the actus reus of the offence of terrorist financing. Under 
the definition of the offence provided by the Convention, a person is criminally 
liable when that person a) unlawfully b) collects c) or provides d) funds. What each 
of these elements means, how they were placed in the Convention and how they are 
interpreted and implemented by states will be discussed in this chapter. 
As will be illustrated, there are so many ambiguities over the definition of these 
elements. But, the main challenge here is, when there is no connection between 
each of these elements and a criminal terrorist act, how the actus reus of the offence 
should be interpreted in order for its criminalization to be justified. The next chapter 
shows that the offence relies heavily on the mental element of the offence, from 
which where the criminality of terrorist financing is assumed to be derived; but as 
it will be shown here, the criminalization of acts of financing, or collecting or 
providing funds, without connecting them to an actual terrorist act, makes the actus 
reus elements ambiguous and causes confusion on the implementation of the 
Convention.  
For example, as illustrated in the final part of this chapter on the definition of 
‘funds’, the Convention’s vague reference to ‘funds’ without the requirement to 
link them to any actual terrorist activities has led some states to criminalize 
financing of anything (US’s approach is an example will be examined here). This 
chapter discusses how such a broad interpretation has violated free speech rights in 
the US. Although, a narrower definition of funds (as it is practiced in Germany and 
Japan) does not contain vague terms, it suffers from a similar problem; that is, a 
narrower definition restricts only the scope of the offence, and consequently the 
scale of abuse of the law; but it does not really address the structural issue of where 
the criminality of the offence originates from. 
6.2 The link between the actus reus of the offence and terrorist acts  
One of the main challenges that the drafters faced was how to outline the scope of 
the new offence so that it could not to be understood or interpreted by implementing 
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State Parties as a preparatory offence to terrorism. To do so, the drafters had to 
clearly define the connection between acts of financing and a terrorist act but at the 
same time emphasise the one was separate from the other. Under the initial draft of 
the Convention, the offence was defined to include “the financing of a person or 
group of persons” who “commits or proposes to commit” an offence annexed to the 
Convention or a terrorist act defined by the Convention.381 While the language of 
this definition, which refers to the commission of subsequent terrorist acts, seemed 
to suggest that the act of financing needs to be related to a specific act, it was argued 
that there should be no need for the establishing of a precise connection between 
particular funds provided to terrorists and a specific act because most of the funds 
given to terrorists are spent on long-term preparations which are not directly related 
to a particular attack.382 It was also pointed out that, while it can be possible to trace 
the providers of a physical item used in the commission of a terrorist act, it would 
be very hard (if not impossible) to trace and prove that a specific amount of money 
has been used to finance the commission of a particular terrorist attack.   
On the other hand, those delegations which tried to restrict the scope of the offence 
to the financing of an organization, found this reasoning inapplicable to the case of 
the financing of individuals.383 They argued that while the independent 
criminalization of the financing of groups, which have the elements of “long-term 
planning, continuity of purpose, division of labour and particular difficulty of 
detection”, is justifiable, the financing of an individual in order to enable that 
individual to commit a crime would merely constitute a preparatory offence under 
national and international law. As mentioned earlier, this reservation was not taken 
into account in the Convention as agreed because the draft sponsors wished the 
offence to have a broader scope.      
After the failure to define terrorist groups, the drafters deleted the references to both 
a person and organization, and the distinction between financing individuals and 
financing organisations that the objecting delegations were trying to make 
collapsed.  The Convention was reformulated with a direct reference to terrorist 
acts, which do not necessarily need to be committed or attempted; that is, the 
                                                 
381 UN, A/C.6/53/9, 4 November 1998, above n 10, art 2.  
382 Aust, above n 68, at 296-297. 
383 UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.12 reprinted in A/54/37, above n 170. 
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Convention requires the criminalization of the collection or provision of funds with 
the intention that the funds should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be 
used, in full or in part, to commit “an act” annexed to the Convention or “any other 
act” which matches the definition of terrorism provided in Article 2 (1). To make 
sure that the scope of Article 2 could expand to include the financing of any and all 
terrorist-related offences, the draft’s main sponsor, France, suggested that “in order 
to convict a person for an offence [defined by the Convention] it shall not be 
necessary to prove that the funds were in fact used to prepare for or to commit a 
specific offence”.384 Therefore, it does not matter how remote the act of collection 
or provision of funds is from the actual commission of subsequent terrorist offences. 
What is important for an act to be considered as a terrorist financing offence is proof 
of the mental elements, that the collected or provided funds “should be” or “are to 
be used” for terrorist purposes. So, the criminality of the offence relies heavily on 
the mental element that a financer may have. This will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.   
As a result of the inclusion of this paragraph, the proposal, which tried to restrict 
the scope of the offence to the financing of the terrorist acts which constitutes 
“main” offences within the scope of the conventions listed to the Annex did not find 
its way into the final draft.385 The “main offence” was defined as any offence within 
the scope of one of the Conventions set forth in the Annex, excluding attempts and 
contributory or participatory offences. The proposer (Austria) may have been 
concerned that a financial contribution to an act which constitutes complicity in an 
offence such as hostage-taking or a car bomb attack would be far from the 
subsequent terrorist act. In the proposer’s view, such criminalization would create 
“the danger of very long chains of participation removing a reasonably close nexus 
to the main offence; the scope of application would become too large”.386  
However, in practice, controversy still exists as to how the preparatory act of 
financing a specific terrorist offence or financing of an individual who is to commit 
a particular attack can be classified as an independent offence.  In practice, some 
countries resist criminalizing the financing of a specific act as an independent 
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offence (probably because of its inconsistency with their domestic law). For 
instance, “if the financing of terrorism is related to a specific crime, Denmark’s 
approach to criminalization ... is through a person’s complicity in the terrorism 
offence” pursuant to sections 114 (terrorism offences) and section 23 (complicity) 
of the Danish Criminal Code.387 Similarly, in Germany, the financing of terrorist 
acts and financing of individual terrorists may be prosecuted using the participatory 
offence of “assisting another to commit a crime.388   
Perhaps the main concern lies in the fact that the application of the Convention to 
the financing of a specific act results in over-criminalization. For example, if 
someone provides his car to terrorists with the intention that it should be used or 
with the knowledge that the car is to be used in a car bomb attack at a specific place 
and at a certain time,389 the car provider, according to the Terrorist Financing 
Convention, is to be charged with the primary offence of terrorist financing. The 
car provider can be also convicted of another ancillary offence under the Article 2 
(3) of the Terrorist Bombing Convention. While the Convention is silent on this 
issue and while national attempts vary with regard to the issue of multiple 
convictions,390 the FATF insists that criminalizing terrorist financing as complicity 
in a terrorist’s act is not sufficient to meet its requirements. In spite of the FATF’s 
recommendations, and in order to avoid multiple convictions, suspects, in Finland391 
and Sweden392, are not prosecuted for the terrorist financing offence if the act is 
punishable as the commission of or an attempt to terrorist offences covered by their 
Penal Code, or offences for which a severe sentence is provided elsewhere in the 
law.   
                                                 
387 Financial Action Task Force Third Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Kingdom of Denmark (Paris, 2006), at [216]. See also 
Financial Action Task Force “Mutual evaluation third follow-up report anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism; Kingdom of Denmark” 22 October 2010 at 150. 
388 International Monetary Fund Germany: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (Washington, DC, 2010), at [210].  
389 Lavalle, above n 68, at 501. 
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Prosecutor v. Zejnil DELALIC, Zdravko MUCIC (20 February 2001), Case No. IT-96-21-A, the 
Appeals Chamber, at [405- 412]. 
391 Financial Action Task Force Third Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Finland (Paris, 2007), at [153]. See also Financial Action 
Task Force 9th Follow-Up Report; Mutual Evaluation of Finland (Paris, 2013).  
392 Section 5 of Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in 
some cases, 2002:444 (Sweden). 
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In the following parts, I will examine the impact of this approach on the four 
elements of the actus reus. 
6.3 ‘Collection’ and ‘Provision’  
Defining the material act of the new offence is not as easy as one may imagine. This 
is because the act of financing, in its nature, is harmless and preparatory, and, in 
many cases, has a legal appearance. Unsurprisingly, the drafters of the Convention 
struggled with clarifying how and when an act of financing turns into the crime of 
terrorist financing. In other words, the difficulty was (and still is) whether, and if 
so, how to criminalize every link in the chain of supply from production of the 
funds, through transfer to reception and possession and whether each link could be 
said to be part of terrorist financing.  
In a revised draft of the Convention, the term “financing” was defined in a separate 
paragraph to mean “the transfer or reception of funds, assets or other property, 
whether lawful or unlawful, by any means, directly or indirectly, to or from another 
person or another organization.”393 However, such a definition provoked serious 
differences of opinion among the delegations. 
The most controversial issue in this regard was whether the act of financing should 
include “the reception of funds in addition to their transfer”.394 A concern was 
expressed that the term “transfer” did not include all kinds of financial assistance. 
An alternative proposal was made to replace the term transfer with “providing, 
provisions” or “making funds available” “so as to make it clear that an actual 
transfer was not required per se”,395 and “to provide a broader scope for the term 
financing beyond the technical connotation of transfer”.396  
The retention of the term “reception” was also opposed on the basis that “it would 
cast the meaning of the term financing too broadly, criminalizing a wide variety of 
activities beyond what was originally intended”, from “active acts of financing” to 
                                                 
393 UN, A/54/37, Annex II, Working document submitted by France on the draft international 
convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism, art 1(1). 
394 UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, Annex III, Informal summary of the discussions in the Working Group, 
prepared by the Chairman at [32].    
395 At [35]. 
396 UN, A/54/37, Annex IV, Informal summary of the discussion in the Working Group, prepared 
by the Rapporteur, at [2]. 
86 
 
“the passive act of receiving”.397 It was also pointed out that the term financing did 
not need to include the case of intermediaries who received funds as “the 
subsequent transfer of those funds would fall within the scope of the term 
transfer”.398 
On the other hand, the retention of term “reception” was supported as it could 
enable authorities “to counter the funnelling of funds through middlemen, who 
possessed the specific intention required by the draft convention, or through other 
similar complex financial arrangements used to finance terrorist acts”.399 It was also 
pointed out that the deletion of the reference to “reception” would restrict the 
prosecution of the intermediaries who possesses funds, but decline to transfer them 
or are arrested before transferring them. A concern was expressed that if the 
delegations considered a reference to “reception” necessary, a specific intent 
element in relation to the act of reception should be defined.400 A relative suggestion 
was proposed in favour of the criminalization of the act of reception “as a separate 
offence to transferring”.401 As a result of the divergent views on the definition of 
financing, the drafters decided to delete the reference to the term “financing”. In the 
final draft of the convention, the objective element of the offence was defined to 
mean the unlawful provision or collection of funds.402  
While this definition was accepted by the delegations without any further argument, 
there are some uncertainties in regard to the application field of this definition. First 
of all, unlike the Palermo Convention in which the possession of proceeds is 
regarded as one of the material elements of money laundering,403 the Terrorist 
Financing Convention is vague on whether the terms collection and provision can 
be extended to cover the possession of funds. Different approaches have been 
adopted by states. Unlike Japan where the mere possession of funds does not 
constitute criminal labiality,404 the UK in Section 16 of Terrorism Act (2006) 
                                                 
397 UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, Annex III, Informal summary of the discussions in the Working Group, 
prepared by the Chairman, at [37]. 
398 At [37]. 
399 At [38]. 
400 At [39]. 
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402 Article 2 (1).   
403 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 210, art 6 (1)(b)(i). 
404 See Financial Action Task Force Third Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism; Japan (Paris, 2008), at [224]. 
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criminalizes the “possession” of money or property intended to be used or likely to 
be used for terrorism. 
In addition, the replacement of the terms transfer and reception by the terms 
collection and provision without any explanation results in different 
understandings. The main question in this regard is how these two acts (collection 
and provision) should be treated? On the one hand, in some jurisdictions, such as 
Portugal, the collection of funds is regarded as a preparatory act which constitutes 
“an attempt or preliminary form of attempt”.405 Under this approach, the link 
between the act of collection and a terrorist act is necessary. Similarly, in Spain, the 
financing of a terrorist organization constitutes an attempted offence when funds 
are collected in order to be provided to the terrorist group in the furtherance of its 
illegal aims and activities.406  
On the other hand, some believe that “the collection of funds” and “the provision 
of funds” are two distinct acts, each of which represents “a separate offence”.407 It 
is argued that “although collecting funds may be a preparatory act to their provision, 
it is not a prerequisite to it since funds provided to terrorists need not have been the 
object of a prior collection”.408 So, if a person raises funds and then provides them 
to terrorists, he perpetrates two different, but successive, crimes. Moreover, in the 
case of the involvement of intermediaries, the person who commits the “collection 
offence” is different from the person who perpetrates the “provision offence” by 
providing the funds to the terrorists. In such a case, however, the question may arise 
as to whether the transfer of funds from collectors to intermediaries should be 
regarded as a collection or a provision? In the US where the term collection includes 
“raising and receiving”, and the term provision means “giving, donating and 
transmitting”,409 a court did not try to differentiate between these two acts. It simply 
held that “the banking activities of receiving deposits and transmitting funds 
between accounts on the basis that the accounts (and funds) belong to groups 
                                                 
405 Financial Action Task Force Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism; Portugal (Paris, 2006), at 183. 
406 Financial Action Task Force, above n 217, at [121]. 
407 Lavalle, above n 68, at 498. 
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engaged in terrorist activity” or charity fronts may create criminal liability under 
the US law.410  
It is worthy of note that in some jurisdictions, the illegality of an act of collection 
depends on the identity of the financers. In Japan, for example, the collection of 
funds for terrorist purposes does not create criminal liability if the collectors are not 
terrorists.411 Their acts will not be punishable unless and until they provide the 
collected funds to terrorists.412 In other words the crime is never inchoate; only 
choate. 
6.4 The requirement of ‘unlawfulness’  
What gives an unconventional appearance to the Convention is the requirement of 
unlawfulness in Article 2 (1); that is, funds have to be collected or provided 
“unlawfully”.413 As the German delegation in the negotiation pointed out, if the 
Convention aims at criminalizing the act of financing terrorism as an offence, “the 
mentioning that such financing has to be unlawful seems superfluous”.414 It should 
be noted that the same qualifier was used in the Terrorist Bombing Convention so 
as not to criminalize the lawful use of explosives.415 The application of this qualifier 
in this case is justified on the basis that non-military people may lawfully use 
explosives for civilian purposes such as construction and mining;416 however, such 
a justification cannot be applied in the case of terrorist financing since collecting or 
providing funds for use in carrying out terrorist acts cannot be legal in any event.  
As far as the discussions in the travaux préparatoires of the Convention are 
concerned, the term “unlawfully” was included to add “an element of flexibility” to 
the definition by excluding from the scope of the application of the Convention 
financing cases such as “ransom payments”,417 or cases which “might have the 
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415 Article 2 (1) of The Terrorist Bombing Convention, above n 5. 
416 Lavalle, above n 68, at 500. 
417 UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, Annex III, Informal summary of the discussions in the Working Group, 
prepared by the Chairman, at [67].  
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unintended result of aiding the commission of” terrorist acts418 such as the provision 
of material assistance to groups believed to pursue terrorist offences as well as 
humanitarian activities.419 Similar concerns were expressed by the representatives 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations  High 
Commissioner for Refugees, whose material assistance to groups of individuals 
(refugee camps were quoted) might unintentionally fall into the hands of the 
guilty.420 It is also cited that the term “unlawfully” might be retained by the drafters 
to refer to “conduct undertaken without authority (whether legislative, executive, 
administrative, judicial, contractual or consensual) or conduct that is otherwise not 
covered by established legal defences or relevant principles under domestic law”.421 
Regardless of what the drafters intended to exclude from the ambit of the 
application of the Convention, the inclusion of the qualifier “unlawfully” has left a 
gap in the Convention, which is open to different interpretations. In fact, the 
insurmountable difficulty that the drafters faced in introducing the new offence of 
terrorist financing was how to define terrorism and terrorist acts in such a way as to 
be distinguishable from the acts committed by freedom fighters in furtherance of a 
struggle against oppression and foreign occupation.422 As mentioned earlier, all 
attempts in this respect failed because the drafters could not adequately outline the 
contours of terrorism and terrorist acts; they also avoided defining terrorist groups.  
In such uncertain and controversial circumstances, it is not surprising that the term 
“unlawfully” can be used as a “shorthand reference to grounds excluding” the 
financing of acts and groups that a state does not wish to label as terrorist and 
unlawful.423 For example, Switzerland424 and Austria425 have introduced, in a vague 
manner, an exclusion of criminality for an act of financing directed to the 
establishment or re-establishment of a democratic and constitutional regime or the 
                                                 
418 UN, A/54/37, Annex IV, at [17]. 
419 Aust, above n 68, at 294. 
420 UN Comments by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the draft international 
convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism (A/C.6/54/WG.1/INF/1, 9 November 
1999), at [4]. See also UN, above n 283. 
421 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism  (16 May 2005), at [82]. 
422 UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, Annex III, at [2 and 81]. 
423 Lavalle, above n 68, at 501.  
424 Criminal Code of the Swiss Confederation 1937, art 260 quinquies(3). 
425 Criminal Code of the Republic of Austria1974, art 278c (3). 
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exercise or protection of human rights.426 However, how and on what basis the 
legitimacy of people who resort to violence to establish a democratic situation or to 
protect human rights should be determined, if determinable at all, may vary from 
one state to another, depending on whose side a state would be on (funding different 
sides in the civil war in Syria is the obvious good example).  
In the absence of clarity and consensus on whether (or how) terrorism includes a 
situation of armed conflict, the inclusion of the qualifier ‘unlawfulness’ gives rise 
to controversy over whether the terrorist financing offence includes cases where the 
financing is carried out for the support of situations involving armed conflict. It 
seems that countries are confronted with dilemmas. Some states, such as 
Switzerland, may not regard an act of financing as unlawful “if with the financing, 
acts are to be supported that are not in contradiction with the rules of international 
law pertaining to armed conflicts”.427 Other states, such as New Zealand,428 may 
favour broadening the meaning of terrorism to include any activities that occur in a 
situation of armed conflict, and the purpose of which is to cause death and bodily 
injury to a civilian, and to intimidate a population or to compel a government to do 
or prevent from doing an act. In such a case, the rules on financing of terrorism can 
be applied to the financing of armed groups involved in a situation of armed 
conflict, including freedom fighters.   
6.5 Definition of ‘funds’ 
Another fundamental element of the design for an independent and generic crime 
of terrorist financing is the concept of ‘funds’ gathered to be used for terrorist 
purposes. During the negotiation of the Convention, there was not much argument 
on the definition of the term “funds”. The first429 and revised draft430 of the 
Convention used a non-specific definition of the term ‘funds’ which encompassed 
“any form of pecuniary benefit”.431 The drafters, however, decided to stretch the 
                                                 
426 It is worth noting that Greece, in Article 187A (8) of its Penal Code, had included a similar 
exception, but it removed the exception in order to meet the FATF requirements. See Financial 
Action Task Force, above n, at [60].  
427 Pieth, above n 303, at 1081. 
428 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (New Zealand), Section 5(1)(c) and 4 (1). 
429 See Article 1 of UN, Letter dated 3 November 1998 from the Permanant Representative of France 
to the United Nateions addressed to the Secretary-general, A/C.6/53/9, 4 November 1998.  
430 UN, A/54/37, Annex II, art 1(1). 
431  At, Annex IV, at [10]. 
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meaning of the term ‘funds’ beyond its dictionary meaning in its agreed version. 
The Convention thus extends the meaning of the funds to cover  
assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, 
however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including 
electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but 
not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, 
shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.432 
The Convention does not clarify what the expression “but not limited to” refers to. 
It has been left to the implementing states to define in their own law. Under a broad 
interpretation, funds can include “anything under the sun”, from “animals, 
buildings, or vehicles of any kind” to any other objects which have pecuniary value. 
433 The implication of this broad interpretation is not clear.  As illustrated in the 
discussion below, which examines a very broad approach to interpreting ‘funds’ 
and ‘funding’, the apparent breadth of this definition, which may seem functional 
in abstract proves, however, to be controversial when it is applied at national levels. 
This definition is also served for functional reasons to stretch the scope of the 
offence in a way that would have a negative impact on its legitimacy as criminal 
law.  
A narrower interpretation of the term ‘funds’ is also possible, although it is not clear 
whether a narrower definition reduces the negative impact. The following 
discussion examines the broad approach interpretation adopted by the US 
contrasting it with the narrower approach used in German and Japan to defining the 
term funds.       
6.5.1 A broad but controversial interpretation of definition of the 
term “funds”  
From a US perspective, which applies a very broad definition of support, the term 
‘funds’ means support beyond pure funding. That is, the US law prohibits providing 
“material support or resources” to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations.434 
The term “material support or resources” contains not only funds and tangible 
                                                 
432 The Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, art 1 (1).  
433 Lavalle, above n 68, at 496. 
434 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339 A and B. 
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goods, but also “training”, “personnel”, “transportation”, “service” and “expert 
advice or assistance”, “except medicine or religious materials”.435  
However, the precise scope of the “material support and resources” provisions has 
proved controversial and come under constitutional attack for their vagueness. The 
main challenge that the US courts have faced is deciding whether the support 
provided by groups seeking to advocate for human rights and peace to and with the 
organizations designated as terrorist organizations fits the definition of “material 
support and resources”.436 In the complicated 12-year long Humanitarian Law 
Project litigation, in which a non-profit organization sought to promote the peaceful 
resolution in violent conflict by supporting groups designated by the US 
government as terrorist groups, namely the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party, the plaintiffs, among other things, claimed that prohibitions against 
providing “material support and resources” to foreign designated terrorist 
organizations were “unconstitutionally vague”.437 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin enforcement against the ban on providing “training, expert advice or 
assistance (when derived from “specialized knowledge”), service and personnel”.   
Despite the clarifying explanations of these terms added to the material support 
provisions,438 the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that these terms 
(except the term “personnel”)439 were impermissibly vague and in contradiction 
with the values of the rule of law discussed in chapter 1.4. With regard to the term 
                                                 
435 The US Congress intended the term medicine “to be understood to be limited to the medicine 
itself, and does not include the array of medical supplies”. The term religious should not be read to 
include “anything that could be used to cause physical injury to any person. It is meant to be limited 
to those religious articles typically used during customary and time-honored rituals or teaching 
particular faith, demonstration, or sect”. See House of Representatives “Terrorism Prevention Act”,  
(15 April 1996), < https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/h104518.htm>.  See also  18 U.S.C. § 
2339A (b)(1).   
436 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F.Supp.2d 1176, (C.D. Cal. 1998) at [1180].  
437 Steven Strasser and Craig R. Whitney The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 
Commission: Excerpts From the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11: Testimony From 
Fourteen Key Witnesses, Including Richard Clarke, George Tenet, and Condoleezza Rice (Public 
Affairs, New York, 2004), at 1185. 
438 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b)(2), (3), 2339B(h),  
439 The US court in the case of Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) at 1152 held that the amendment to the material support provisions (Article 2339B(h)) 
limits “prosecution for providing “personnel” to the provision of “one or more individuals” to a 
foreign terrorist organization “to work under terrorist organization’s direction or control or to 
organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organizations”. The provision 
also clarifies that “[i]ndividuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization 
to advance its goal or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist 
organization’s direction and control”.       
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“training” which is defined as “instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific 
skill, as opposed to general knowledge”,440  the Court of Appeals accepted the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the term “training”, does not clearly  “put a person of 
ordinary intelligence on notice that his or her contemplated action is unlawful” 
because  it is highly improbable “that a person of ordinary intelligence would know 
whether, and when teaching someone to petition international bodies for tsunami 
related aid … is imparting a “specific skill” or general knowledge”, and because “a 
plaintiff who wishes to instruct members of a designated group on how to petition 
the United Nations to give aid to their group could plausibly decide that such 
protected expression falls within the scope of the term ‘training’”.441 The Court of 
Appeals stated that even if persons of ordinary intelligence could understand the 
scope of the term training, the term would remain vague as it could still be read to 
cover speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment.442  
With regard to the term “expert advice or assistance” defined as imparting 
“scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge”,443 the plaintiffs argued that 
the “specialized knowledge” portion of this definition is unclear because “it merely 
repeats what an expert is and provides no additional clarity”;444 so, “they must now 
guess whether their expert advice constitutes specialized knowledge”.445 The Court 
of Appeals ruled that   
“specialized knowledge” includes the same protected activities that “training” 
covers, such as teaching international law for peacemaking resolutions or how to 
petition the United Nations to seek redress for human rights violations”. … [T]he 
phrase “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” does not clarify the 
term “expert advice or assistance” for the average person with no background in 
law.446    
The insertion of the undefined term “service” to the definition of the ‘material 
support’ provisions has been also attacked on vagueness grounds. Emphasizing that 
the plaintiffs could freely engage in human rights and political advocacy “on behalf 
                                                 
440 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) 
441 Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey 552 F.3d 916, (9th Cir 2009), at [929]. 
442 At [929]. 
443 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3). 
444 Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, above n 439, at [1152]. 
445 At [1152]. 
446 Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, (C.D. Cal. 2005) at [1151]. 
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of” designated groups before any forum of their choosing, the defendants argued 
that the dictionary meaning of the term ‘service,’ which is “an act done for the 
benefit or at the command of another” or useful labor that does not produce a 
tangible commodity”, clarifies the scope of the prohibition on the provision of 
service.447 The plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ contradictory arguments, claiming 
that such a definition “forces the plaintiffs to guess whether human rights and 
political advocacy action taken “on behalf of” another, which [the] [d]efendants 
concede is protected action, or “for the benefit of another”, which [the] [d]efendants 
argue is prohibited”.448 Adopting the District Court’s reasoning and its holding, the 
Court of Appeals found the term “service” unconstitutionally vague because “the 
statute defines ‘service’ to include ‘training’ or ‘expert advice or assistance’, terms 
the court has already ruled are vague”,449 and because “it is easy to imagine 
protected expression that falls within the bounds’ of the terms ‘service’”. 450  
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision on what I 
argue are insufficient and controversial grounds. It found that the lower courts 
inappropriately merged the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge with their First 
Amendment concerns.451 It claimed that the provisions survive scrutiny if each of 
those challenges is regarded independently. With regard to the vagueness challenge, 
the court criticized the lower courts’ approach for examining the statute’s 
application in any possible circumstances, not to the facts before them. While 
acknowledging that “the material-statute may not be clear in every application”,452 
the Supreme Court upheld that most of the activities in which the plaintiffs wish to 
engage are clearly banned by the provisions.453 That is, a reasonable person would 
realize that training the Kurdistan Workers' Party’s (PKK’s) 454 members to use 
international law to resolve disputes or to petition the UN for relief falls within the 
scope of the terms “training” and “expert advice or assistance” because they impart 
                                                 
447 At [1151- 1152]. 
448 At [1152]. 
449 At [1152]. 
450Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, above n 441, at [930]. 
451 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 130 S.Ct. 2705, (2010), at [2719]. 
452 At [2720]. 
453 At [2719]. 
454 The Kurdish Workers’ Party (the PKK) in turkey is designated as a terrorist in the US. See US 
Department of State, above n 202.   
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a “specific skill”, not “general knowledge”.455 The court found that political 
advocacy on behalf of the PKK or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)456 
may also be regarded as material support in the form of providing “personnel” or 
“service” the scope of which are extended by the statute to cover coordinated or 
directed, and not “independent”, advocacy, 457 which consists of advocacy “that is 
not directed by, or coordinated with, a designated terrorist organization.”458 The 
court refused to answer the plaintiffs’ questions of “how much directions or 
coordination is necessary for a conduct to constitute a “service” or “personnel”? 
Would any communication with any members be sufficient? Must the relationship 
have any formal elements, such as an employment or contractual relationship? 
What about a relationship through an intermediary?”459 The court found these 
questions too “hypothetical” to be considered.460  
With regard to free speech claims, the Supreme Court, in a controversial ruling and 
for the first time in its history, ruled that the government may prohibit the provision 
of material support in the form of political advocacy of the type at issue to a terrorist 
organization without violating the First Amendment.461 Favouring urgent political 
demands,462 the court recited the government’s concerns that foreign terrorist 
organizations are so tainted by their criminal conduct that training and coordinated 
support in the form of advocacy of a terrorist group’s lawful activities might be put 
to violent ends in the way that money, food and other “fungible” resources could 
be.463 They may “lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups … that makes it easier 
for those groups to persist, to recruit members and to raise funds”.464 Providing 
foreign terrorist groups with material support in any form strains the US’s 
relationships with their allies and undermines their efforts to prevent terrorism.465 
Terrorist groups acquainted with the United Nations’ human rights bodies might 
                                                 
455 Holder v.Humanitarian Law Project above n 451, at [2720]. 
456 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. See US Department of State, above n 202. 
457 Holder v.Humanitarian Law Project above n 451, at [2721-2]. 
458 Owen Fiss “The World We Live In” 2011 83(2) Temple Law Review 295 at 299. 
459 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project , above n 451, at [2722].  
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use also the information to “threaten, manipulate and disturb”.466  Assisting groups 
to peruse peaceful negotiations might be used as “a means of buying time to recover 
from short-term setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately 
preparing for renewed attacks”.467  
The decision of the court has been criticized mainly because neither the court nor 
the government provided any evidence to prove how the plaintiffs’ advocacy of 
human rights or peacemaking could be turned to terrorist activities.468 The threat 
that the court considers that the law seeks to prevent is potential (or perhaps more 
accurately fictional) not actual.  The court only prohibited coordinated advocacy, 
advocacy that occurs in coordination with, or at the direction of, a designated 
terrorist organization. Nevertheless, the court’s reasoning is questionable: if the 
harm of political advocacy is adequate to justify the prohibition, why is it not 
sufficient to justify the ban on ‘independent’ advocacy? Independent advocacy 
might, one assumes, free resources, legitimatize groups or give terrorists the 
opportunity of exploiting it for their illegal purposes.469 Moreover, both types of 
advocacy (coordinated and independent) undermine free speech. 
The court’s reasoning also raised the concern that if the government does not intend 
to suppress particular advocacy for particular groups designated as terrorist groups, 
whether the provision of “job training” to other groups such as gangs should be 
banned on the assumption that the skills might make them more effective criminals 
or lend them legitimacy. Or should peaceful coordinated advocacy with activist 
non-governmental organizations like Greenpeace be proscribed on the theory that 
these organizations sometimes use illegal methods to achieve their goals?470 Might 
advocating for delisting a foreign terrorist group, which usually requires some 
degree of coordination with the organization, be considered as provision of material 
support in the form of “services” to the group? After the decision of the Supreme 
                                                 
466 At [2729]. 
467 At [2729]. 
468 At [2730-2340] (Justice Breyer, dissenting).   
469 Fiss, above n 458, at 302. 
470 David Cole “The First Amendment's Borders" the Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Project in 
First Amendment Doctrine” 2012 6(1) Harvard Law & Policy Review 147, at 157. 
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Court in Humanitarian Law Project, the answers to these questions may be yes, 
although they differ from question to which the court was applying itself.471  
In a similar case,472 the US Court of Appeals complicated the issue by holding that 
the First Amendment does not permit the government to proscribe advocacy 
coordinated with a “domestic” terrorist organization. Although it applied the 
Humanitarian Law project decision, the court reasoned that advocacy for a 
designated “domestic” group whose assets had already been frozen could not free 
up the group’s assets for its illegal purposes.473 Nor does it endanger the US 
relationship with its allies as it is domestic. However, neither the court nor the 
statute defined the term “domestic”.474 
To sum up, what the US approach teaches us is that the lack of requirement to 
connect funds to any terrorist act means the offence depends heavily on the mental 
element of the offence as a tainting element. Moreover, the vague wording of the 
Convention, which seems to permit the term ‘funds’ to include almost anything, 
leads to the impingement of the basic rights such as free speech as discussed in 
Humanitarian Law Project case. The question discussed in the next part is whether 
a narrower definition can remedy this impact.  
6.5.2 A narrower definition of the term “funds”  
Unlike the US and the other states that broadly define the term “funds”,475 some 
states define funds to include only pecuniary resources or funds of a certain value. 
                                                 
471  With regard to advocacy for the Communist Party which engaged in illegal activities, the court 
held that even teaching or advocating criminal conduct cannot be banned except where such teaching 
and advocacy produce incite and likely produce “imminent lawless action”. See Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1996) at 448. Or in De Jonge v. Oregon 299, U.S. 353, (1937), the court 
quashed the conviction of the defendant who engaged in speaking and recruiting on behalf of the 
Communist Party because he advocated lawful, nonviolent activities.   
472 In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. US Department of Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir 
2011), a local community organization sought to engage in coordinated advocacy with a group 
designated as a domestic terrorist group to protest the designation, issue a press release and hold a 
press conference.  
473 At [1053]. 
474 The court asserted that the designated group at issue in this case is “neither wholly domestic nor 
wholly foreign”. But it is considered “domestic” because it is “incorporated” under US law, it is 
“physically located” in the US, it has domestic bank accounts, and most of its activities are carried 
out in the US. The court, however, alleged that the groups had ties and interactions to and with 
foreign organizations. See At [1052].  
475 In Article 421-2-2 of the Criminal Code of the French Republic, the reference to the term funds 
includes “funds”, “securities or property of any kind and “advice”. Or in Article 187A of Greek 
Penal Code, material support includes “information and material means”, “funds” in the meaning of 
the Terrorist Financing Convention, “financial means” of any kind.  
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Following its proposal in the negotiations on the Convention, in which Japan 
proposed the use of the generic definition of “funds” such as “any form of pecuniary 
benefits”,476 Japan, in Article 2 of the Act on the Punishment of Financing of 
Offences of Public Intimidation, uses the term “shikin” which is the translation of 
the word “funds” and which is used and understood as “cash and monetary 
instruments easily convertible into cash”.477 In the case of the law at issue, the scope 
of the term “shikin” has been also defined by the Ministry of Justice of Japan under 
whose jurisdiction a law is enacted and applied to include not only “cash and other 
means of payment”, but also “other kinds of assets that are provided or collected 
with the intention of gaining such cash or other means of payment as a fruit or to 
be converted into such cash or other means of payment”.478 Japan however 
“criminalises the financial support of terrorist acts without the need to establish a 
link with a specific terrorist act or the need to prove that the funds were actually 
used to further a terrorist act”.479  
The scope of the terms “assets” is also limited under German law by section 89a 
(2) number 4 of German Penal Code to comprise only assets which are not 
“insubstantial” in value. The term insubstantial is defined by the German 
Parliament to include movable and immovable property of a certain value. It was 
added that “assets [that] might be deemed insignificant when seen in isolation may 
be more than merely insubstantial if, in an overall evaluation, they have made a 
greater than merely insubstantial contribution to the preparation of a serious 
violence act endangering the state”.480 It seems that the German legislators intended 
to narrow the scope of the offence to financing conduct whose contribution to a 
violence act endangering the state is “substantial”, and whose substantiality can be 
determined with regard to that violent conduct which has been committed or 
attempted. But, section 89a (2) does “not require the actual act endangering the state 
to be committed or attempted, nor the funds to be linked to a specific act”. So, it is 
not clear when a violent act endangering the state is not committed or attempted, 
how the substantiality of funds should be determined. If the substantiality of funds 
                                                 
476 UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.10 reproduced in UN, A/54/37, above n 170, at 28. 
477 Financial Action Task Force, above n 404, at [219]. 
478 At [221]. 
479 At [224]. 
480 International Monetary Fund, above n 388, at [207]. 
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is determined based on their market value, then it seems that the acts of financing 
is only limited to the collection or provision of funds of certain value.    
With regard to financing of terrorist groups, broadening the scope of term “assets”, 
Section 129a (5) of the German Penal Code forbids provision of the “support” for 
terrorist groups. While the term “support” is not defined, according to the 
Federal Supreme Court, “support” of a terrorist group includes “any objectively 
useful, supportive act, and therefore also all types of provision of funding referred 
to under the [Terrorist Financing] Convention”.481  However, the definition of a 
terrorist group within the meaning of the Section 129 is narrower than the definition 
provided by the FATF.482   
While the German approach has been criticised by the FATF,483 it should be noted 
that the drafters of the Convention did not take into account the similar suggestion 
put forward during the negotiations, and which emphasised the fact that the 
Convention “should be carefully reviewed so as to avoid the criminalization of 
minor offences”.484  
Again, the question arises as to whether narrowing the definition of funds to include 
specified things (monetary instruments according to Japanese law or substantial 
support under the German law) will remedy the problems arises from a broad 
interpretation that occurs in the US. In the absence of access to any case, it is hard 
to judge the scope of the offence in the way Japan and Germany interpret the 
Convention. But on a literal interpretation of the statute, what is obvious is that a 
narrower definition may limit the scope of the offence to include financing of 
certain things but not necessarily justify the criminalization of the offence, or 
prevent the abuse of the law. 
                                                 
481 At [221]. 
482 According to Section 129 German Criminal Code, a terrorist group is viewed to be “an 
organization combination of at least three persons, designed to exist for a certain period of time, 
where _ with subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group as a whole _ the 
members pursue common goals, while standing in such relation to one another that they feel 
themselves to be a uniform cluster”. Terrorist organizations are also those whose purposes or 
activities are aimed at committing the certain classes of crimes specified by the section. 
483 The FATF experts believe that the imposition of a requirement for the finds to be of a certain 
minimum value is not fully in line with its requirements. See International Monetary Fund, above n 
388, at [208].  
484 UN, A/54/37, Annex IV, at [14]. 
100 
 
6.6  Conclusion 
The main challenge of the drafters of the Convention was how to define the 
connection between acts of financing and a terrorist act from which criminality of 
terrorist financing is derived but at the same time emphasize the former is separate 
and independent from the latter. To make sure that the scope of the offence could 
expand to include financing of any terrorist offences, a paragraph, suggested by the 
drafts’ main sponsor, France, was added to the Convention; this paragraph 
emphasizes that in order to convict a person for an offence “it shall not be necessary 
to prove that the funds were in fact used to prepare for or to commit a specific 
offence”.485 Therefore, it does not matter how remote the act of collection or 
provision of funds is from the actual commission of subsequent terrorist offences; 
similarly the definition of funds could be expanded to include anything as they do 
not need to necessarily to be used for the commission or preparation of a terrorist 
act. What is important for an act to be considered as a terrorist financing offence is 
proof of the mental elements, that the collected or provided funds “should be” or 
“are to be used” for terrorist purposes. So, the criminality of the offence relies 
heavily on the mental element that a financer may have, which will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. But such an approach has negative impact on the 
definitional elements of the actus reus.   
There are four elements defined for the actus reus of the offence: 1) unlawful 2) 
collection or 3) provision 4) funds. The definition and scope of each of these 
elements have been discussed. It has been shown that how ambiguous these 
elements are, and how their ambiguity has resulted in different understanding 
among implementing states. Some of the ambiguities with regard to acts of 
‘collection’ and ‘provision’, discussed in this chapter, are that it is not clear whether 
they include the possession of funds, and whether the act of collection is perquisite 
to the act of provision, or there are two different, but successive offences. Different 
approaches have been adopted by different states.  
The inclusion of the qualifier “unlawfully” has also left a gap in the Convention, 
which is open to different interpretations. It has been argued that in the presence of 
ambiguity over the definition of terrorist act and terrorist group, the term 
                                                 
485 UN, “Working paper prepared by France on article 1 and 2”, A/54/37, above n 170.  
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“unlawfully” can be used to exclude the financing of acts and groups that a state 
does not wish to label as terrorist and unlawful.486  
The Convention expands the definition of ‘funds’ beyond its dictionary meaning in 
its agreed version; it has been left to the implementing states to define the scope of 
the term funds. Interpreting the term funds to include almost everything is the 
approach adopted by the US. It has been discussed how, in the absence of a 
requirement to connect funds to any terrorist act, such a broad interpretation have   
led to the impingement of the basic rights such as free speech.  
The approach of Japan and Germany to defining the term has been also discussed; 
however, it is doubted whether and how, in the absence of any link between funds 
and an actual act terrorist act, this approach can prevent the abuse of the law, as 
seen in the US.  Theoretically, what is obvious is that a narrower definition of funds, 
which under the Japanese law, is restricted to monetary instruments, or according 
to the German law includes only substantial support (if the substantiality of the 
support is measured based on its market value), may limit the scope of the offence 
to include financing of certain things but not necessarily give citizens fair notice of 
what they are forbidden from doing. I assume there would still be potential for 
citizens to become deprived of their rights, such as deprivation of free speech in the 
US, for being involved in the collection or provision of a narrower category of 
things regarded as funds. It may be that the drafters of the Convention hoped that 
the reliance on the mental element of offence, which permits and justifies the 
criminalization of the collection or provision of funds when they are carried out 
with the intention or knowledge that the funds are to be used for terrorist purposes, 
could narrow the scope of the offence and both justify the offence and fix this 
problem.  
                                                 
486 Lavalle, above n 68, at 501. 
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Chapter Seven: The key role of the subjective element in the 
construction of the new offence 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned, to establish an independent offence of terrorist financing, the drafters 
of the Convention did not require the proof of any connection between the act of 
financing and a specific terrorist act. Such a requirement would limit the crime of 
financing to the equivalent of inchoate offences. To avoid this, the drafters 
formulated the offence in a way that relies heavily on the mental element of the 
financer; that is, this is the financer’s intention or knowledge that the funds collected 
or provided are to be used for a terrorist act makes the act of financing criminal. 
However, when there is no requirement to link the act of financing to a specific 
terrorist act, what should the financer know or intend to be held criminally liable?  
In the following part, I will explore how and why the drafters of the Convention 
formulated the mental element of the offence in the way drafted, and discuss 
whether the mental element embedded in the Convention is per se clear. Pointing 
out why the answer to the latter is negative, I will look at the approach of two 
jurisdictions (Australia and Canada) to defining and interpreting the scope and 
structure of the mental element. The analysis of the decisions in Lodhi and 
Khawaja, dealing with the mental element of the offence, illustrates how in practice, 
any requirement other than actual knowledge or intention as to a specific act causes 
confusion and ambiguity over the structure and scope of the mental element of the 
offence. Of course, such an ambiguity is inconsistent not only with the values of 
the rule of law discussed in chapter 1.4.1, but also with many principles of criminal 
liability and basic citizens’ rights.     
7.2 History of the negotiations on the mental element of the offence 
The final formulation of the offence in which no causality between the act of 
financing and subsequent terrorist acts needs to be established turned the attention 
of negotiators to the definition of the mental elements; that is, what the collector or 
provider of funds needs to intend or to know in order to commit the crime of terrorist 
financing. Under the working document submitted by France, a person commits a 
crime if that person intentionally proceeds with the financing of a person or a group 
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in the knowledge that such financing “will or could be used, in full or in part, in 
order to prepare or commit” terrorist acts.487  
However, the inclusion of the expression “could be used” was heavily criticized 
mainly for its vagueness. It was argued that the acts of financing should be 
criminalized only if the funds “provided” are likely to be used for the commission 
of terrorist acts.488 “The language “or could be used” covers all possibilities of a 
use of the assets or property for terrorist activities and leaves too much room for 
interpretation.  
The majority of states suggested the deletion of the term “could be used”, which 
would have resulted in the requirement that the financer should know or intend that 
the funds provided “will be used, in full or in part, to commit or to prepare” the 
commission of a terrorist act. A suggestion was also made to lower the mens rea 
standard to negligence, requiring the criminalization of the provision of funds 
where “there is a reasonable likelihood that the funds will be used for” the 
preparation or commission of terrorist offences.489  
Another proposal of particular interest put forward by a group of delegations 
(Austria, Belgium, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland) tried to limit the scope of the 
criminalization to the financing that was not remote from the act of terrorism. 
According to their proposal,  
[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person unlawfully and intentionally provides funds, directly or indirectly and 
however acquired, to any person or organization committing or attempting to 
commit: 
a) Any offence within the scope of one of the Conventions listed in the Annex ... 
or  
b) ...   
                                                 
487 UN, A/54/37, Working document submitted by France on the draft international convention for 
the suppression of the financing of terrorism, Article, 2 (1), at 15. 
488 UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.26, reprinted in UN, A/54/37. See also, UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.12, 
reprinted in UN, A/54/37, above n 170. 
489 UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.20, reprinted in UN, A/54/37, above n 170. 
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Such financing shall [either] be made with the intention that the funds be used [or 
in the knowledge that the funds are to be used], in whole or in part, for the 
commission of the offences mentioned above.490   
The proposal sponsors explained that “the inclusion of the term ‘or attempting to 
commit’ [in this definition] is subject to the deletion of any reference to attempts 
and participatory offences under the scope of the Convention listed in the annex”.491 
In fact, the proposers tried to introduce a filter in the definition in order to exclude 
from the scope of the Convention the financing of an attempt of the offences listed 
in the Annex because they had doubts that a contribution to an act which constitutes 
complicity in those conventions and which would be too remote from its subsequent 
act could be independently criminalized. The language “committing or attempting 
to commit” also implied that the financer had to be aware of the material causality 
between his or her provision of the funds and an attempted or committed act.   
Another proposal sought to exclude from the ambit of the Convention the financing 
of offences listed to the Annex, and which are not “serious”. 492  The goal of this 
proposal was to avoid the scope of the application of the Convention to “trivial 
offences”.  
None of these proposals were taken into account as they appeared to place too much 
emphasis on the knowledge and intention of the financer in relation to the 
commission or preparation of a specific terrorist act. This would have restricted the 
scope of the new offence to an act of complicity in, which was not what the draft 
sponsors wished. In other words, from the drafter’s perspective, any reference to 
the attempt or commission of a subsequent terrorist act or inclusion of any qualifier 
which excludes from the scope of the Convention the financing of particular 
(preparatory forms of complicit in) terrorist acts, including the financing of attempts 
and participatory offences as proposed, might have endangered the effectiveness of 
the Convention. Imposing the proposed limitations would have made proof difficult 
because in many instances it would have required the prosecution to infer the 
                                                 
490 UN, A/AC.252/1999/WP.49, reprinted in UN, A/54/37, above n 170. 
491 At. 
492 See UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, Annex III, Informal summary of the discussions in the Working Group, 
prepared by the Chairman, at [71]. 
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knowledge or intention of a financer in regard to the specific act for which the funds 
have been collected or provided.  
As a result, the drafter decided to reformulate the definition in Article 2(1) to be 
read as follows: 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or 
collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that 
they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:  
 a) An act which constitutes an offence ... defined in one of the treaties 
listed in the Annex; or 
b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in 
a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature 
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
Paragraph 3 was added to Article 2 to emphasize that “for an act to constitute an 
offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually 
used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b)”.493 
As a result, the inclusion of paragraph 4 and 5 in Article 2 was accepted without 
any argument. These provisions criminalize any attempt to finance, including 
secondary participants, those organizing and directing others to commit terrorist 
financing, and conspiracies to commit terrorist financing. The inclusion of these 
provisions extends the scope of the criminalization to conduct which is remote from 
the act of financing, regardless of whether the funds are used for a subsequent 
terrorist act and regardless of whether a subsequent act is committed or planned. 
 In short, what makes the act of financing an offence is not the intrinsically criminal 
or terroristic nature of the act, but the malicious intent of the financer. With the 
inclusion of paragraph 3, the fault element of the crime acquires a “hypothetical” 
nature as the financer who does not know about an actual terrorist act will violate 
the law if they carry out the material elements on the assumption or in the 
                                                 
493 The Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, art 2 (3). 
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acceptance that the recipient will use the funds collected or provided to further a 
terrorist cause. Under such a formulation, in a similar way to the law in the UK and 
Canada,494 it would be more precise to speak of the financing of “terrorist purposes” 
or “terrorist activities”.495  
This conception of the offence in which the intention or the knowledge of the 
financer in regard to future conduct or a possible harm is relied on but that conduct 
itself does not necessarily have to occur is “ground-breaking” in the law on terrorist 
offences.496 While all of the prior terrorist-related conventions target harmful, self-
supporting offences such as murder, kidnapping or destruction of and severe 
damage to property, and require a fault element which is specified in relation to the 
physical elements of these offences, the Terrorist Financing Convention 
criminalizes victimless, nonviolent and preparatory acts or illegal (but non-terrorist) 
conduct (where funds are derived from illegal sources) only on the basis of the 
terrorist purposes or knowledge of others’ purposes that a financer has.  
The criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent stand-alone offence 
extends the scope of criminal law in a way not previously seen in the most modern 
liberal criminal justice systems. Traditionally, the law has incriminated preparatory 
acts through the extension of criminal liability to accessorial liability. Accessorial 
liability has a “derivative” nature in the sense that the prosecution should prove that 
the substantive offence has been committed or least attempted.497 Under this 
approach, the scope of inchoate crimes has been extended to include “encouraging 
and assisting” offence(s) that “will be committed”.498 This new offence applies 
irrespective of whether the substantive or anticipated offence(s) are or actually will 
be carried out by the principal offender. The inchoate offender must believe, 
without any significant doubt, that the principal offender will commit the 
anticipated offence(s) with the relevant intent element.499 The inchoate offender 
                                                 
494 Criminal Code (Canada), s 83.04(b); Terrorism Act (UK) 2000, s 16(2). 
495 Lehto, above n 14, at 263. 
496 At 269. 
497 Bernadette McSherry “Expanding the Boundaries of Inchoate Crimes; The Growing Reliance on 
Preparatory Offences” in Bernadette McSherry, Alan  Norrie, and Simon Bronitt (eds) Regulating 
Deviance: The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, UK, 2008), at 142. 
498 Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK), s 44-47.  




must also believe that any circumstances or consequences specified in the 
anticipated offence(s) will be fulfilled. The prosecution must therefore specify the 
offences that the inchoate offender’s act might have assisted or encouraged.500 In 
contrast, the terrorist financing offence takes one step further; it does not need to be 
proved in relation to any specific or subsequent terrorist crime. The only relevant 
offence here, as some argue, is a “fictional crime” that the financer assumes or 
accepts the recipient of the funds will commit.501  
7.3 Where does it come from? 
It has been argued that the autonomous criminalization of preparatory acts including 
terrorist financing should be considered within the context of the shift towards 
“preventive” approach,502 where “the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is 
increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime logic of security”.503 Under this 
approach, states are licensed to criminalize “abstract endangerment” acts that pose 
the risk of certain harms.504 These acts are criminalized not because they are 
“wrongful or harmful” in themselves, but because they create an opportunity for the 
commission of future dangerous acts.505 The typical examples of these acts are 
possession offences: possession of weapons,506 of illegal drugs,507 and burglarious 
instruments.508 Unlike inchoate offences, conviction for these offences does not 
necessitate proof of intent to commit any subsequent crime. Instead, the prosecution 
simply needs to prove that the offender has been aware of the possession “under 
suspicious circumstances”.509 The justifiability of criminalizing these types of 
offences is, however, questioned. It is argued that these offences “may criminalize 
people at a point too remote from the ultimate harm, not allowing for a change of 
mind”.510 It is also pointed out that possession offences extend the scope of criminal 
                                                 
500 At. 
501 Lehto, above n 14, at 287. 
502 See Carol S. Steiker “The Limits of the Preventive State” 1988 88(3) Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 771.  
503 L. Zedner “Pre-crime and Post-Criminology?” 2007 11(2) Theoretical Criminology 261, p. 263. 
504 A. P. Simester and Andrew Von Hirsch Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart, Oxford, UK, 2011), at 57. 
505 Ashworth, above n 499, at 38. 
506 See for example Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (UK). 
507 Misuse of Drugs Acts 1977 (UK), s 5 (2). Or Criminal Code (Canada), s 88.  
508 Theft Act 1968 (UK), s 25. 
509 C. Slobogin “A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness” 2003 98(1) Northwestern University Law 
Review, at 56. 
510 Ashworth, above n 499, at 97. 
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law beyond the inchoate crimes, sweeping too wide in the sense that “[t]hey 
encompass cases where there is no potential social harm”.511  
Regardless of whether the criminalisation of remote harms is justifiable, it seems 
that there are substantial differences between these offences and the terrorist 
financing offence introduced by the Convention in terms of the risks that flow from 
them, the objects involved, and the circumstances within which these offences are 
carried out. While the risk in many of the remote harm offences is more visible and 
immediate, a risk which is either explicit (dangerous driving), or implicit 
(speeding),512 the risk of harms in the terrorist financing offence is even more 
remote. Indeed, it is far too remote and/or ‘fictional’ as the financer need only 
assume or admit that the funds collected or provided will be used (by the financer 
or others) for terrorist purposes. Terrorist financing has a greater similarity with the 
rare cases when a state, for example, prohibits certain public demonstrations 
because of what they may prompt others to do in response, than with many other 
preventative crimes.      
In regard to objects and circumstances, while the criminality of remote harm 
offences is, in most cases, reliant either on the illegal nature of the object possessed 
(possession of controlled drugs or unregistered possession of firearms or 
explosives), or on the circumstances within which the object is being used 
(possession of tools for use in a burglary at the place other than the abode of the 
possessor),513 terrorist financing includes material assistance or financial 
contributions which, in most cases, have a legal appearance (fund-raising or the 
transfer of the funds collected to middlemen). Even if the financing involves illegal 
transactions such as purchase of explosives, although the criminal intention of the 
offender can be easily related to the illegal circumstance that the offender is 
involved in, the proof of the financier’s intention or knowledge that a terrorist act 
will occur or be attempted, seems difficult (if not impossible) and, furthermore, 
according to the Convention, unnecessary. In other words, unlike remote harm 
offences in which the fault element is the intent in relation to the act that the 
                                                 
511 George P. Fletcher Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 
1998), at 176. 
512 Ashworth, above n 499, at 38. 
513 Theft Act 1968 (UK), s 25(1). 
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offender carries out, not to its eventual harmful consequences, the fault element in 
terrorist financing cannot be merely an intent to perform acts of financing because 
such acts, in themselves, do not have a terrorist nature especially when all that is 
involved is the collection or the transfer of the funds collected to middlemen.  
Now I turn to examine the very important question of what constitutes the mental 
element of the offence. 
7.4  Examination of the fault elements of the offence of terrorist financing 
The question which the drafters left unanswered is that if there is no need to link 
the acts of financing to any actual terrorist act, and if financing alone can hardly 
provide a solid basis for prosecution or conviction, what should the financer know 
to be held criminally responsible? How should the intention be read where the act 
of the financer is potentially very remote from any subsequent act?  
While the Convention is not clear on these matters, the answer to these questions 
seems to be very critical as all other elements of the offence are heavily reliant on 
the fault element. Let us recap:  
1- While financing is the basic element of an offence in the inchoate mode (collection 
or provision of funds with intent to supply terrorism), the drafters established an 
independent offence of terrorist financing by putting a great deal of weight upon 
the fault element: financing with the intention or in the knowledge that the funds 
collected or provided will be used for commission of a terrorist act. The 
Convention does not even differentiate between the act of provision and the act of 
collection which seems (at least in some cases) to be a prerequisite to the act of 
provision; that is, as long as an act, either collection or provision, is involved in the 
idea of terrorism, it falls into the category of the offence.  
2- The term “funds” has been defined very broadly to cover any contributions (with 
or without legal origin) which are intended or known to be used for terrorist 
purposes.   
3- The Convention requires the criminalization of financing of an attempt and 
attempts to finance which are carried out with terrorist intent although they are very 
remote from a possible subsequent act and although their criminalization extends 
the scope of criminal liability beyond the existing law of attempts. 
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Drawing on states’ legislation on terrorist financing and cases, this section 
examines whether the fault element of an independent offence of terrorist financing 
can be adequately defined and whether such criminalization can be justified using 
traditional justifications for criminalization. The most practical way of clarifying 
this, it is suggested, is to test the offence’s fault element in the sorts of 
circumstances within which financing may actually take place. In reality and 
regarding the current counter-terrorism regime, two scenarios can be envisaged:  
1- When the financing is carried out for the preparation or commission of a terrorist 
act, which will be discussed in this chapter.  
2- Financing of a group or a person who is designated as terrorist or is involved or 
has been involved in terrorist activities. This will be discussed in chapter 8.         
7.5 Financing of a terrorist act  
This scenario includes the situation where a financer is involved in the collection 
or provision of funds known or intended to be used for the preparation or 
commission of a terrorist act. The main question here is whether, in the absence of 
a requirement to link the financer’s conduct with a terrorist act, the imposition of 
guilt on the financer is justifiable and compatible with the basic principles that 
underlie the criminal law? According to the Convention, the financer acquires 
independent criminal liability (similar to terrorism) for the conduct that is no more 
than preparatory to the intended commission of the subsequent offence. While 
many features of this situation are similar to an inchoate offence or complicity, the 
common argument put forward in justification of this approach is that the 
criminalization of such an act as an inchoate crime may not secure the conviction 
sought since, “in most jurisdictions, aiding and abetting occurs only when the 
alleged perpetrator has knowledge that the principal offence is being committed or 
at least attempted”.514 Three objections to criminalizing the financing of a terrorist 
act as an independent offence, however, stand out.  
First, normal principles seem not to support such liability: if financing carried out 
to support the commission of a particular offence is independently criminalized 
                                                 
514 International Monetary Fund “Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Handbook for 
Legislative Drafting” (2003) IMF <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2003/sfth/>. See also Koh, 
above n 66, at 66.   
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without the requirement to prove the financer knew of or intended to fund a specific 
violent act the occurrence of which depends on a further decision by the financer or 
by another, such intervening criminalization might relieve the original actor of the 
subsequent offence of criminal responsibility, and so it is the financer who should 
be punished. If the financer is to perform the subsequent offence, such an approach 
does not treat the financer as an independent agent capable of deciding to abandon 
his criminal enterprise. This point will be revisited in chapter 9.  
Second, this brings the potential for injustice. The fault element of the financer 
should not be inferred with regard to the putative offence for which the financing 
has been carried out because the commission of the subsequent crime may not be 
necessarily the result of the financing. Yet under the Convention, any contribution 
seems to suffice for liability, no matter how small and no matter whether the 
contribution has any actual impact on the commission of the subsequent offence.515 
So, financers in both minor and major cases of financing incur the same liability 
and are subject to the same punishment. Such an approach is not acceptable to some 
jurisdictions. For example, in spite of the FATF’s criticism,516 in Germany, an 
“insubstantial” contribution to the commission of a violent act is outside the scope 
of the offence of terrorist financing even if it is collected or provided with the intent 
to be used for a terrorist act.           
Finally, the criminalization of the financing of a terrorist act leads to confusion 
about the further fault element that should be proved. If financing can be 
criminalized without any need to prove its connection to the subsequent offence for 
which the financing has been carried out, what state of mind should be shown in 
order to hold the financier criminally responsible? If the Convention should be read 
to mean that the collection or provision of funds should be merely carried out for 
terrorist purposes, what, then, amounts to terrorist purposes or terrorist intent? Is 
terrorist intent definable? Does terrorist intent mean the objectives of terrorist acts 
defined by the Convention: intimidating a population or compelling a government 
or an intentional organization to do or to abstain from doing an act? That is, should 
                                                 
515 The Convention does not differentiate between minor or major cases of terrorist financing. 
516 Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism; Germany (Paris, 2010), at [210]. 
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a financer know or intend that the funds collected or provided to be used to bring 
about these purposes? 
7.5.1  Is ‘terrorist intent’ adequate as the mental element? 
Regarding the fact that there is no consensus on the definition and elements of 
terrorism, it seems that such a reading of the Convention may give rise to the 
absence of a harmonized implementation of the Convention. In this regard, national 
attempts to come to grips with the fault element have proved that defining ‘terrorist 
intent’ can be controversial. For example, Germany, in implementing the 
Convention, criminalizes the collection or provision of funds carried out with the 
intent to fund serious violent acts “endangering the state”. “Endangering the state” 
is defined as  
an offence against life ... or against personal freedom ... which under the 
circumstances, is intended to impair or and capable of impairing the existence or 
security of a state or of an international organisation, or to abolish, rob of legal 
effect or undermine constitutional principles of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.517  
As can be seen, the serious violent act “endangering the state” is narrower in scope 
than the definition of terrorist acts introduced by the Convention as it does not cover 
the objective of ‘intimidation of population’.   
Other jurisdictions have introduced explicit criteria which exclude from their 
implementation of the obligation in the Convention the financing of violent acts 
carried out for some particular purposes. Switzerland, for instance, does not 
consider the financing of a violent act as a terrorist financing offence if the financing 
has been carried out with the intention to establish or re-establish a democratic 
regime or a State governed by the rule of law, or with the intention to exercise or 
safeguard human rights.518 While it is not clear how human rights or democratic 
values can be restored by resorting to violence, imposing such requirements is not 
beyond expectation when the scope of the offence of terrorism has not been (cannot 
be) defined.  
                                                 
517 Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany 1971, s 89a (1). 
518 Criminal Code of the Swiss Confederation 1937, art 260 quinquies (3). 
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Regardless of what constitutes terrorist intent and how such intent could be inferred, 
courts in some jurisdictions do not require the proof of terrorist intent as an essential 
element of preparatory terrorism offences, including the terrorist financing offence, 
at all. For example, an Australian court held that it is not necessary to prove that the 
defendant, who was accused of possessing things connected with preparation for, 
the engagement of a person in, or assistance in a violent act, had terrorist intent.519 
That is, the prosecution did not need to prove that the defendant carried out the 
conduct that he was accused of with the intent to advance a political, religious or 
ideological cause and with the intent to coerce, influence by intimidation, a state, 
Territory of Commonwealth government or intimidate the public or a section of a 
public.520 As will be explored in great detail in the next section,  the Court reasoned 
that a defendant might not have any interest in accomplishing any of these purposes, 
but he might, for instance, be simply plying his trade, or doing a favour for an 
acquaintance, or repaying a debt.521          
What then, however, of the intent requirement as the connection between the act of 
financing and the subsequent violent act? Here, again, problems may arise with 
interpretation.  
7.5.2  So, what is the mental element for terrorist financing? 
Generally, the mental element of a crime can be determined in relation to the 
physical elements of that crime. Physical elements, in general, can be divided into 
three parts: the individual conduct, the consequences of that conduct, and the 
circumstances in which the conduct has occurred.522 The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, as Lehto argues,523 provides a good illustration of how 
the fault element can be demonstrated in respect of each material element of a 
crime.524 Setting out the requirements of knowledge and intention for the purposes 
of creating criminal liability, article 30 of the Rome Statute provides that “a person 
has intent where (a) in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the 
conduct, and (b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
                                                 
519 Lodhi v The Queen (2007), 179 A Crim R 470, at [91].  
520 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Australia), s 100.1 
521 R v Lodhi (2006), NSWSC 468 reprinted in Mcsherry above n 497, at 148.  
522 Lehto, above n 14, at 285. 
523 At 285. 




consequence”. Similarly, knowledge only exists where the person is aware that “a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”.  
Similar to the Rome Statute, the mental element of the offence set out by the 
Convention consists of two main variants: intention that funds will be used to carry 
out a terrorist act, and knowledge that the funds are to be so used. However, it is 
often impossible to presume the intent from the physical act of financing as the 
conduct element of the offence consists of acts which are innocent in themselves 
(especially when the funds have a legal origin, and the charge is that of collecting), 
or which may have a criminal but non-terrorist nature.  
In addition, intention in the sense of the desire to bring about a certain consequence 
or knowledge of consequences seems to have a “hypothetical quality”525 when it 
comes to the crime of financing of a terrorist act. According to the paragraph 3 of 
article 2, it is not necessary that funds are to be used to carry out a terrorist act. If 
this provision has any meaning at all, this must indicate that intention or knowledge 
does not have to be linked to the terrorist act for which the funds are collected or 
provided; that is, the end use of funds is irrelevant, it is what the financer thinks the 
end use is, which is relevant. The point is that if a specific (subsequent) violent 
offence was required to be intended or known, it would limit the crime of financing 
to the equivalent of an act of complicity or attempted offences.526 This was not what 
the drafters of the Convention intended; they intended to criminalize terrorist 
financing, as an independent offence, even when there is no connection between 
financing and a terrorist act or when a financer does know about, or intend 
commission or preparation of any terrorist act. But the question is what, then, does 
the financer need to know or intend in order to be liable. It appears fair to conclude 
that the drafters failed to establish a clear mental element for the offence. 
At the national levels, this seems to lead to confusion and controversy over the 
intent that must be proved, which I will explore in the rest of the chapter.   
  
                                                 




7.5.2.1 Can awareness of a circumstance be the mental element? 
R v. Lodhi 
Awareness of a circumstance was regarded as a sufficient ground for imposing 
liability by the court in an Australian case, R v Lodhi,527 where the court tried to 
determine the necessary fault element for independent preparatory terrorism 
offences in Australian law which are analogous in many ways to the terrorism 
financing offence in the Terrorism Financing Convention.528 Lodhi provided a test 
case for interpretation of these preparatory terrorism offences, which do not define 
a clear fault element in relation to the physical element of these offences. Lodhi was 
accused of three offences: collecting (purchasing) of two maps of the Australian 
electricity supply system in preparation of a terrorist act, possessing information 
regarding the ingredients for and the method of manufacture of explosives in 
preparation for a terrorist act, and seeking a price list of chemicals for the use of 
explosives for a terrorist act.529  
The accused explained that his obtaining of the maps had nothing whatsoever to do 
with any terrorist act or part of any plot to carry out a terrorist act against the 
Electricity Supply System.530 In fact, he said that he wanted them for a business of 
an electrical nature he was proposing to establish. He gave similar explanation for 
the seeking a price list of chemicals. He stated that he had contemplated a business 
venture, which would involve the exporting of certain chemicals from Australia.531 
Regarding the possession of the materials containing information about making 
explosives, he gave evidence that many years earlier, he had seen them on a 
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documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts”, “collecting or making documents likely to facilitate 
terrorist acts”, “other acts done in preparation for, or planning, terrorist acts” and terrorist financing). 
As the definition of funds under Section 101.1 is an expansive definition which includes various 
objects, and as the language of other terrorism-related   sections - particularly the phrases such as 
“things” or “document” -  is very broad, these offences can capture many forms of financing of 
terrorism. But, what all these provisions have in common is that they fail to draw a clear connection 
between the person who collects materials and the subsequent offences for which the materials are 
collected. 
529 R v Lodhi (2006), 199 FLR 364, (Whealy J).  
530 At [15]. 
531 At [30].   
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computer when he was studying some architectural subjects at the University of 
Sydney.532 
Relying on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution alleged that Lodhi intended to 
“advance the cause of violent jihad and intimidate the government and the public” 
by plotting to bomb part of Sydney’s electrical supply system.533 The prosecution 
argued that there was found in Lodhi’s possession a significant amount of material 
which threw considerable light on his intention in relation to these offences. The 
material included a CD-Rom which was described, throughout the trial, as the 
"jihadi CD”.534 The prosecution also alleged that Lodhi was in contact with a French 
terror suspect while he was in Sydney. 
Lodhi explained that he had never seen the "jihadi CD" and that he could not explain 
its presence in the material found at his home.535 Although he acknowledged the 
existence of some of the other material containing exhortations to violent jihad, he 
explained that “he had either not seen it or, if he had seen it, it was only in part and 
that he had generally little to do with the contents”.536 Regarding the association 
with the French suspect, Lodhi admitted that he was in contact with the French 
suspect, but he stated that he did so as a courtesy to stranger travelling in a new 
country at the behest of a mutual friend.537 
The court was left to decide on this circumstantial evidence whether it could 
establish the criminal intent of the accused in the absence of the subsequent offence 
for which the preparatory acts were to be carried out, and struggled to come to a 
decision. The court stressed that  
an evaluation of the criminal culpability involved in any particular offence requires 
an analysis not only of the act itself, which may be relatively innocuous, but as 
well an examination of the nature of the terrorist act contemplated, particularly in 
the light of the intentions or state of mind of the person found to have committed 
the offence.538  
                                                 
532 At [41]. 
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534 At [18].   
535 At [19].   
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It read the offence as not requiring the prosecution to prove that the accused 
intended to facilitate either a specific or general terrorist act.539 The judge said that 
such offences “will have been committed by a person in a preliminary way ... even 
where no final decision has been made over the final target.”540 This makes it clear 
that knowledge that terrorism is to be committed or planned is not required.  
The main question is how the court could have inferred the terrorist nature of such 
preparatory acts without requiring the prosecution to prove that the accused 
intended to bring about the subsequent offence. The court’s rulings do not seem to 
be consistent. On the one hand, the court was satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt, 
at the forefront of the offender’s mind when he collected the maps, that he had not 
at that stage necessarily made a final determination as to the precise target, or the 
precise area of the target, that was to be hit.”541 Indeed, the court held that  
the maps themselves would not have given sufficient information to the offender. 
Nor would they, of themselves, have given sufficient insight into how such an 
attack upon the electrical system could be maintained at a time when the actor has 
not decided precisely what he or she intends to do, an offence.542  
So, the court concluded that it was “not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt ... that 
the offender had at any time made up his mind that it would be he who would carry 
out the bombing of the Australian Electrical Supply System”.543 In the same way, 
it concluded that although there was a formula for making a bomb in the accused’s 
possession, there was no evidence to suggest that the offender ever intended that 
there would be an enterprise involving the use of the formula aimed at any person, 
or for that matter, any property.544 
However, the court ruled that it did not matter that the evidence could not prove 
that Lodhi had determined “when, how, where or by whom a terrorist act might be 
carried out”.545 The court found that the accused was aware of the circumstances in 
which the preparatory acts occurred. That is, the accused knew that there was, “in 
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the circumstances of all three offences, really one continuing uninterrupted course 
of conduct centring upon an enterprise to blow up a building or infrastructure”.546 
In spite of the fact that the document which contained information on how to make 
explosives was written (collected) a long time before the accused bought the maps 
and asked for the price list of chemicals, the court concluded that the contents of 
the document considerably fleshed out the accused’s intention in relation to the 
circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the maps and the enquiries he made of 
the chemical supply company.547   
In addition, the court, without explanation, considered the accused’s contact with 
the French suspect as a relevant matter to the existence of these intentions, while it 
acknowledged that there was no evidence to indicate what the French suspect’s role 
was to be in relation to any terrorist act.548 Similarly, the court found the accused’s 
possession of the “Jihadi CD” relevant, stating that the “truth is that all this material 
makes it clear that the offender is a person who has, in recent years, been essentially 
informed by the concept of violent jihad and the glorification of Muslim heroes who 
have fought and died for jihad, either in a local or broader context”.549 It stated that 
“the [Jihadi] material is eloquent as to the ideas and emotions that must have been 
foremost in the offender's mind”. The court sentenced Lodhi to 10 years 
imprisonment for the possession and collection of the materials related to terrorism 
and 20 years for doing an act in preparation for a commission of a terrorist act. The 
sentences were required to be served concurrently. This decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal.550  
However, the court’s interpretation of the mental element of the offence is subject 
to criticism for being unjustifiable in terms of the traditional notions of 
criminalization, for imposing unfair burden of proof on the accused, and for being 
vague. With regard to the unjustifiability of the this interpretation of the mental 
element, if the fault requirement, as the court ruled, is limited only to the awareness 
of the act of preparation or facilitation without a need to prove that an accused 
intended to facilitate or finance a terrorist act, any preparatory act which is 
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548 At 11. 
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presumed to be connected to some sort of unplanned and unforeseen terrorist act 
(or acts), falls within the scope of the offence. This is a “significant extension of 
concepts of criminal liability”551 as it imposes liability and heavy punishment on a 
person with unclear criminal intent, who possesses jihadi videos, perhaps watches 
them, meets someone who a foreign state (France) regarded as a suspect terrorist, 
proceeds with the collection or possession of materials such as collecting a map, 
asks for prices of chemicals or possesses a document about how to make explosives 
which might never be used for any terrorist act. There was no proof that a terrorist 
act was even planned. While the traditional criminal law has long identified 
offences based on complicity in a crime or attempt to commit a crime, the 
application of this fault requirement colours otherwise innocent (though perhaps 
politically suspicious) conduct as a serious offence at a very early and incoherent 
stage.  
This mental element cannot be justified from a purely subjectivist approach,552 
which imposes liability on the basis of a person’s intention or knowledge with 
which the person acted regardless of whether the commission of the offence is 
incomplete or physically impossible.553 A subjectivist approach to the preparatory 
offences such as financing of a terrorist act would require a high standard of the 
mental element, which would be actual knowledge of the subsequent terrorist 
offence. But when there is no need to prove knowledge of any terrorist act, “any 
remaining knowledge of a terrorist activity would have to be extremely tenuous, 
abstract and hypothetical”.554 So, there is a great risk that awareness of a terrorist 
act could be nothing more than possessing a Jihadi CD or “reckless or angry talk” 
or expression of “extreme political or religious views about past or future acts of 
terrorism or about known terrorists”.555 Such a fault requirement, would not be 
supportable by a subjectivist approach. This point will be explored in greater detail 
in chapter 9.3.      
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In addition, this loose interpretation of the mental element appears to unfairly 
reverse the evidential burden of proof; that is, by not being required to link the act 
of collection or provision to any material terrorist act, the prosecution seems to have 
to prove little; and then the accused bears an evidential burden of exculpation, by 
introducing evidence that his conduct was nothing to do with commission or 
preparation of a terrorist act. Although the prosecution needs to refute the accused’s 
claim beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused must first put them to the task of 
doing so by establishing an evidential case that his actions were innocent first.556  
The shifting of the evidential burden is also of concern because of the breadth with 
which the fault element is identified by the Lodhi court. There is no doubt that by 
not being required to prove the intention of the accused as to the subsequent crime, 
the prosecution can precipitately lay charges on those who are strategically 
preparing for the commission of an offence; but it does not “provide others with 
sufficient certainty about what could expose them to prosecution”.557 The Court 
clearly drew an inference about Lodhi’s states of mind based on what he had in his 
possession even though it is not entirely clear what precise state of mind they 
required.  
In other words, the offence is vague about what precise state of mind in regard to 
what crime the prosecution should have to prove and what kind of evidence a 
suspect financer should adduce to prove his innocence and to escape liability. So, 
an innocent person who, for example, provides funds in response to the request of 
an unknown impoverished student who later turns out to be a suicide bomber558 can 
put themselves at risk of being charged and convicted for financing terrorism if the 
person cannot prove that she did not intend or know the funds would be used for 
the commission a terrorist act.   
Despite these criticisms, the presumption of innocence seems to be becoming so 
insignificant (at least in a liberal democratic country such as Australia) to policy- 
makers, legislators and courts that they do not even consider it as necessary to give 
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a reason for imposing a burden on the accused. The neglect of the presumption is 
well reflected in the reasoning of the Australian Minister for Justice and Customs 
when he justified terrorism offences as follows:  
In the security environment that we are dealing with, you may well have a situation 
where a number of people are doing things but you do not yet have the information 
which would lead you to identify a particular act ... When you are dealing with 
security, you have to keep an eye on prevention of the act itself as well as bringing 
those who are guilty of the act to justice ... [T]he original intention of the legislation 
[is] to remove any doubt that a person can be prosecuted for a terrorist act and acts 
preparatory to a terrorist act, and that our agencies can investigate such acts even 
if a specific target has not been identified.559    
7.5.2.2 Is general knowledge of a terrorist act sufficient? Knowledge v. 
Intention 
R v. Khawaja 
In introducing a mental element for terrorism offences which are preparatory in 
their nature and which do not need to be connected to any specific terrorist act, a 
Canadian court held in R v. Khawaja560 that general knowledge of a terrorist act is 
sufficient. The Ontario Court of Appeal found Khawaja guilty of developing, 
working on and possessing an explosive substance with the intent to perform a 
terrorist act, in what became known as the British “fertilizer bomb plot”. Unlike the 
trial court which dismissed these charges because the prosecution could not prove 
that the accused knew he was assisting in the fertilizer bomb plot, to secure the 
conviction, the Court of Appeal referred to section  83.19 (2) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code which states that “a terrorist activity is facilitated whether or not the 
facilitator knows that a particular terrorist activity is facilitated; or any particular 
terrorist activity was foreseen or planned  at the time it was facilitated”.561  
The accused argued that the qualifiers in this provision are not consistent with the 
approach of the traditional criminal law as it does not require adequate levels of 
subjective fault, which would be knowledge or intention related to a specific 
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terrorist act (the British fertilizer bomb plot).562 A concern was also raised as to how 
a person can knowingly facilitate a terrorist act when he does not know that “any 
particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated”.563 
There seems “to be little or no mens rea at the time the actus reus of facilitation 
was committed”.564 
The court, however, accepted the prosecution’s argument that these qualifiers 
seems designed to address cases where a member of a terrorist cell may not know 
the specific nature of the terrorist act that is going to carry out until the last 
moment.565 But, unlike the Australian court’s ruling, the court added an extra 
requirement by concluding that “it is unnecessary that an accused be shown to have 
knowledge of the specific nature of terrorist activity he intends to aid, support, 
enhance or facilitate, as long as he knows it is terrorist activity in a general way”.566  
The fault requirement of general knowledge of a terrorist act is different from the 
Australian court’s fault requirement in which the prosecution is not required to 
prove that the accused knew or intended to support either a specific or general 
terrorist act, meaning that the accused does not need to know that any terrorist act 
is planned or foreseen at the time it was facilitated or financed.567 According to the 
Canadian court’s ruling, the accused may not know the specific details of the 
subsequent terrorist act but does need to know “an act of terrorism is coming”.568 
This reading of the fault requirement is similar to the reading upheld by some other 
jurisdictions. For example, in Sweden, “there is a need to show that funds were 
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provided with intent that a particular serious crime sooner or later will be carried 
out”.569  
While it seems that the Canadian court’s extra fault requirement satisfies minimum 
standards of knowledge since it requires some type of material or actual connection 
between the act of preparation and facilitation and the subsequent crime, there are 
three sources of uncertainty as to the breadth of such a fault requirement. First, 
although this fault requirement is broad enough to secure the conviction of those 
who facilitate the commission of a terrorist act without knowing the specific details 
of that terrorist act until the last moment, it imputes guilt to those who are remotely 
and indirectly linked to a terrorist act and who do not have any intention to finance 
or facilitate any terrorist act or do not know how their conduct will serve terrorism. 
For example, a restaurant owner who knows that certain customers are using his 
restaurant to plan a terrorist act can be held criminally liable for financing a terrorist 
act in the same way as those who are directly involved in the facilitation of that 
terrorist act.570 The court may not accept the accused’s argument that he did not 
have any particular intention to finance the terrorist act, and that his main purpose 
was to gain money from his business. The court may argue that whatever his 
purpose was, he ‘knowingly’ made his restaurant available to be used for planning 
a terrorist act.571 
But does ‘knowingly’ here refer to the knowledge form of a guilty mind, called 
indirect or oblique intent, according to which a person must be found guilty when 
the person embarks on the course of conduct to bring about a desired result, 
appreciating or realizing that another (harmful) result would be a “virtually certain” 
consequence of his or her action.572 It appears that the mental requirement suggested 
by the Khawaja court requires a mens rea element closer to recklessness or 
negligence than a knowledge requirement. That is, if an accused does need to know 
the specific terrorist act for which the financing is carried out, he cannot be 
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absolutely or virtually certain that his funds or donation will be used for the 
commission of the terrorist act; he may be reckless. It seems that the Judge in 
Khawaja case admitted such an interpretation by concluding that “I see nothing 
wrong in asking, indeed expecting law-abiding citizens to avoid any knowing 
activity that aids, support or advances terrorist activity or a group engaged in such 
activity.”573  
However, his conclusion was criticized as it “runs the risk of blurring the distinction 
between punishing a person as a terrorist for their subjective fault or for their 
negligence in not taking reasonable steps to avoid assisting terrorists.”574 It was 
pointed out that any understanding that negligent engagement in the facilitation or 
financing of a terrorist act would suffice for the offence is inconsistent with the 
Canadian law (as well as the Terrorist Financing Convention), which excludes 
references to negligence and recklessness.575 Concern has also been raised that it 
would be unjust to expose “negligent and intentional assisters of terrorism to the 
same liability and punishment”.576  
The breadth of the mental element is also worrying as it may impose liability on 
innocent conduct not carried out for the commission of any terrorist act unless 
otherwise proven. For instance, if a member of a terrorist group which is planning 
a terrorist act engages in fund-raising for religious purposes, he can be charged for 
terrorist financing if he knows of this possibility, even if it is only remote, as all 
elements of the offence exist; the act of fund-raising along with the knowledge of 
an upcoming terrorist act provides a sufficient circumstantial ground for the 
prosecution to ask for the conviction of the accused for terrorist financing without 
a need to prove that he intended to finance the terrorist act. The accused can be held 
liable for the financing of a terrorist act if he fails to prove - in the sense of providing 
some evidence to disturb the inference of his knowledge - that the act of fund-
raising was carried out for different purposes and he did not think it was to be used 
for terrorism. The imposition of such liability on the accused on the basis of his 
knowledge about the upcoming act, not on the basis of his knowledge or intention 
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that raised funds will be used for the commission or preparation of the upcoming 
act, is unfair and in violation of the criminal law principle of mens rea which 
requires the imposition of liability on people “only for events or consequences 
which they intended or knowingly risked”.577 This brings back the argument full 
circle to the necessity of proving the actual knowledge of the terrorist destination 
of funds, or the intention that the funds will be used for the commission of the 
subsequent offence. However, proving such intent limits the scope of terrorist 
financing to an inchoate offence or complicity in the crime of terrorism itself. This 
was the interpretation that the supporters of the Convention wanted to avoid.  
7.6 Conclusion  
The offence of terrorist financing is heavily reliant on poorly-defined and 
ambiguous fault elements (knowledge and intention). To establish an independent 
offence, the Convention does not require the act of financing to be linked to any 
specific terrorist act. But in the absence of preparation or commission of a terrorist 
act, the Convention has not clarified what a financer needs to know or intend, in 
order to be criminally liable. The mental elements of the offence can be examined 
in two circumstances within which acts of financing may take place: financing of a 
terrorist act and financing of a terrorist group. In this chapter, the mental element 
of the offence has been examined in circumstances when financing is carried for 
the purposes of financing a terrorist act. 
By analysing the Australian case of Lodhi and the Canadian case of Khawaja, in 
which awareness of a circumstance or general knowledge of a terrorist act was 
regarded as a sufficient ground for imposing liability, it has been illustrated that 
when the financing is involved in collection or possession of funds for the 
commission or preparation of a terrorist act, any mental requirements other than 
actual intention and knowledge as to the subsequent offence would significantly 
expand the concept of criminal responsibility beyond the scope of not only 
completed substantive offences but also the traditional inchoate offences; it might  
impose liability on the innocent, on people who are remotely and indirectly linked 
to a terrorist act, or on people with an unclear criminal intent. It might also result in 
an unfair reversal of the burden of proof as it is vague what state of mind the 
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prosecution should prove and with regard to what criminal terrorist act a suspect 
financer should adduce evidence to escape liability. While it seems necessary to 
require proof of an actual intention or awareness as to the subsequent terrorist act, 
the drafters of the convention avoided such a requirement in order not to limit the 
crime of financing to the equivalent of inchoate offences.  
The vague mental element of the offence becomes more problematic and 
controversial when the offence is read to include financing of terrorists or terrorist 
groups. This is the matter that needs a special examination, so it will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Eight: The fault element of the offence of financing 
terrorist organizations   
8.1 Introduction 
Despite the fact that the Convention failed to define a terrorist or terrorist 
organization, cutting off financial resources of terrorist organizations has become a 
lately much-used method of addressing terrorism financing. FATF and the UN 
Security Council have developed a sharp focus on countering financing terrorists 
and terrorist organizations.  Relying on the wording of the Convention, FATF asks 
states to extend the scope of the terrorist financing offence defined by the 
Convention to include   
any person who wilfully provides or collects funds or other assets by any means, 
directly or indirectly, with the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part…(b) by a terrorist 
organisation; or (c) by an individual terrorist.578 
The UN Security Council repeatedly requires states to prevent any form of support, 
active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts,579 and more 
broadly to criminalize “the financing of terrorist organizations or individual 
terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or 
travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act”.580 However, applying 
the Convention to suppress the financing of terrorist organizations gives rise to 
uncertainty as to what amounts to the fault elements of the offence of the financing 
of terrorist organizations.  
This mainly resulted from the ambiguity of the provisions of the Convention. The 
term ‘funds’ has, as illustrated in chapter six, a broad meaning which includes any 
materials, legal or illegal tools, fungible and non-fungible resources, which may not 
even be usable for the commission of a terrorist act, and which in themselves may 
not indicate a disposition to support terrorism. Also, according to Article 2(3) of the 
Convention, the terrorist end use of funds is irrelevant, which literally means there 
                                                 
578 Financial Action Task Force, above n 13, at 8.  
579 UN, S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001, at [2].  
580 UN, S/RES/2253, 17 December 2015, art [17]. 
130 
 
is no need to prove the link between financing and a terrorist act. Therefore, in the 
case of financing of an individual terrorist or a terrorist organization, it is not clear 
what the requirement of intention that the funds should be used to carry out a 
terrorist act, or the knowledge that funds are to be so used, actually refers to. What 
can be inferred from the wording of the Convention is that the Convention should 
not be read to mean that the mental state of a financer has to refer to any terrorist 
offences being prepared or carried out by a group, otherwise the offence of 
financing of terrorist groups would come close to the concept of complicity in the 
sense that it depends on the commission or preparation of its subsequent terrorist 
offence. For a similar reason, the proof of the knowledge of the intention of the 
recipient of funds to commit specific offences is not intended to be the fault 
element.  
Such a vague reference to a connection between a financer and the illegal activities 
of a group has been the cause of some confusion: is it enough if a financer knows 
the identity of the recipient of funds as a designated terrorist group or a group which 
is involved in terrorist activities? What if the financer knows the recipient is a 
terrorist group, but intends to further the lawful purposes of the group? Does the 
offence need specific intent? Or does it only require recklessness? These questions 
will be examined in this chapter. In order to avoid over complication of this 
discussion, it is assumed that the law of a state is clear on the definition and scope 
of a terrorist organization. The discussion also does not have regard, in this chapter, 
to whether and how the political process of designating a group as terrorist may 
impact the criminalization of terrorist financing; this matter will be discussed in 
chapters ten and twelve.  
8.2 Does the knowledge of the identity of the recipient of funds suffice?  
The most direct way to hamper a corrupt and dangerous group is to proscribe it 
outright, including by making the knowing provision of any support to the group 
an offence. However, application of this fault element can be challenged for being 
inconsistent with principles of criminal law, for being arbitrary and for historically 
being unprecedented.  
From a criminal law perspective, if the knowledge of the identity of the recipient 
alone suffices for the intent, somewhat similar to status or situational offences, the 
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offence of financing terrorist groups seems to impose punishment on an act based 
only on the connection of that act with others’ status, not to their criminal conduct. 
In other words, the physical element of collecting or providing funds is innocuous 
enough; it is (the knowledge of) the status of the person or the group with whom 
people associate that criminalizes these acts. Consequently, the actual intent of 
financers appears to be irrelevant. 
While the principle of legality seeks to punish criminal conduct or participation in 
a criminal act “not criminal types”,581 and while the principle of mens rea 
emphasizes that people “should be held liable only for events or consequences 
which they intended or knowingly risked”,582  it is possible to argue that applying a 
status-based approach to terrorist group-related offences is “neither novel, nor 
extraordinary”.583 The criminal law has after all long included “status offences”, 
such as consorting with criminals, which penalize people “on the basis of whom 
they know and associate with”.584 However, these offences have usually been 
considered to be of a less serious nature (summary offences), and a result of the 
controversial expansion of police powers in response to the threat of criminal 
groups and gangs.585 In contrast, terrorist organization and association offences are 
classified as serious offences which carry hefty sentences586 and which inflict heavy 
damage to an accused’s reputation if they are convicted.  
It seems that in order to satisfy the principle of personal guilt, it is necessary to 
introduce a higher intent requirement than convicting a person for the provision of 
funds to a group on the grounds that he or she knows the group is a designated group 
or that it is involved in criminal activities. In fact, if the focus of the criminalization 
of terrorist group offences is on the donation and how a group might use the 
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donation, the evidence should be sufficiently strong in demonstrating that the 
donation is substantial enough in its value or in its effects to strengthen the group’s 
illegal activities. Consequently, to impute guilt on the donor, it should be proved 
that the donor knew (had a specific intent) that his or her substantial donation would 
contribute to the achievement of the criminal aims of the group.  
From a practical point of view, this knowledge requirement - convicting a person 
for the provision of funds to a group on the grounds that he or she knows the group 
is a designated group or that it is involved in criminal activities - causes some 
concerns in terms of sweeping up both guilty and non-guilty mental states. In United 
States v. Al-Arian,587 a US court tested several hypothetical situations against the 
knowledge requirement in section 2339B(a)(1) of the US Criminal Code, which 
states that  
[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, 
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a 
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist 
organization ..., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity ..., 
or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism… .588 
The Court explained: 
Under [the construction of this knowledge requirement], a cab driver could be 
guilty for giving a ride to a [terrorist organization] member to the UN, if he knows 
that the person is a member of a [terrorist organization] or the member or his 
organization at some time conducted an unlawful activity in a foreign country. 
Similarly, a hotel clerk in New York could be committing a crime by providing 
lodging to that same [terrorist organization] member under similar circumstances 
as the cab driver.  
The court concluded that this knowledge element does not satisfy the requirement 
of personal guilt as the knowledge of the identity of the recipient or the knowledge 
of the unlawful activities of a group is not strong enough to impute guilt to the 
                                                 
587 United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F.Supp.2d 1322, (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
588 At [1337-1338]. 
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donor’s conduct; that is, “when criminality and punishment are justified by a 
relationship to others’ conduct, that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to 
constitutionally support criminal liability”.589 To support this conclusion, the court 
discussed another hypothetical situation:   
A and B are members of a [foreign terrorist group or a] FTO. The FTO exists to 
oppose and remove (by violent and non-violent means) a foreign government. A 
opposes the FTO's use of violent means to accomplish its goals. B has no problem 
with the group’s use of violence and wants to raise funds for weapons to further 
that interest. B travels to where A lives to raise money. A does not know that B is 
coming to fundraise on behalf of the FTO. A picks B up at the airport. A allows B 
to stay in his home, use his telephone, and use his house to entertain other FTO 
members while A is at work. B fundraises while A is gone. Under the government's 
construction of Section 2339B(a)(1), A is criminally liable for providing 
transportation, lodging, communications equipment, and facilities, and, if the 
money raised results in the death of any person, he will face life in prison. A's 
criminal liability is inextricably connected to his association with B and the FTO. 
Further, the level of A's criminal punishment is totally dependent on B's and other 
members of the FTO's criminal conduct.590 
Concern also arises that such a knowledge requirement imposes liability on well-
intentioned financers. That is, because a financer does not need to intend that his or 
her funds be used for terrorist activities or for the terrorist functions of a group, no 
humanitarian support can be sent to any designated group.591 This has a chilling 
effect on those who seek to provide material resources to “the non-violent 
humanitarian and political activities” of designated groups.592 It also has a tragic 
effect on the provision of humanitarian aid to the disaster and war zone controlled 
by designated terrorist groups.593 In addition, this seems to be in contrast to the 
intent of the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention who desired to 
criminalize only financing cases carried out “unlawfully”. As mentioned earlier, the 
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qualifier “unlawfully” was included to the definition of offence to add “an element 
of flexibility by, for example, excluding from the ambit of application of the draft 
convention legitimate activities, such as those of humanitarian organizations and 
ransom payments.” 594   
Historically, it was also unprecedented in liberal democratic states to apply such an 
approach to the mens rea of criminal organization and association offences. For 
example, in the US, courts dealing with cases of membership in and association 
with quasi-political groups seeking the violent overthrow of the government as well 
as social welfare goals, such as the Communist Party, ruled that: 
[i]n our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when imposition of punishment on a 
status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that 
status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent 
overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept 
of personal guilt. 595   
However, where the relationship between the accused’s involvement and the 
criminal activities of a group is “too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal 
liability”,596 or where the involvement includes a status or conduct that establishes 
a relationship with a criminal enterprise rather than its criminal activities, the 
principle of personal guilt “are be cured, so far as any particular defendant is 
concerned, by the requirement of proof that he knew the organization engages in 
criminal activity, and that was his purpose to further that criminal activity”.597 This 
approach was later applied to civil cases where, for example, the Supreme Court 
held that: 
Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a 
group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For a liability to be 
imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group 
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to 
further illegal aims.598  
                                                 
594 UN, A/C.6/54/L.2, Annex III, Informal summary of the discussions in the Working Group, 
prepared by the Chairman, at [67].  
595 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S 203, 205, (4th Cir 1961), at [224-225].   
596 At [226].  
597 At [226].  
598 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, (1982), at [920].  
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Even with regard to providing fungible resources, the US Supreme Court, in another 
case, ruled that the mere provision of money (membership dues) to the Party did 
not establish a “meaningful association with the party” on the basis of which the 
accused could be liable.599 The court adopted the position of the prior courts by 
requiring the prosecution to prove that the accused was aware of the nature of the 
Party and its involvement in illegal activities, and that he intended to contribute to 
those criminal activities by paying dues and attending some meetings.600    
With regard to terrorism offences, there was a controversy on whether such a fault 
requirement can be applied to terrorist financing. US courts in the early cases of 
terrorist financing applied the fault requirement by holding that a donor is not liable 
for supporting a designated terrorist group so long as he does not know or 
specifically intend that the recipient of funds would use the support to further the 
terrorist functions of that group.601 However courts in subsequent cases took the 
position that the Communist Party court’s decisions are not applicable to terrorist 
financing. It was argued that the Communist Party cases “address[ed] situations 
where people are punished by reason of association alone ... in other words, merely 
for membership in a group or for espousing its view”.602 Instead, the terrorist 
financing offence criminalizes 
 the act of giving material support, and there is no constitutional right to facilitate 
terrorism by giving terrorists the weapons and explosives with which to carry out 
their grisly missions. Nor, of course, is there a right to provide resources with 
which terrorists can buy weapons and explosives.603 
It is also argued that terrorist groups are so tainted by their criminal conduct that 
any contribution to such groups aids their unlawful purposes by freeing up 
resources that can be used for terrorism.604 So, because all contributions can be 
directly or indirectly used for terrorism, it does not matter what a financer intends 
that his contribution will be used. As long as he knows the group that he is 
supporting is a terrorist group, he is criminally liable.  
                                                 
599 Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S 469, (1963), at [476-77].  
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However, this reasoning, which Jonakait calls, an “action-membership distinction” 
was criticized for following reasons.605 Although membership seems to be a status, 
a membership is not acquired “passively”. “Except for memberships resulting from 
birth, it takes some sort of act to become a member of a group”.606 Also US courts 
used to apply the same mens rea requirement to the cases where “the defendant had 
engaged in variety of activities [beyond mere membership] to support the 
Communist Party including organizing new members, teaching Communist 
principles to students and members, and soliciting contribution for the Communist 
party”.607 In addition, membership is a way of providing human resources to an 
organization. If any contribution to a terrorist group frees up resources that can be 
used for terrorist acts, an active member may very well free up another member to 
undertake illegal actions in furtherance of the group’s illegal purposes.608 
Moreover, the US courts in Communist Party cases applied this fault requirement 
(the specific fault requirement) to include not only membership, but also 
‘association’. Association, from these courts’ perspective, has a broader meaning 
than membership.609 It captures the concept of financing; that is, “[o]ne can 
associate with a group in more ways than joining its formal membership rolls”; 
people may “associate with a group by donating their money, services or goods”.610 
Also, in terms of the right of association, it is argued that “the distinction between 
association and material support is illusory. Groups cannot exist without the 
material support of their members and associates. If the right of association meant 
only that one had the right to join organization but not to support them, the right 
would be empty.”611 
Similarly to the US courts’ approach to the offences related to the Communist Party, 
the Palermo Convention, in establishing criminal group and association offences, 
introduces a specific mental element far greater than the knowledge of the identity 
of a criminal group. According to article 5 (1)(a) of the Convention, the offence of 
                                                 
605 Randolph N  Jonakait “The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material Resources to a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization” 2004 56(3) Baylor Law Review 861, at 905. 
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607 Humanitarian Law Project v. United States, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir 2003), at [395]. 
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610 Jonakait, above n 605, at 901. 
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“active” participation in the criminal activities of a criminal organized group 
requires knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of the group or 
its intention to commit the crimes addressed by the Convention. With regard to the 
involvement in non-criminal and supportive activities of a criminal group - 
activities which “may not constitute crimes, but they perform a supportive function 
for the group’s criminal activities and goals”612- the Convention introduces an 
additional requirement: “knowledge that such involvement will contribute to the 
achievement of a criminal aim of the group”.613 Such an approach can be seen in 
the implementation of the Convention at the national level. For example, in Canada, 
a person who “knowingly... participates in or contributes to any activity of [a] 
criminal organization” is criminally liable if such involvement or contribution is 
made with “the purpose of enhancing the ability of [the] criminal organization to 
facilitate or commit an indictable offence”.614 
However, the imposition of a specific intent requirement, such as the one required 
by Palermo Convention, was opposed for (among other reasons discussed later) 
creating a dangerous loophole for terrorist organizations and their supporters to 
raise and receive funds and avoid prosecution. While the specific intent can be 
inferred from the nature of support when the financing is involved in or related to 
the provision of weapons or explosives to a terrorist group,615 this may often not be 
the case when the support contains “dual use” and fungible resources. To illustrate 
the “security flaws” of this requirement, the following hypothetical situation is 
normally discussed: 
[I]f a person writes a check to [a terrorist group involved in both violence and 
humanitarian activities] for $10,000 and writes on the memo line of the check for 
educational purposes only, the donor would not be liable under the specific intent 
standard so long as there was not other evidence showing an intention to aid 
                                                 
612 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes Legislative Guides for the Implementation of 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol Thereto 
(New York, NY, 2004), at 24.   
613 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 210, art 5(a)(ii)(b). 
614 The Canadian Criminal Code, art 467.11.  
615 See United States v. Aref , 553 F.3d 72, (2nd Cir 2008). In this case, the court found the defendants 
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terrorism. But, whether the donor intended to aid terrorism or not, the check could 
be used for many other projects, including illicit ones.616 
Moreover, no criminal liability could be imposed on a donor who is told (deceived) 
by the fundraiser working on behalf of the group that the money would be spent 
“for the support of orphans”, not on any violent act. Under the specific intent 
requirement, the intentional, deceived and reckless donors should be acquitted 
where the prosecution cannot prove the specific intention of the donors. So, the 
donations can flow into the hands of terrorists.617  
8.3 Reckless financing of a terrorist group  
In order to close this loophole and to avoid legal challenges resulting from the 
imposition of only the knowledge requirement, some suggest a lower mental 
element of recklessness as an alternative mens rea to the specific intent.618 Under 
the recklessness requirement,619 a person should be held to be reckless about the 
terrorist end use of funds where the person knows the group that he is financing is 
a designated terrorist group, or engages in terrorist activities, but he proceeds with 
financing the group despite knowing the risk that the supplied resources will be 
used to further the illegal aims of the group.620 
It is argued that the structure of the terrorist financing offence defined by the 
Convention gives support to such a mental requirement.621 The Convention does 
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not require that the mental elements of the knowledge, that funds collected or 
provided are to be used for the commission of a terrorist act, or the intention, that 
the funds will be used for terrorism, be proven in relation to any actual terrorist act. 
Also, the funds do not need to be “actually” used for the commission of any terrorist 
act; thus, they do not necessarily have to have a substantial effect on the commission 
of a terrorist act. In the case of financing terrorist groups, such a structure is claimed 
to inject a concept of foreseeability into the mental elements of the offence; that is, 
when a financer intends a terrorist end use of his funds, it is not the financer but the 
recipient of the funds “whose actions may bring about the intended result at a later, 
unspecified point of time”.622 The financer also does not have control over the 
decision of the recipient; nor can there be “absolute certainty” that the funds will be 
used for such purposes623 especially if the funds are in a fungible form, and the 
recipient (group) is involved in multiple activities of a humanitarian as well as 
violent nature. Similarly, with regard to the knowledge element, the financer is far 
“too removed from” terrorist acts that the recipient may carry out “in terms of time 
and knowledge”.624 Also, the practical effect of the supplied funds on those acts is 
neither foreseeable nor easy to determine. Therefore, when it is stated that the 
financer knows that the funds are to be used for terrorism, it means he either actively 
takes the risk that the funds will be used by the recipient for terrorism, or foresees, 
but ignores, “the possibility, sometimes even the probability that the funds may be 
used for the commission of terrorist acts”.625 In the both cases, the financer takes 
the risk that the funds will be used by others for terrorism. While in the former, the 
risk is willingly taken, the risk, in the latter, is foreseen but ignored or deliberately 
taken in the hope that it does not cause harm.  
In practice, it is believed that this mental requirement would secure the conviction 
against those who know or foresee whom and what their supplied funds goes to 
support, but who disguise their intention or foolish faith through, for example, a 
statement in the memo of a cheque.626 Unlike the knowledge requirement in which 
the donor can be convicted for merely knowing that the group is a terrorist group 
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(regardless of his intention), the recklessness requirement would permit “non-
reckless” resources to aid the humanitarian goals of a group; resources such as 
sending medicines and non-controversial materials to the areas suffered from 
natural disasters and controlled by terrorist groups.627  
However, it is doubtful whether a recklessness requirement provides a convincing 
and viable alternative as a mental element for the offence for following reasons. 
From the Convention’s point of view, it should be noted that although the structure 
of the offence defined by the Convention implies that the offence may include cases 
of less certain mens rea, any interpretation whereby the mens rea of the offence is 
defined in terms of recklessness or negligence is inconsistent with the actual 
wording of the Convention, which clearly requires only two mental elements of 
intention and knowledge. In addition, such an interpretation contradicts the aims of 
the Convention’s drafters. During the negotiation on the Convention, all of the 
proposals which aimed at imposing liability on those who collect or provide funds 
in circumstances “where there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be used for 
terrorist purposes” were rejected.628 In addition, the drafters of the Convention 
added the qualifier “wilfully” to the definition of the offence seemingly “to 
emphasize that the financing had to be done deliberately, not accidently or 
negligently”.629  
In practice, although using a recklessness requirement would secure the conviction 
of those who “convincingly plead ignorance while secretly desiring” the terrorist 
end use of their funds,630 the examination of some of the hypothetical cases used 
above illustrates that this recklessness requirement would not be able to alleviate 
the due process concerns of sweeping breadth and vagueness. In terms of 
overbreadth, the offence under this recklessness requirement would still sweep-up 
non-guilty mental states in the scope of criminality. The first example is the 
previously mentioned hypothetical case where A, a member of a terrorist group who 
opposes the group’s use of violence, allows B, another member of the group who 
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supports the use of violence by the group, to use his property, in order to do B a 
favour. Without informing A, B uses A’s property to raise funds for the group. 
Under the recklessness requirement, A would be liable for letting a terrorist friend 
use his property if A foresees the possibility that B may use his property for raising 
funds, and if B may give the funds to the group, and if the group may use the funds 
for terrorist purposes. Raising funds is not wrongful or harmful. Also, there is 
nothing wrong with giving the money to the group. The risk that the funds may be 
spent by the group (if B gives the group the funds) for terrorist purposes should not 
be taken. 
But is it really what the concept of recklessness implies? According to the many 
common law jurisdictions, a person is ‘reckless’ if the person “foresees that a 
certain consequence could well follow from his action, not just a remote risk”.631 
Such a definition requires an existence of some form of an actual and substantial 
(more than merely possible)632 risk and its foreseeability by the accused. It seems, 
at least to me, the risks that B may use the property to raise funds, and that B may 
give the raised funds to the group, and that the group may use it for terrorist 
purposes are too remote to conclude that it “could well follow” from A’s action of 
letting B use his property. 
Similarly, in the example of the cab driver who knowingly gives a ride to a member 
of terrorist group, it is still likely that the cab driver would incur liability for 
knowingly providing services to a terrorist who is carrying a weapon in his bag if 
the driver is aware of a risk that the suspect terrorist may have a gun. But such a 
possibility seems to be vague and not to be regarded as a real possibility that 
normally will be regarded in offences where recklessness suffices as mental 
element. In a similar way, a hotel clerk could be prosecuted for being reckless in 
providing lodging to the same person under similar circumstances as the cab driver. 
It has been pointed out that under the recklessness requirement, providing any 
fungible resources such as money to a terrorist group would raise liability;633 
therefore, no explanation would be accepted for writing a cheque to a terrorist group 
                                                 
631 R v Tipple, (2005), CA217/05 (New Zealand), at [23].  
632 Darkan v The Queen (2006) HCA 34. 
633 Chesney, above n 617, at 84. 
142 
 
for educational purposes as the donor knows the group would be free to use the 
money as it would see fit, but he takes the risk.  
The imposition of guilt on the innocent financers in the above cases is neither 
surprising, nor unexpected; it is because their liability would not be inferred from 
their ‘advertent recklessness’ as to a proscribed consequence or their ‘reckless 
knowledge’ of a specific circumstance, but from knowingly financing a person or 
group where there is a vague (and not actual or specific) possibility that the funds 
will be used for a terrorist act. The main reason that this mental requirement 
acquires a sweeping character is its failure to define the relationship between a 
financer’s conduct and the criminal activities of a group. Normally, when a criminal 
liability of one person is tied to the criminal activity of another, culpability or guilt 
is imputed to the former on the basis of his awareness or intention (or recklessness) 
as to the criminal conduct of the latter, and on the basis of his awareness (of 
possibility that) his action will contribute to the prohibited consequence committed 
or attempted or planned by another. It seems, however, that this formulation is not 
applicable to the offence of terrorist financing. That is, to establish an independent 
offence, the Convention does not require any of these elements: the act of financing 
should not result in or be related to any subsequent offence; nor do the supplied 
funds need to be actually spent for the commission of a terrorist act.  
8.4 Terrorist purposes as a mental element; what does it mean? 
In the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act or acts, FATF welcomes the 
criminalization of the financing of an individual or a terrorist group when financing 
is carried out for “terrorist purposes”.634 Similarly, the UN Security Council often 
requires states to freeze funds meant to be used for “terrorist purposes”.635   
However, what, then, constitutes “terrorist purposes”? No definition has been 
provided by FATF or Security Council for this term. The Convention in its 
preamble and Article 2(5)(3) uses the term ‘terrorist purpose’. But no definition has 
been provided for the term. Literally, the term ‘terrorist purpose’ seems to include 
conduct including but of greater scope than just an act of terrorism. A comment has 
been made that “[t]his terrorist purpose supposedly consists of the perpetration or 
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preparation of terrorist acts, or the participation in terrorist acts or terrorist 
training”.636 It can also include activities related to “the maintenance of terrorist 
structures” of a group;637 or if understood in an even broader sense, it can refer to 
political or religious ideology of a group. Therefore, if the funds given to a terrorist 
or a terrorist group “could be used for broad terrorist purposes including but not 
limited to the preparation of terrorist offences”,638 prosecution would precipitately 
and largely lay charges on any donor on the ground of taking the risk that the funds 
would be used somewhere and somehow for broad terrorist purposes. 
Under this view of ‘terrorist purposes’, terrorist groups are “so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that 
conduct” or “frees up resources that can be used for” that conduct,639 and it follows 
that almost every donation can be assumed to directly or indirectly result in 
terrorism unless the financer proves otherwise. Therefore, a grocery store manager, 
for example, could be prosecuted for trading with a member of a terrorist group 
while he foresaw the risk that the goods sold to the member would meet the basic 
needs of the group and eventually assist the group to fulfil its terrorist purposes. 
The accused might only escape conviction if he proves that he had no reason to 
believe they would be used for terrorist purposes.     
However, when the scope of the term “terrorist purposes” is not precisely defined, 
and if it should be read to include provision of anything that can facilitate the 
criminal activities of a group, or free up other resources that can be used for those 
criminal activities, what exactly should a donor provide as evidence to prove that 
he did not foresee the possibility that his contribution would be used for terrorist 
purposes? The vague definition and scope of the term ‘terrorist purposes’, 
inconsistently with the rule of law, leaves citizens uncertain as to what kinds of 
activities or what groups they should not support financially on pain of prosecution.  
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8.4.1  A specific intent Standard: intention or motive? 
Imposition of criminal liability under a higher mens rea standard (specific intent) is 
also controversial and problematic, irrespective of how narrowly or broadly the 
term ‘terrorist purposes’ is understood. Financing ‘terrorist purposes’ can be read 
to mean an act or acts which enhance the ability of a terrorist group to facilitate or 
carry out a terrorist act or acts (as the Canadian criminal law indicates).640 Under 
this reading, in order to acquire criminal liability, a financer needs to know or 
specifically intend that the funds given to a group will enhance the ability of the 
group to commit a terrorist act or acts it is involved in.  
Regardless of any controversy that may arise over what constitutes acts enabling a 
group to carry out its terrorist activities, such a fault element creates a serious 
evidentiary burden for law enforcement. That is, the prosecution would need to 
demonstrate what type of terrorist act or acts a group is involved in, how the funds 
supplied to the group would or could be used for the commission or preparation of 
those acts, and whether the financer knew or specifically intended such an end use 
of the funds. In practice, the proof of such a connection is believed to be particularly 
difficult, if not impossible, especially when support is in a fungible form, and a 
group is involved in multiple activities of a humanitarian as well as violent 
nature.641 The critics of this formulation claim that this prosecutorial hurdle 
“permits skilful terrorist sympathizers to evade detection and slip through the 
prosecutorial net”.642 In addition, it seems that the Convention does not support 
such an intent requirement by not requiring the proof of the terrorist end use of 
funds.    
‘Terrorist purposes’, in a broader sense, can also be read to include a group’s 
ultimate aims and purposes of (what the Convention regards as) intimidating a 
public or coercing a government or an organization to do or abstain from doing. 
                                                 
640 Canadian Criminal Code, s 83.18. 
641 See for example United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, (7th Cir 2005), at [1001]). In this case, 
the accused was charged in several cases including purchasing and providing clothes, boots, 
uniforms, blankets, tents, X-ray machine, ambulances and walkie talkies to an organization that he 
knew they are involved in violence and military operations. Despite the substantial intelligence and 
documentation on the close relationship between the accused and Bin Laden dating from mid 1980s, 
the court dropped his terrorism charges as the prosecution could not prove that the recipient of the 
resources was engaged in “a federal crime of terrorism”, and that the accused intended the donated 
material to be used to “promote a federal crime of terrorism”. 
642 Pendle, above n 591, at 778. 
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Under this definition, the mental element of the offence would be understood in the 
sense of having intent to enhance the ability of a group to peruse and fulfil its 
ultimate purposes of intimidation or coercion. In the absence of commission or 
preparation of any terrorist act from which such intent may be inferred, it would be 
sufficient for the prosecution to introduce evidence that a financer entertains similar 
views and purposes to those that the group supported holds. Such a reference to the 
ultimate purposes of a group implies a state of mind closer to a motive requirement 
than specific intent.   
Regardless of whether motive can constitute an essential element of terrorism 
offences, the main concern is whether reliance on evidence of political motive, as 
circumstantial evidence, in the proof of terrorist financing charges would be 
justifiable and fair? Even though one may assume it is fair,643 it should be noted 
that there is a considerable difference between a person who intends the resources 
he supplies to be used for the commission or preparation of terrorist acts and a donor 
who, for example, admires the Palestinians’ resistance and their resort to violence 
to stop or prevent the Israeli government from the expansion of its settlement plan, 
and who supplies resources to the area controlled by Hamas for humanitarian or 
educational purposes. But under this motive requirement, a court would need to 
admit evidence about the donor’s political views and beliefs (as an essential element 
of the offence) and uphold his conviction irrespective of what intent promoted the 
donation. This evidentiary problem indicates that even the imposition of a motive 
requirement does not guarantee that the offence would not sweep together both 
guilty and non-guilty mental states. 
                                                 
643 Roach, above n 554, at 292-293. While  Roach  disagrees with the idea that the mental element 
of terrorist offences should be  defined with a vague reference to a “political and religious motive 
requirement ... because of its potentially harmful effects on those who may share political and 
religious beliefs with terrorists and on its harmful  effects on the accused by requiring admission of 
political and religious motive evidence regardless of the balance between its probative value and 
prejudice” (p. 271),  he does not found it unsupportable and unfair to define terrorism offences with 
an implicit reference to the intention of intimidating the public or coercing a state or an organization. 
He argues that in comparison with the political and religious motive requirement according to which 
courts need to face “the difficulty of determining and judging the true nature of a person’s religious 
beliefs, or the sincerity of their expression”, the intent of intimidation and coercion are “easy to 




This chapter has examined the mental element of the offence of financing individual 
terrorists and terrorist organizations. It has been explained that FATF and the UN 
Security Council asks states to expand the scope of the offence, provided by the 
Terrorist Convention, to include financing of terrorists and terrorist groups. As 
explained in chapter seven, the offence of terrorist financing defined by the 
Convention, is heavily reliant on poorly-defined and ambiguous fault elements 
(knowledge and intention). To establish an independent offence, the Convention 
does not require the act of financing to be linked to any terrorist act. But in the 
absence of preparation or commission of a terrorist act, the Convention has not 
clarified what a financer needs to know or intend, in order to be criminally liable. 
Similar ambiguity arises when the offence is read to include the offence of financing 
terrorists and terrorist groups.    
Different alternative fault elements have been tested. It has been illustrated that 
mere knowledge of the identity of the recipient of funds would not suffice for the 
offence as it sweeps up both guilty and non-guilty mental states into the scope of 
liability. It also imposes liability on well-intention financers who seek to provide 
resources to non-violent humanitarian and political activities of a group. Multiple 
legal challenges would also target any other intent requirements (recklessness or 
specific intent), including arguments based on vagueness, overbreadth and the 
requirement of the presumption of innocence.  
It has been explained that the FATF and the UN Security Council welcomes the 
idea of the criminalization of financing individual terrorists and terrorist groups 
when it is carried for “terrorist purposes”; but the term ‘terrorist purposes’ has not 
been defined. It has been argued that the application of terrorist purposes as a mental 
requirement could result in the creation of a whole new class of political crimes. 
Why such criminalization goes so wrong is the question examined in the next 
chapter.       
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Chapter Nine: The Offence of Terrorist Financing: Why does it go 
so wrong? 
9.1 Introduction 
In general, in anti-terrorist legislation, the main rationale for targeting preparatory 
conduct and criminalizing it as a stand-alone offence stems from the need “to 
defend further up the field”.644 In other words, the ability to defend further up the 
field, which is a footballing phrase, should be advanced as  
a consequence of the highly destructive potential of single, concentrated terrorist 
attacks; the dangers of allowing such a plot to run; and so the resulting need to 
intervene at an earlier stage.645  
Defending further up the field in practice means “earlier criminalization, earlier 
interventions by law enforcers, and earlier and more policing, much closer to 
everyday behaviour”.646 
The terrorist financing offence was created with this same rationale. The offence 
permits criminalization of the collection or provision of funds when they are carried 
out with the knowledge or intention that the funds will be used for preparation of a 
terrorist act, or used by terrorists or terrorist groups “for any purposes”.647 This 
extends the reach of criminal law so far ‘up the field’ that it includes a broad range 
of conduct which falls short of constituting attempt, conspiracy or incitement.  
It should be noted that such criminalization of a preventive kind is not limited to 
terrorist-related offences.648 For instances in Australia, it is an offence to connect 
“equipment to a telecommunication network” with intention “to commit, or 
facilitate the commission of”, “a serious offence of the Commonwealth”.649  Or in 
UK, it is an offence to meet, or travel to meet, a child for the purpose of person 
                                                 
644 David Anderson “Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law” 
2013 3 European Human Rights Law Review 233, see the version uploaded on SSRN 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2292950), at 14.  
645 At 6. 
646 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner Preventive Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 
2014), at 118. 
647 Financial Action Task Force, above n 12, at 22.  
648 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 99. 
649 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Australia), art 474.14. 
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committing a child sex offence.650 In both offences the defendant’s purpose of 
committing a substantive offence allows early intervention and criminalization of 
conduct which is very distant from the substantive offence.  
Is it justifiable? There are many different possible ways to argue whether such an 
approach to criminalization can be justified. It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to identify all of them and discuss their merits. My purpose in this chapter (and 
thesis) is to examine the justifiability of the terrorist financing offence with regard 
to the principles and values that liberal criminal law is based on. I have chosen the 
values of liberal criminal law as a yardstick because, as explained, the idea of 
criminalization of terrorist financing was proposed and developed mainly by 
Western liberal States. The diffusion of these criminalization measures is 
overwhelmingly supported by them or the inter-governmental or international 
organizations backed up by them. It is apt, therefore, to engage in a normative 
analysis of this offence against the values said to underpin Western criminal law. 
For purposes of convenience, the issue will be discussed in the context of Anglo-
American criminal law.  
In the next section, the spectrum of terrorist financing offences, their scope and their 
elements, are explained. Then the role of liberal criminal law is briefly discussed. 
The values, principles and policies that should have influence on shaping 
substantive criminal law are set out in this discussion. In the final section, the four 
main principles that should be deployed in evaluating the justifiability of creating a 
candidate offence - the principle of harm, the wrongful requirement, the remoteness 
requirement, and rule of law standards - are examined in relation to the terrorist 
financing offence. Whether the terrorist financing offence satisfies the standard 
criteria of criminalization provided by these principles is discussed, and as a result 
a determination is made about the justifiability of the offence on these principles. 
No argument in support of the offence should outweigh, or be regarded more 
important than, the arguments favouring these values and principles since they are 
the compasses of the society that must continue to evolve in order for us to “keep 
up our bearings”.651 This does not mean at all to suggest that special rules should 
                                                 
650 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK), s 15.  
651 Anderson, above n 644, at 19. 
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not be adopted for exceptional situations when existential threats are involved. 
However, it is controversial to consider terrorism as an existential threat, as well as 
to think that if terrorism was a threat to our existence, the derogation from these 
principles and values would be justified. Simester captures the point well:   
Western Europeans will recall many acts of terrorism across the past four decades 
that did not pose such a risk. Until there are cogent reasons for thinking that the 
terrorist threat has reached that stage, acts of terrorism should be treated as criminal 
conduct in the ordinary way. Moreover, even if existential threats were real, it 
would not follow that exceptional criminal-law responses should be adopted. If and 
when that juncture is reached, the way forward will be to address such dangers by 
emergency mechanisms of the kind appropriate to other radical events such as 
natural disasters, the spread of a virulent, non-treatable diseases, or international 
war. At least in context of making wrongs criminal, it is a moral mistake to think 
that, when existence is threatened, the gloves may come off and anything goes.652     
9.2 Spectrum of terrorist financing offences  
Terrorist financing is a term used to include two types of conduct: (i) financing of 
a terrorist act, and (ii) financing of a person or an organization who or which intends 
to commit or prepare for a terrorist act, or who or which is designated as terrorist. 
While from a traditional criminal law perspective, these acts are preparatory in their 
nature in the sense of facilitating a substantive offence (a terrorist act), the Terrorist 
Financing Convention and FATF’s recommendations conceptualize them as an 
independent offence. In this part, they will be categorised into two groups of 
offences: financing of a terrorist act and financing of a terrorist person or an 
organization.      
9.2.1 Financing of a terrorist act 
According to the Terrorist Financing Convention, the independent offence of 
terrorist financing refers to the financing of terrorist acts. The Convention 
introduces the terrorist financing offence as an act of collection or provision of 
funds when it is carried out with the knowledge or intention that the funds are to be 
used for the commission of a terrorist act.653 FATF emphasizes that the 
                                                 
652 A. P. Simester “Prophylactic Crimes” in G R Sullivan and Ian Dennis (eds) Seeking Security: 
Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms (Hart, Oxford, UK, 2012), at 59-60. 
653 Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, art 2.  
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criminalization of the financing of terrorist acts “solely on the basis of aiding and 
abetting, attempt, or conspiracy is not sufficient to comply with” their 
Recommendations.”654 Both the Convention and the FATF’s Recommendations 
emphasize that “terrorist financing offences should not require that the funds or 
other assets: (a) were actually used to carry out a terrorist act(s)655; or (b) “be linked 
to a specific terrorist act(s)656.” According to the FATF’s “guidance on 
criminalising terrorist financing”, this means that the financing of a terrorist act 
includes 
instances where the terrorist financier intended to finance a terrorist act, but no 
terrorist act was in fact carried out or attempted (e.g. because a planned terrorist 
act was prevented; or because no specific act had been planned; or because the 
funds or other assets intended for use in a terrorist act were in fact used for some 
other activity.657  
Understandably, the nexus between financing/funds and their subsequent terrorist 
act is not required in order for the offence to stand as an independent offence; 
otherwise the offence would fall into the category of inchoate offences or offence 
of complicity. As a result, the offence is defined so broadly in order to include any 
conduct carried out to facilitate commission or preparation of a terrorist act at some 
uncertain point; 658 so, it includes actions which are not appropriately open to 
criminalization as they did not fall within the scope of attempted offences or 
complicity. Consider the following examples:  
                                                 
654 Financial Action Task Force, above n 13, at 37. 
655 The Terrorist Financing Convention, art 2(3). 
656 Financial Action Task Force, above n 13, at 17. 
657 Financial Action Task Force, above n 12, at [56]. 
658 Such a formulation found its way into domestic legislations. For example, Section 16 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) states “[a] person commits an offence if he (a) possesses money or other 
property, and (b) intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be 
used, for the purposes of terrorism”.  Or Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) says that “[a] 
person commits an offence if, with the intention of … committing acts of terrorism, or … assisting 
another to commit such acts, he engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his 
intention. It is irrelevant for the purposes of [this provision] whether the intention and preparations 
relate to one or more particular acts of terrorism, acts of terrorism of a particular description or acts 
of terrorism generally”.  Similar provisions can be seen in Section 101.6(1) of the Australian Penal 
Code and Section 83.19 of the Canadian Penal Code.  
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Example 1- Buying a map of a city with the intent to prepare or plan for a terrorist 
act.659 
Example 2- Possessing information about how to make explosives with the intent 
to commit a terrorist act.660  
Example 3- Buying dangerous substance to rob a bank with the intent to use the 
robbed money for the preparation of a terrorist act.   
Example 4- Going to the gym in order to get fit for the preparation or commission 
of a terrorist act.  
9.2.2. Financing of an individual terrorist or a terrorist organization 
The Terrorist Financing Convention does not address the financing of terrorists and 
terrorist groups directly. The Convention only calls on all states to take preventive 
measures to counter “the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations”.661 
FATF, nonetheless, calls upon countries to extend the scope of the offence of 
terrorist financing to include conduct carried out by “any person who wilfully 
provides or collects funds or other assets by any means, directly or indirectly, with 
the unlawful intention that they should be used, or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used … by a terrorist organisation; or … by an individual terrorist … for any 
purpose”.662 FATF has tried to clarify this offence but it seems to fail for following 
reasons. 
The FATF has not provided a generic definition of terrorists or terrorist groups.663 
According to FATF’s recommendations, these terms refer to “an organisation or 
                                                 
659 This example is similar to the Australian case R v Lodhi (2006), 199 FLR 364 discussed in 
Chapter 7, in which the accused was charged and convicted for collecting (purchasing) of two maps 
of the Australian electricity supply system in preparation of a terrorist act, possessing information 
regarding the ingredients for and the method of manufacture of explosives in preparation for a 
terrorist act, and seeking a price list of chemicals for the use of explosives for a terrorist act. See 
chapter 7.4.2.1. 
660 Under Section 57(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK): “[a] person commits an offence if he 
possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is 
for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”. 
661 Terrorist Financing Convention, Preamble. 
662 Financial Action Task Force, above n 13, at 37. 
663 Under FATF’s recommendations, the term terrorist refers to “any natural person who: (i) 
commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts ; (iii) organises or directs others to commit 
terrorist acts ; or (iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering 
the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act”. And 
the term terrorist group refer to “any group of terrorists that: (i) commits, or attempts to commit, 
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individual that commits, attempts, or is otherwise complicit in a terrorist act”.664 As 
I will discuss in great detail in chapter ten, an individual or organization can also 
be designated as terrorist by the decision made by national authorities or UN 
Sanction Committee on the basis of the information or intelligence they receive 
without any judicial process.    
The term “for any purpose” means that  
the terrorist financier must be acting with the knowledge that the funds or other 
assets are to be provided or collected for a terrorist organisation or individual 
terrorist; and (b) it is only the terrorist financier’s unlawful intention/purpose which 
is relevant, and that unlawful intention/purpose must be to provide or collect funds 
or other assets for a terrorist organisation or individual terrorist.665 
Under the FATF’s Guidance, the following aspects are not relevant to the scope of 
the terrorist financing offence:   
• the purpose for which the terrorist financier intended those funds or 
other assets to be used by the terrorist organisation/individual 
terrorist;  
•  any knowledge that the terrorist financier may have had about how 
the terrorist organisation/individual terrorist was using or intending to 
use the funds or other assets;  
•  the use to which the terrorist organisation/individual terrorist actually 
put (or intended to put, or tried to put) the funds or other assets; and  
• Whether or not the funds or other assets were used to plan, prepare for 
or carry out a specific terrorist act.666  
This formulation casts the net of criminal liability even wider than the offence of 
financing terrorist acts in such a way so as to include conduct not intended to be 
used for a terrorist act. As explained in chapter eight, it appears that such prohibition 
                                                 
terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully; (ii) participates as an 
accomplice in terrorist acts; (iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (iv) 
contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose 
where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with 
the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act”. See Financial Action Task 
Force, above n 13, at 126. 
664 Financial Action Task Force, above n 12, at [25]. 
665 At [21]. 
666 At [22].  
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is imposed due to the dangerous status of the recipient (a terrorist individual or 
group) of funds. Therefore, in addition to the examples listed above, the offence of 
financing of terrorists and terrorist groups can include the flowing examples:        
Example5: Selling foods to a person with the knowledge that the person is preparing 
for the commission of a terrorist act. 
Example 6: Providing hotel services to a person designated as terrorist. 
Example 7: Employing a designated terrorist to raise funds for charitable purposes.  
9.3 Role of Criminal law 
Before proceeding with the discussion on whether the terrorist financing offences 
satisfy the core principles of criminalization, the normative basis and goals of 
liberal criminal law will be very briefly examined. Individuals are the main 
components of a liberal society.  The aims of a liberal society are to preserve 
individuals’ rights and to maximize their freedom of choice. Under a liberal theory 
of criminal law, individuals are assumed to be self-interested, calculating beings 
who are capable of pursuing their own interests.667 Therefore, they must be free to 
do whatever they want to do as long as their action does not conflict with the rights 
and the liberty of others.668 In order to preserve liberty of the individual, liberal 
theorists all agree that the society needs law.669  
A state is the creation of individuals (the governed) who under a contract, transfer 
their authority of self-government to it; they give it authority to make and apply 
such law.670 Assuming that “individuals have in general the capacity and sufficient 
free will to make meaningful choices”,671 the state must treat every individual as 
                                                 
667 Alan W. Norrie Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (3rd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2014), at 35. 
668 M. P. Zuckert “The Virtuous Polity, the Accountable Polity - Liberty and Responsibility in the-
Federalist” 1992 22(1) Publius-the Journal of Federalism 123, at 124. 
669Bottomley and Bronitt point out that there are “differences between liberals over permissible 
scope of law and the appropriate method of legal reasoning … .  Is law to be used only to provide a 
neutral framework within which individuals can peacefully pursue their separate ends? Or is law to 
be used as a tool of social engineering towards certain collective ends including collective 
freedoms?” See Stephen Bottomley, Simon Bronitt and Michael Kirby Law in Context (4th ed, 
Federation Press, Annandale, NSW, 2012), at 5.  
670 Thomas Hobbes Hobbes's Leviathan (Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1967) Chapter XXX. 
671 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013), at 23. 
154 
 
equally responsible for their conduct to the law.672 The state is also given authority 
to create and enforce law which criminalizes, punishes and prevents activities 
which harm or damage the rights and liberty of other individuals.673 States exercise 
this authority through its agent, the criminal justice system. However, there should 
be a strong justification for the enforcement of any punitive and preventive law 
made by the state because individuals also should be free from the arbitrary control 
by the state; in other words, individuals have rights not to be unjustly criminalized 
by the state;674 otherwise, the liberty of individuals (citizens), which is the main 
purpose of a liberal society, cannot be maintained and maximized.  
To restrict the power of the state, the liberal theory of mid-19th century introduced 
the harm principle. John Stuart Mill famously said “the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others”.675 Under this view, harm to others is 
the only legitimate reason for state intervention. However, the application of the 
harm principle is not always unproblematic; the main problem with the harm 
principle is its ambiguity on “what ‘harm’ really is, conceptually and 
substantively”676 or what types of harm (physical harm, harm to property, and harm 
to feelings or indirect harms) merits criminalization.677  
The indeterminacy and breadth of the concept of harm has led liberal legal theorists, 
such as Feinberg, to argue that the harmfulness of conduct does not alone provide 
                                                 
672 The idea of ‘equality’ before the law is one the main component of the rule of law.  However, 
equality is a deeply contested concept. Bottomly and Bronitt point out that “in a crude sense, the 
definition of and importance attached to equality differs according to the political complexion of the 
liberal standpoint adopted. On the libertarian end of the spectrum, the attachment is very much to a 
purely formal or procedural equality-equal treatment of individuals is very much to a purely formal 
or procedural rather than substantive ends. As formal or strict equality promotes sameness of 
treatment, it may conceal the substantive political, social and economic inequality of disadvantaged 
groups or individuals.”  The opposite version of equality focusses on the “quality of opportunity”. 
See Bottomley, Bronitt and Kirby, above n 669, at 19. However, liberal criminal law applies to 
everyone equally regardless of circumstances in which they act. See Norrie, above n 667.  
673 The preventive function of states is theorized in accordance with Hobbes’s theory of social 
contract.  Hobbes argues “[t]he very end for which this renouncing, and transferring of rights is 
introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man’s person”. See Hobbes, above n 670, Chapter 
XIII. 
674 Dennis J. Baker The Right Not to be Criminalized: Demarcating Criminal Law's Authority 
(Ashgate, Farnham, 2011), at 56. 
675 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Middlesex, Harmondsworth, 1979), at 13.  
676 Nina Peršak Criminalising Harmful Conduct the Harm Principle, its Limits and Continental 
Counterparts (Springer, New York, NY, 2007), at 14. 
677Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 104. 
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a sufficient ground for criminalization; it is the wrongful (right-violating) cause of 
harm that makes the conduct in question deserved to be criminalized.678 Ashworth 
and Horder require further tests to be fulfilled: they argue that “before 
criminalization is justified, not only must the conduct be morally wrong, but there 
must also be no strong countervailing considerations, such as absence of harm, the 
creation of unwelcome social consequences, the curtailment of important rights and 
so forth”.679   
However, the perception of these requirements (harmfulness, wrongfulness, 
unwelcome social consequences, public wrong) may vary not only through time, 
but also through space (between societies).680 Ashworth and Horder accept the 
limits of the liberal theory of criminalization when they argue that “it remains true 
that key concepts such as harm, wrongdoing, and offensive may tend to melt into 
the political ideology of the time”.681 They refer to McCormick who points out that: 
Resort to the criminal law is always parasitic on or ancillary to an established legal 
order of rights and duties in the spheres of private law and public law. Such an 
order of rights and duties (et cetera) has to be founded on some (however muddled 
and patchwork) conception of a just ordering of society. The interests protected 
from invasion by criminal laws are interests legitimated by a given conception of 
a just social order. … [T]he criminal law in so far as it is concerned with fending 
off harmful behaviour is necessarily geared to protection of what are legitimate 
interests according to a certain dominant political morality.682 
Nonetheless, this political reality does not hinder many of liberal legal theorists 
from arguing that “it is still appropriate to discuss the [liberal] values and principles 
that ought to be relevant to criminalization decisions, since such considerations 
rightly play some part at various stages in the generation and refinement of reform 
proposals”.683 Ashworth and Horder argue that  
                                                 
678 Joel Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1984), at 26. 
679 Ashworth and Horder, above n 671, at 29. 
680 Lindsay Farmer “Criminal Wrongs in Historical Perspective” in Antony Duff and others (eds) 
The Boundaries of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2010). 
681 Ashworth and Horder, above n 671, at 39. 
682 At.  
683At. See also Douglas N. Husak Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK, 2008). 
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although it is true that the frontiers of criminal liability are not given but are 
historically and politically contingent, it remains important to strive to identify 
those interests that warrant the use of the criminal law and to refine notions such 
as harm and wrongdoings which play so prominent a part even in political 
discussion of these questions.684  
They have identified a set of principles that, they think, ought to be considered by 
a liberal democratic state when determining whether and how to make conduct 
criminal.685 They do not hide the fact that these principles, which flow from either 
“the nature of criminal law and punishment” or “some social derivations”, may 
conflict in some situations or may be “contestable in their application to given 
facts”.686 They argue, however, that these principles should influence the shaping 
of substantive criminal law. I will name these principles in the footnote here but 
avoid explaining them.687 However, I have used and will use some of them to 
examine the justifiability of the offence of terrorist financing in this chapter or other 
chapters. 
Now I turn to consider some of the fundamental principles that must be deployed 
to justify the creation, and restrain the scope of, a candidate offence. These 
principles include the principle of harm, the wrongful requirement, the remoteness 
requirement, and rule of law standards. My purpose is to examine whether the 
terrorist financing offences satisfy the standard criteria of criminalization provided 
by these principles in liberal legal theory.       
9.3.1 The harm principle    
Beginning with the well-known justification, the harm principle is not only about 
the state’s role of punishing harms. It may be linked to the state’s duty of preventing 
harm.688 The state, under the principle of welfare, has an obligation to “create the 
                                                 
684 Ashworth and Horder, above n 671, at 23. 
685At 23.  
686 At 40. 
687 General principles: the principle of individual autonomy, the principle of welfare, the principle 
of harm and public wrongs. Specific principles (the minimalist approach): the principle of respect 
for human rights, right not to be punished, criminalization as a last resort, the principle of not 
criminalizing where this would be counter productive, the principle of proportionality, principles 
relating to the rule of law, the non-retroactivity principle, the principle of maximum certainty, the 
principle of strict construction, the presumption of innocence. Principles relating to the conditions 
of liability: the principle of mens rea, the principle of correspondence, the principle of fair labelling. 
688Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 103. 
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social conditions necessary for the exercise of full autonomy by individual 
citizens”.689 So, the harm principle of criminalization recognises a right for the 
society and state “to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions”.690  
Feinberg says “[i]t is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it 
would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons 
other than the actor”.691 This extends the reach of criminal law beyond its punitive 
function by giving it a preventive role. Insisting on limiting the coercive use of 
power by the state, Mill sought to restrain the use of the harm principle in justifying 
criminalization. He asserts that conduct is not harmful if it is “merely contingent, 
or, as it may be called, constructive injury … which neither violates any specific 
duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual 
except himself”.692 Instead, the harm in question should be “a definite damage, or 
a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public”.693 While there is 
less difficulty in determining the nature and gravity of a definite damage such as 
murder, the controversy is over what constitutes “a definite risk of damage”.694 How 
should such a risk be measured? What kinds of harms or risk of harms merit 
criminalization? Can the harm principle justify the criminalization of conduct 
which does not causes any harm, but contributes or facilitates the commission of 
harm - conduct such as (remote harm offences, general - public order legislation or 
preparatory offences)? “To what extent can we hold a perpetrator liable, how far 
should we look for harm mediated through other actors that can still be legitimately 
imputed or assigned to the perpetrator?”695   
Given the indeterminacy and vagueness of the concept of harm, it is warned that a 
broad reference to the harm principle “could supply a prima facia justification for 
almost all of” conduct nominated for criminalization as candidate conduct may 
cause harm at some point, and “can be rationalized as preventing harm to others”.696 
A broad reference to the principle would also “erode the usefulness of the harm 
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principle as a constraint on the state’s punitive power”.697 The limitation of the harm 
principle has resulted in the adoption of other principled restrains by criminal law 
theorists as grounds for criminalization.  
But, before proceeding with discussion on other restraints, I would like to address 
my initial inquiry: is the harm principle able to provide justificatory basis for the 
criminalization of terrorist financing? The answer is both positive and negative. The 
answer is negative as the current formulation of the offence which seeks to target 
terrorist financing without connecting it to an immediate harm (a terrorist act) also 
presents a challenge for the harm principle because its attraction is  derived “from 
its having been applied to more immediate harms” rather than a long-term risk of 
harm.698 However, the answer to the question could be positive because 
traditionally, the harm principle seems to have less difficulty in justifying a group 
of preventive offences, the inchoate and participatory offences.     
9.3.1.1 Terrorist financing as an inchoate crime 
In other words, criminalization of preparatory conduct is not unknown to Anglo-
American criminal law. “Most systems of criminal law have some general inchoate 
offences”699 (attempt, conspiracy and incitement), which adequately deal with 
conduct when the substantive harm is not caused yet. The main rationale for 
criminalization of inchoate offences is to reduce “harm by authorizing law 
enforcement officers and the courts to step in before any harm has been done, as 
long as the danger of the harm being caused is clear”.700 Even though the scope of 
inchoate  offences  is controversial (controversy over “significance of intention”, 
“relevance of impossibility”, “significance of resulting harm”),701 they are defined 
in a way to include conduct which is connected to and has substantially facilitated 
a substantive offence, and/or which there is a clear intention towards that 
                                                 
697 Simester and Von Hirsch, above n 504, at 53.  
698 At.  
699 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 96. 
700 Ashworth and Horder, above n 671, at 456. 
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substantive offence. Let’s have a quick look at some of the inchoate offences’ rules 
and their requirements.     
The law of attempts requires that “there can be a conviction even though the 
substantive offence that was intended is not completed and no apparent harm is 
caused”.702 In this formulation, “the intent becomes the principal ingredient of the 
crime”703 because, it permits the criminalization of conduct before, and even 
without, the commission of the substantive harm. However, not all preparatory acts 
constitute attempts. Under English law and the criminal law of Australia, an act 
must be “more than merely preparatory to the commission of the [subsequent] 
offence”,704 or according to United States’ Model Penal Code, the act must 
constitute “a substantial step in the course of the conduct planned to culminate in 
the commission of” the subsequent offence.705 However the issue, especially with 
regard to incomplete attempt, is deciding when should preparatory conduct be 
regarded as more than merely preparatory or a substantial step. There are two 
schools of thoughts on this issue. Under a subjectivist approach, 
 the essence of an attempt is trying to commit a crime, and … all the law should 
require is proof of the intention [of the substantive offence] plus any conduct 
designed to implement that intention. The reasoning is that any person who has 
gone so far as to translate a criminal intention into action has crossed the threshold 
of criminal liability, and deserves punishment.706  
Objectivists, on the other hand, argue that the law should require “proof of an act 
close to the commission of the substantive offence”.707 Their concern is that if the 
scope of the offence of attempt is not restricted tightly, “any overt act [is] to suffice 
as the conduct element in attempts”.708 This can result in increasing “wrongful 
arrests”, conviction on the basis of the dependent’s intention; “the police might be 
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tempted to exert to obtain a confession; miscarriage of justice might increase”; and 
“we would be risking a world of thought crimes and thought police”.709       
Neither of these traditional justifications for attempt offences can be applied to 
every possible offence of financing terrorist acts. In other words, the scope and 
definition of offence, according to which the act of financing, or funds raised, do 
not need to be linked to any terrorist act, seems to make it impossible to apply either 
a subjectivist approach a or an objectivist approaches to justify the offence. Unlike 
the objectivist approach which requires criminalization of the last act which is 
unambiguously close to the substantive offence, the offence of terrorist financing 
includes any act at any a stage (e.g. buying a map, possessing info on explosive or 
going to the gym), even if it is not linked to a terrorist act. A subjectivist approach 
cannot be applied as a rational for criminalization for every possible terrorist 
financing cases since a clear intent towards an actual, substantive offence is not 
required. 
9.3.1.2 Terrorist financing as secondary participation  
Similarly, the application of the harm principle to justify the offence of financing 
terrorists or terrorist groups is also problematic because the offence does not require 
criminalization of conduct which facilitates, or contributes to, preparation or 
commission of harmful conduct carried out by others. Traditionally, the 
criminalization of such conduct is justified by reference to the law of complicity or 
inchoate offences. For instance, the law of complicity requires that to be liable as 
an accomplice, there should be connection between accomplice’s conduct and the 
principal’s offence; that is, it should be shown “the accomplice’s conduct helped or 
might have helped the principal in some way”.710 In addition, the accomplice must 
know the essential elements of the principal’s offence, or, according to the recent 
expansion of the UK’s scope of accomplice liability, “a real possibility” that the 
principal will commit a certain crime or “one of a group of offences”.711  A 
comparison between the scope of these offences with that of the offence of 
financing a person who intends to prepare or commit a terrorist act indicates the 
major shift in criminalization. Consider example 5: selling food (or anything else) 
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to a person with the knowledge that the person is planning or preparing terrorist. 
The seller is criminally liable regardless of whether, and how, the buyer would use 
the food for a terrorist act, or regardless of whether the seller intended, knew or 
believed the food would be used for that the commission or preparation of the 
terrorist act. The offence merely requires knowledge that recipient is a person who 
intends to commit a terrorist offence. So, the harmful consequences of the provision 
of the foods do not matter at all. 
In a similar manner, the imposition of liability for the financing of a designated 
terrorist or terrorist group is not connected to any act whether harmful or harmless. 
Consider example 6: providing hotel services to a designated terrorist. The hotel 
clerk does not need to know that the designated terrorist intends to commit or 
prepare for any terrorist act; he does not need to intend any terrorist act to be carried 
out by the designated terrorist. He is liable because he simply knows that the person 
is a designated terrorist. This is significantly different from, for example, the law of 
inchoate offences (the English law of the encouraging and assisting crime) which 
requires that a defendant’s preparatory act must be capable of assisting the 
commission of the subsequent offence, and that the defendant must intend, know or 
foresee (oblique intention) that his act facilitates its commission.712   
Furthermore, while some terrorist financing cases such as example 7 resemble 
conspiracy, the offence of financing a designated terrorist does not rely on the law 
of conspiracy to determine the harmful consequences of the financing conduct. 
Under the UK’s conspiracy law, a person is liable for conspiratorial agreement if 
that 
person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be 
pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, 
either (a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or 
offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or (b) would do so but for 
the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence or any of the 
offences impossible. … Where liability for any offence may be incurred without 
knowledge on the part of the person committing it of any particular fact or 
circumstance necessary for the commission of the offence, a person shall 
nevertheless not be guilty of conspiracy to commit that offence … unless he and at 
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least one other party to the agreement intend or know that that fact or circumstance 
shall or will exist at the time when the conduct constituting the offence is to take 
place.713  
Under such a law, the principal fund-raiser in my example would not be liable 
because (a) there is no conspiratorial agreement between them (meeting of minds), 
and (b) no harmful consequences are intended. However, under the offence of 
terrorist financing, the principal fund-raiser is liable for employing a designated 
terrorist merely because he knows he is a designated terrorist, no matter whether 
the designated terrorist intends the funds to be used for a terrorist purposes, and no 
matter whether the principal funds-raiser knows, believes or foresees the designated 
terrorist may use the funds for a terrorist purposes.  
9.3.2 The wrongfulness requirement   
“A narrower strand of justification than the harm principle” focuses on the 
wrongfulness of conduct.714 Feinberg argues that  
[i]t is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it is 
necessary to prevent serious offence (as opposed to injury or harm) of persons other 
than the actor and would be an effective means to that end if enacted.715     
Under this approach, “it is not the causing of harm that alone justifies 
criminalization, but the wrongful causing of harm”.716 What counts as wrongs? To 
Feinberg who seeks to extend the concept of harm to include wrongs, harm is 
“setbacks of interests that are wrongs, and wrongs that are setbacks to interest” 
(harmful wrongs).717 Adopting Feinberg’s approach, Ashworth and Horder regard 
wrong as “culpably assailing a person’s interests, or abusing them by using them as 
a means to another’s satisfaction”.718 Simester and von Hirsch regard conduct as 
wrongful when it treats others “with a gross lack of respect or consideration”.719 
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Many legal moralists agree that wrongfulness is a prerequisite but not a sufficient 
requirement for criminalization; therefore, not all moral wrongs (such cheating at 
games or lying) are the subject of criminal law.720 A wrong must be regarded as 
publicly wrong. The “public” element does not only include acts which “harm or 
wrong the public collectively or the polity as a whole” (crimes such as tax evasion, 
treason), but also wrongs which, although committed in private and harm 
individuals without impacting “the wider word” (crimes such murders and rapes), 
concern all of us as wrongs against the values we share.721  Duff defines public 
wrongs as a “concern of all citizens in virtue of their shared membership of the 
polity”.722  On the other hand, there is some conduct that is not pre-legally wrongful 
(or malum in se) but regarded as wrongful because it is prohibited by law (mala 
prohibita) - conduct such as  such as traffic offences.  
In short, in the criminalization of conduct as wrongful, a following general principle 
should be followed:  
when labelling conduct as wrongful, and when labelling those it convicts as 
culpable wrongdoers, the state should get it right. In particular, the criminal law 
contains a general limiting principle that D[efendent] should not be convicted of 
an offence unless he is responsible for a wrong. Any formal judgment of blame, 
including the finding of guilt on which the conviction is based must be predicated 
upon norm-violating conduct. One cannot blame a person unless that person does 
something that, all things considered, she ought not to do.723 
Applying this requirement to the offence of terrorist financing, the question is where 
the wrongfulness of the offence is derived from? Let me narrow down the question: 
is collecting a map, possessing information on explosives, purchasing a weapon, 
selling foods, offering hotel services, employing a designated terrorist, or sending 
money to a family member wrongful? How do these actions set back the interests 
of others? How can we justify the criminalization of terrorist financing by reference 
to the wrongfulness requirement?  
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There is no doubt that committing a terrorist act is a harmful wrong in the sense of 
setting back to others’ interests (make them worse off) and treating them “with a 
gross lack of respect or consideration”.724 Financing of a terrorist act, although not 
harmful, can be justified as wrongful due to its connection with the harmful act of 
terrorism. So, its wrongfulness is contingent; that is, it is wrongful because it is 
correlated with the preparation or commission of a terrorist act.  
But this is not what the definition of the terrorist financing offence implies. It should 
be remembered that the FATF diffuses the idea that terrorist financing includes 
cases where “no terrorist act was in fact carried out or attempted … or … no specific 
act had been planned; or … the funds or other assets intended for use in a terrorist 
act were in fact used for some other activity”.725 What this formulation implies is 
that any financing conduct (collection, possession or provision) carried out with the 
intent to further a terrorist act should be criminalized. So, it is neither the harmful 
prospect of financing conduct, nor its connection to a terrorist act which makes the 
act of financing wrongful; instead, the financer’s mere intent that the funds    
collected or provided will be used for a terrorist act makes the act of financing 
(collection or provision) criminalizable. The question is whether bad intent can 
make conduct wrongful? If so, when?   
In response to this question, Simester draws a distinction between three categories 
of conduct: “inherently innocent” “morally ambiguous” and “inherently wrongful”. 
With regard to inherently innocent conduct, he argues that   
a criminal prohibition constitutes, inter alia, an official pronouncement that the 
activity is morally wrongful _ qua activity, and not just on particular occasions. 
Where the proscribed activity is not wrongful, it follows that the state is not telling 
the truth and criminalisation is prima facia unjustified. Hence the state should not 
prohibit, and label as criminal … inherently innocent conduct. … The thought here 
is that [such an activity] is simply not wrong, and its normative status … cannot be 
infected by the further intentions with which it is done.726  
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He also points out that “the prospect of future wrongdoing does not seem to supply 
any significant reason as to why we should not do those activities, any reason that 
we might remark upon. The risk of facilitating such wrongdoing is too ancillary, 
especially where the conduct is otherwise quinidine and harmless”.727 These rule 
out the criminalization of otherwise harmless conduct such as buying a map, going 
to the gym, selling a car, offering hotel services and employing a designated 
terrorist.  
With regard to the morally ambiguous conduct the character of which “cannot be 
determined by reference to its external, actus reus feature alone” (e.g. picking up a 
wallet lying in the street), Simester argues that the mens rea requirement of an 
offence “may suffice to restrict its application to activities that are indeed wrongful” 
(e.g. picking up the wallet in order to keep it versus picking up the wallet in order 
to hand it over to a nearest police station).728 While this satisfies the wrongfulness 
requirement in the cases where the mental element of the offence is clearly and 
closely directed to the substantive offence (e.g. keeping the wallet), such a 
connection in the terrorist financing offence is missing. So, the criminalization of 
the possession of information on explosives (example 2) or any other articles which 
have a legal as well as illegal function is not justifiable unless their application is 
restrictively limited to a specific activity intended by the possessor. Needless to say 
that such a requirement rules out the offence of financing designated individuals or 
groups, which does not link to any wrongful conduct.  
In respect of “inherently wrongful”, Simester argues that there are some activities 
whose nature indicates their wrongfulness. His example is the purchase of a police 
radar detector. He argues that “one cannot regard the use of radar detectors as 
incidental or ancillary, and unconnected to its purposes”.729 So, their purchase or 
possession is wrongful and must be subject of criminal law due to its core function, 
regardless of whether there is any harmful act is planned or attempted.  
Can this approach be used to justify the financing cases when the financers are 
involved in illegal acts?  Let’s examine the example 2. A person purchases some 
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explosives to use them in a bank robbery. The person wants to use the proceeds of 
the crime for the commission or preparation of a terrorist act. According to 
Simester’s argument, the purchase of the explosives is wrongful as it will be used 
for damaging another’s property (a bank). But is it accurate to argue that it is 
wrongful because of its direct connection to the bank robbery? Or should we 
conclude that it is wrongful because of the ulterior intent of the person (using the 
money for commission or preparation of a terrorist act)? What if the person will 
change his mind after the bank robbery and will not proceed with his plan of 
committing, or preparing for, a terrorist act? Is it fair to regard his act of purchasing 
the explosives as terrorist financing? It seems, at least to me, that such labelling is 
not consistent with the principle of fair labelling which requires offences must be 
“subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the 
law breaking”.730       
 9.3.3 The nexus requirement 
As mentioned, the offence of terrorist financing does not follow the traditional 
pattern of criminalization as it permits criminalization of financing cases where 
connection between financing conduct and a terrorist act is blur. This poses, what 
Simester calls, “remoteness problems”. Simester distinguishes between two types 
of remoteness; remoteness with regard to the “nexus” between the preparatory 
conduct and the substantive offence for which the preparatory conduct is carried 
out, and remoteness in relation to distance between these two.731  
9.3.3.1 Remoteness of the nexus 
In relation to the remoteness of the nexus, Simester argues that 
the nexus requirement … addresses the connection between risks of Y and doing 
of X, such that doing X with the intent to do Y becomes wrong. Its point is that the 
connection is established when there is a nexus between the doing of X and the 
intent to do (or, perhaps, facilitate) Y. If I am walking the streets today, having 
resolved to murder my brother tomorrow, that connection is lacking - unless my 
actions today are part of my project for tomorrow.732  
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Unlike the offence of financing terrorists or terrorist groups, the offence of 
financing terrorist acts seems to satisfy this requirement since, for example, the 
purchase of a map or possessing of information on how to make explosives is part 
of a terrorist attack which may (or may not) be executed at some point. However, 
in practice, the offence raises evidential and human rights concerns;733 the main 
question here is: when there is no terrorist act involved, how can a court determine 
that the purchase of map or having information on explosives is part of a [future] 
project? A defendant may have a terrorist intention, but how can a court determine 
with sufficient certainty that the purchase of a map or possession of the information 
is related to a terrorist act, or will be used for the commission or preparation of a 
terrorist act which may not be planned yet? In the absence of any real connection 
between financing conduct and an actual terrorist act, the offence seems to require 
the imposition of liability based on the presumption that these acts may be related 
to a terrorist act. This approach is in obvious contradiction with a fundamental 
principle of procedural fairness in the criminal law or the presumption of innocence 
which requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not shadow of doubt.734  
What if “the defendant’s conduct gives good ground for suspecting that the risk of 
some eventual wrongful harm has been increased by virtue of this person’s 
actions”735? Is the prosecution of such conduct justified if the law gives the 
defendant an opportunity (defence) to prove and reassure a court, the state and 
fellow citizens that his suspicious behaviours are nothing to do with commotions or 
facilitation of any terrorist act (an evidential burden)?736 The question then arises: 
when there is no terrorist act planned or attempted, with regard to what terrorist act 
should the suspect provide evidence to avoid liability?  Even if, as Duff argues,  
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[w]e can make normative sense of this procedural structure by thinking about what 
it is reasonable to expect citizens to answer for in a criminal court,  [it would be] 
on the pain of conviction and punishment if they cannot offer an exculpatory 
answer. They can be expected to answer for what we call ‘presumptive wrongs’ – 
conduct that the court can probably conclude or presume to have constituted a 
culpable public wrong in the absence of an exculpatory explanation of it.737 
In addition, Peter Ramsay warns that the enforcement of such a law results in “mass 
routine surveillance” which seeks “to identify the dangerous intentions that may be 
lurking there”.738 The effect of such a law is also to make “the distribution of 
criminal liability more dependent on executive discretion (formally so in respect of 
preventive orders), and to extend the scope of executive surveillance and coercion 
into the most private areas of individual subject’s existence”.739  
9.3.3.2 Remoteness and the distance problem 
The second sense of remoteness concerns with the problem of distance between 
preparatory conduct and the subsequent act.740 Ashworth and Zender argue that 
“even if a sufficient nexus between X and Y is established in the particular case, X 
may still be too distant from Y to justify criminal liability”.741 The offence of 
financing terrorist acts fails to pass this test as it targets conduct very far from any 
terrorist act.  Similarly, the offence of financing of terrorists or terrorist groups does 
not satisfy this requirement as criminal liability can be imposed merely because the 
status of recipient(s) of funds is regarded by the state or UN Sanction Committee 
as dangerous.   
In the support of such an approach, one may raise the argument that the gravity of 
the offence of terrorism requires and justifies the early intervention and 
criminalization of any preparatory conduct which may lead to a terrorist act. Why 
should a connection between preparatory acts and a terrorist act matter? Why should 
we adhere to the nexus requirement and demand criminalization of conduct which 
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“comes close to the actual commission of the offence” and not “merely conduct 
undertaken with intent to commit an offence?”742 Duff argues that  
An initial answer is that the law should leave intending criminals a locus 
poenitentiae: the chance to decide for themselves to abandon their criminal 
enterprises. This matters, because the law should treat and address its citizen as 
responsible agents. The central value to which this answer appeals is that of 
individual freedom to determine one’s own action. We must look more carefully 
at the character of that value. From one, roughly consequentialist, perspective, 
individual freedom is a good which the law should seek to maximize. That is, the 
law should aim to secure to every citizen the maximum possible freedom to 
determine her own actions and future, by her own choices.743  
Do preparatory offences like terrorist financing fulfil this commitment? Simester 
argues the approach taken to deal with preparatory offences rests on an idea that  
focuses on the lack of trust and respect exhibited by a state that pre-emptively 
regulates conduct. ... At the core of any decent legal system is a commitment to 
respect the dignity of those it governs, to treat them as reasoning human beings. 
Preparatory crimes undermine that commitment.744 
So do terrorist financing offences.  
9.3.4 Rule of law standards 
An offence cannot be justified unless it satisfies the fundamental principles and 
values of the rule of law. A minimum respect for the principle of autonomy requires 
citizens to “be informed of the law before it can be fair to convict them of an 
offence”.745 The principle of maximum certainty requires that “criminal laws should 
be drafted with as much certainty as possible, so as to clarify the boundaries of the 
criminal sanction, both for individuals and courts”.746 The law must also “avoid 
taking people by surprise, ambushing them, putting them into conflict with its 
requirements in such a way as to defeat their expectations and to frustrate their 
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plans.”747 How consistent the offences of terrorist financing are with these 
principles will be discussed in great detail in the rest of this PhD thesis. I will briefly 
discuss some controversial elements of the offence here.   
Under the Terrorist Financing Convention, the offence of terrorist financing 
prohibits unlawful and wilful collection or provision of funds with the intent that 
the funds are to be used, in order to carry out commission or preparation of a 
terrorist act.748 However, this formulation of the offence does not satisfy rule-of-
law values for the following reasons.    
The first issue is related to the definition of terrorism. Internationally, there is no 
consensus on the definition of terrorism. The attempt of the drafters of many 
conventions on terrorism to define terrorism failed. Resort to definition by the 
Security Council749 seems to indicate an absence of agreement in the draft UN 
Convention on Terrorism. 
No international convention has defined ‘terrorist group’.  States’ definitions of 
terrorism are different from one another. In some countries (such as the United 
Kingdom), terrorism has been defined so broadly that includes conduct which does 
not inflict violence.750 A state may have several definitions of terrorism.751  
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Security’s definition has much emphasis on the damage or threat to “critical infrastructure or key 
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Terrorist Financing Convention defines terrorism as an act “intended to cause death 
or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part 
in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by 
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.752 Nonetheless, 
as discussed in chapter five, this definition does not precisely clarify what types of 
conduct, by whom, in what circumstances and when, against whom (targets or 
victims) and with what intention or motivation ought to be considered 
terrorism? So, if a definition of terrorism suffers from ambiguity, it is not 
surprising that any terrorist-related offences would be ambiguous. In other 
words, if financing with the intent to bring about a terrorist act is the subject of 
criminal law, there should be a clear understanding of what constitutes 
terrorism the financing of which is urgently sought to be tackled. This causes 
problems especially because terrorism is regarded as a transnational offence 
which transcends international borders and transgresses the laws of several 
states, and which needs a close and harmonised cooperation to be prevented. 
The absence of an agreement on a generic definition of terrorists, or a lack of 
consensus on distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters can lead to 
massive variation in the application of terrorist offences, in the violation of the 
rule of law.    
Secondly, the conduct element of the offence is both vague and broad. As discussed 
in Chapter 6.3, it is vague because it is arguable whether the act of collection is 
prerequisite to the act of provision, or there are two different, but successive offences? 
That is, if a person collects funds in order to provide them, is it an inchoate crime or 
complete one? Is it also controversial what ‘unlawful’ collection or provision of funds 
means? Under what circumstances, or when, is financing of a terrorist act or an 
individual terrorist or an organization lawful? The conduct element is also very broad. 
The Convention defines term “funds” in the way to include almost everything: 
                                                 
resources” (See the Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection”, 
<https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7 >).  The US Department of 
Defence’s definition of terrorism has more emphasis on the use of threat “to instil fear and coerce 
the government or society” (see “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, 8 November 2010; As Amended Through 15 February 2016” < 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf>). 
752 The Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, art 2(1)(b).  
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monetary as well as non-monetary articles.753  It has been explored in Chapter 6.5 
that, in the US, funds include tangible goods, “training”, “personnel”, 
“transportation”, “service” and “expert advice or assistance”.754 So, it is 
controversial how giving advice to a terrorist group about “how to petition the 
United Nations to seek redress for human rights violations” is considered a criminal 
act?755   
Thirdly, a general principle of the rule of law requires that citizens have “fair 
opportunity to exercise the capacity for doing what the law requires and abstaining 
from what it forbids”.756 Central to this principle is the principle of mens rea, which 
states that “criminal liability should impose on persons who are sufficiently aware 
of what they are doing, and of the consequences it may have, that they can fairly be 
said to have chosen the behaviour and its consequences”.757 That the offence can be 
committed without connection to, or the existence of a terrorist act disregards this 
rule of law value. In other words, in the absence of such connection the question 
arises as to what a financer should know or intend to be criminally liable? 
According to the FATF’s recommendations, “terrorist purposes” is the mental 
element;758 however, it is also unclear what constitutes “terrorist purposes”? To sum 
up my arguments about the definition of the offence, if “criminal law should operate 
so as to guide people away from certain courses of conduct, and should provide for 
the conviction only of persons who intend or knowingly risk the prohibited 
consequences”,759 it is not wrong to conclude that the current formulation of the 
terrorist financing offences, as applied and advocated by liberal states, fails to play 
such a role.  
Lastly, the over-inclusiveness of an offence concerns the rule of law. Ashworth and 
Zender argue that “it is contrary to principle to provide for the criminalization and 
                                                 
753 According to Article 1 (1) of Terrorist Financing Convention, “funds means assets of every kind, 
whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or 
instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, 
including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, 
securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit”.  
754 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339 A and B. 
755 See for example Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134, (C.D. Cal. 2005), 
at [1152].  
756 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 113-114. 
757 Ashworth and Horder, above n 671, at 155 
758 Financial Action Task Force, above n 12, at [15]. 
759 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 114. 
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punishment of conduct that is significantly broader than the wrong it is aimed to 
prevent.”760 Referring to Husak’s argument of over-criminalization,761 they argue 
that it risks “a presumption against over-inclusive criminal law, explaining that an 
over-inclusive law is one whose justificatory rationale applies to some but not all 
of the conduct it proscribes”.762 The offence of terrorist financing is a good example 
of over-inclusiveness. The offence permits the criminalization of conduct even 
before a terrorist act is planned. Such an early intervention, leads to laying liability 
on people before they determine whether and how they may commit a terrorist act.  
This is contrary to the principle of individual autonomy which underpins the liberal 
view that “individuals should be treated as capable of changing their mind and 
conforming to the criminal law, because this is what it is to respect him as a 
responsible agent”.763  
Regarding the financing of a terrorist or a terrorist group, the offence stretches the 
boundaries of criminal law beyond the preventive role of criminal law by 
prohibiting conduct carried out with no bad intention (e.g. financing designated 
individuals or groups). The FATF justifies such criminalization by arguing that 
funds can be used by a terrorist organization for different purposes such as 
“propaganda and recruitment, training, salaries and member compensation, and 
social services”. … “Funds provided for and spent on these non-attack activities 
nevertheless contribute to terrorist attacks, by sustaining the terrorist organisation’s 
capability to mount such attacks”.764 While there may be some truth in this 
argument, the use of criminal law in such a vague and broad way can turn the law 
into a sweeping tool which targets a broad range of conduct assumed to contribute 
to the sustainability of terrorist groups.765 So, it is not surprising that, if the law on 
terrorist financing is interpreted loosely, I am criminally liable for intentionally 
writing this chapter while I know that terrorist groups may read it and use its 
                                                 
760 At 113. 
761 See Husak, above n 683. 
762 Ashworth and Zedner, above n 646, at 113. 
763 At 110. 
764 Financial Action Task Force, above n 12, at [19].  
765 “A well-known example, though not a typical one, is of Rizwaan Sabir, the University of 
Nottingham student who in 2008 downloaded the Al-Qaida training manual from the US Justice 
Department website in order to research his choice of thesis, and found himself detained for several 
days in a police station, along with a University employee, on suspicion of the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. He eventually won his action for false imprisonment”. 
See Anderson, above n 644, at 10. 
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arguments in their propaganda against liberal states which have established, support 
and diffuse a law on terrorist financing which actually contradicts their fundamental 
principles of criminalization and which violates human rights.  
9.4 Conclusion 
Prevention of sending funds to those who commit terrorist acts is a good idea. 
However, this requires a clear definition of terrorist acts, terrorists and terrorist 
organizations. Being certain on the scope and nature of terrorism, then we need to 
respond to another question: is the criminal law a proper tool to be deployed in 
countering terrorist financing? It should be noted that criminal law is “a censuring 
and preventive mechanism” but not the only one. 766 It is the “the strongest formal 
censure that society can inflict”;767 so it should be used as a last resort.768 “Morality, 
social convention”, “peer pressure”, “civil liability” and “administrative regulation” 
are other sources of regulating suspicious and unwelcomed behaviour.769 Whether 
terrorist financing is one of the behaviours that can be dealt with more effectively 
by one of these mechanisms was beyond the scope of this research. The focus, 
instead, was, and will be, on the detrimental consequences of the stretch of the scope 
of criminal law to accommodate the terrorist financing offence which is poorly 
conceptualized and vague. 
Even if the thesis’ argument concerning the impermissibility of the vagueness of 
the penal measures on terrorist financing does not stand up or is not convincing, the 
criminalization of terrorist financing in the way required by the Terrorist Financing 
Convention or UN Security Council’s resolutions, or in the way recommended by 
FATF is not justifiable in terms of existing notion of criminalization. In other 
words, terrorist financing cannot be criminalized without being connected to an 
actual terrorist act and still adhere to the principles of criminalisation. Financing 
conduct in many cases is so innocent and ancillary that its criminalization cannot 
be justified on these principles. Its criminalization as an independent offence 
                                                 
766 Ashworth and Horder, above n 671, at 33. 
767 At 1. 




violates liberal criminal law principles and values and raises regulatory problems 
and human rights concerns, as discussed   
The sad part of the story is that liberal Western states and inter-governmental 
organizations backed by them insist the offence must be adopted globally and 
implemented rapidly, and pressure other states to do so. As it will be discussed in 
chapter thirteen, states, including those with low or no respect for democratic 
values, have started embedding the offences in their domestic law. The point is that, 
if the terrorist financing offence violates the fundamental principles which criminal 
law relies on, or disturbs protected individuals rights in countries where those rights 
and democratic values are highly respected and promoted, its draconian impacts on 
the life of those who live and are ruled by authoritarian or dictatorial states will be 
catastrophic. Whether or not it is the time to rethink the offences of terrorist 
financing should be left to legislators and international policy makers to decide. 
This chapter, however, has raised serious doubts on the compatibility of the 
offences with some of non-negotiable, fundamental principles of criminalization. I 
have not spent much time evaluating the arguments in favour of the offence as I 
believe any argument in favour is invalid as long as the offence does not satisfy the 
requirements of these principles. A further question is whether and if so how such 
over criminalization impacts other counter-terrorist financing measures. In the 
following chapters, I will examine the impact of the scope of the offence on seizure 
and confiscation measures. 
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Chapter Ten: The history of the development of forfeiture 
legislation 
10.1 Introduction 
The second set of penal measures, introduced by the Convention, are the seizure 
and forfeiture of terrorist funds.770 The application of these measures, which largely 
depends on the vague definition (especially of the mental element) of the offence 
of financing of terrorist acts in the Convention and the offence of financing terrorist 
individual terrorists or terrorist groups structured by FATF and the UN Security 
Council, deserves rigorous scrutiny. It has been established above there is no need 
to link funds collected or provided to any terrorist act (the consequences of 
criminalisation of terrorist financing as an independent offence). So, the question 
becomes whether and if so how the mental state of a person who has been collecting 
or providing funds for a terrorist act, which is not attempted or planned, can be used 
to impose a confiscation sanction on the property of that person. Similarly, it should 
be examined whether such a mental state provides a sufficient basis for imposing 
freezing or confiscation sanctions on those who provide funds to individual 
(suspect) terrorists or terrorist groups.    
This chapter begins with a brief exploration of the historical concepts on which the 
modern (Anglo-American) forfeiture law are based on. The study of the modern 
(Anglo-American) forfeiture law is important as it has had a significant influence 
on the existing (being globalized) laws and agreements on the seizure and 
confiscation of terrorist funds. It shows how the American approach to the 
confiscation of proceeds of drugs, which is an unattractive reconstruction of ancient 
concepts (that had long since been abolished or fallen into desuetude), was 
expanded to confiscate terrorist funs. It also illustrates how this approach has crept 
                                                 
770 See Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, art 8. Nowadays and in this thesis, the terms 
confiscation and forfeiture are used interchangeably. But traditionally and literally, “the subject 
matter of forfeiture is generally specific property immediately connected with the commission of an 
offence. Confiscation is a more modern term often used, in contradiction to forfeiture, to denote 
deprivation of an offender of assets being the proceeds, or profits of crime”. However, the difference 
between these terms is blurred as in many legal national and international legal laws, the term 
forfeiture includes confiscation of proceeds of crime. Brent Fisse “Forfeiture, Confiscation and 
Sentencing” in Brent Fisse, David Fraser, and Graeme Coss (eds) The Money Trail: Confiscation of 
Proceeds of Crime, Money Laundering and Cash Transaction Reporting (Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1992), at 109.       
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into the international and regional conventions and agreements, resulting in the 
creation of a draconian forfeiture regime, that is linked to a weak fundamental 
premise – the justification for criminalisation of terrorist financing.  
10.2 The ancient concepts of Forfeiture   
There is a lengthy history behind the States’ power to seize and forfeit, which is 
beyond the scope of this research. But, in order to understand the complexity and 
function of our modern forfeiture law, it is important to introduce, although very 
briefly, the historical concepts on which our modern forfeiture law are based. More 
specifically, special attention needs to be devoted to the history of English law 
which has had a significant influence on the existing (being-globalized) laws on 
confiscation. 
Asset seizure and forfeiture as legal hybrids of criminal and civil penalties have 
existed for thousands of years.771 They were rooted in the ancient concepts of 
‘corruption of blood’ and ‘deodand’. Until 1840, in England, a person who was 
convicted of treason or a felony and who was sentenced to death was subject to “the 
automatic extinction of his civil rights, including the right to hold, inherit or dispose 
of property”772 (forfeiture of estate). The confiscated objects did not need to be 
connected to an offence, but simply were confiscated because the crime was 
regarded as “a breach of the offender’s fealty to his lord”.773  
The concept of deodand, which means a “thing forfeited, presumably to God for the 
good of community, but in reality to the English crown”,774 also permitted 
confiscation when an inanimate object was the cause of the death of any reasonable 
creature. The Biblical example of this is a ‘goring ox’ sentenced to death by stoning 
for killing a man.775 A similar notion was the basis of confiscation in the ancient 
Greece where it was believed that “inanimate objects which caused death had 
                                                 
771 David Fraser “Lawyers, Guns and Money; Economics and Ideology on the Money Trail” in Brent 
Fisse, David Fraser and Graeme Coss (eds) The Money Trail: Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime, 
Money Laundering and Cash Transaction Reporting (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992), at 53. 
772 A. Freiberg “Criminal Confiscation, Profit and Liberty” 1992 25(1) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology 44, at 46. 
773 At. 
774 Leonard W. Levy A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property (The University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), at 7. 
775 Exodus 21:28. “If a bull gores a man or woman to death, the bull is to be stoned to death, and its 
meat must not be eaten”.    
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personalities possessed by Erinys, the furies”, and had to be banished.776 
Confiscation in this form proceeded on the fiction that if the object is guilty, it 
should be held forfeit as a dangerous thing which had to be removed from 
circulation. It seems that the foundations of the current confiscation law can be 
found in this notion allowing governments to confiscate guns, cars with concealed 
compartments that are used for drug smuggling, or electronic devices used for child 
pornography even in the absence of a conviction.       
Even by thirteenth century, when the law of deodands was transformed for more 
practical purposes into a revenue producing function, the same practice was 
followed; so “an animal that killed a person, the wheel of a water mill that crushed 
him, and the cart that ran over him” were confiscated to the Crown as deodands (or 
their equivalent value in money was paid to the Crown) as the Crown was 
responsible for keeping peace that has been disturbed by the death.777 Interestingly, 
a similar analogy was used by the US government when it sued the rifle used to 
assassinate President Kennedy, forfeiting the gun for public as compensation.778      
The law of deodands survived the Reformation by being justified as a deterrent 
against misfortunes. It was argued that accidental deaths “are in part owning to 
negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such 
forfeiture”.779 Deodands presumably would result in better care on the part of the 
owner.  
However, in the nineteenth century, the increase in the frequency of deaths, which 
resulted from industrialization, urbanism and the development of the railroad, and 
which required the provision of a remedy to the victims’ survivors (instead of 
confiscation to God or the Crown) necessitated the consideration of an alternative 
to deodands.780 The Crown also lost interest in deodands “as it was increasingly 
                                                 
776 Levy, above n 774, at 9. 
777 At 13. 
778 United States v. One 6.5 Mm. Mannlicher-Carcano Military R., 250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 
1966), at [414]. 
779 William Blackstone Commentaries on the laws of England, Chapter the Eighth : Of the King's 
Revenue, at 301. 
780 Levy, above n 774, at 11-12. 
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ineffective as a source of revenue and the Crown found that it could more 
effectively raise revenue by taxation than forfeiture”.781  
Therefore, from 1870 to 1980, a series of statutory forfeitures were enacted, which 
although they “pave the way for the reversion of wrongful death to the realm of 
civil tort law”,782 they restricted the scope of the law of deodands in such a way as 
to acknowledge the right of victim’s survivors to compensation, and withdrew the 
Crown or King from “direct concern as an injured party” 783 Even in the cases of 
felonious homicide (intentional murder), the confiscation of a convicted felon’s 
property (as a corruption of blood) to the Crown was replaced with other penalties 
such as deprivation of life and liberty.784  
However, the fact is that although these statutory forfeitures were aimed at 
abolishing of the deodands and the corruption of blood, they had a clear solicitude 
for the protection of the Crown (State) revenue, of the health and safety of 
community and of the quality of its products.785 Therefore, they were developed on 
the basis of objective criminal liability, which “allowed little scope for 
distinguishing culpability on the basis of subjective states of mind”.786 In other 
words, as Freiberg says, these  
statutory forfeitures proliferated together with regulatory offences to create and 
support the modern administrative state. As a general rule, the collective interest 
in conviction took precedence over the concept of personal guilt. It is this social 
defence of forfeiture law which partly explain[s] … the Draconian overreach of the 
modern forfeiture law.787  
This also proved to be a landmark, “opening up an entirely new realm to the 
criminal law, namely that which has come to be known as Public Welfare 
                                                 
781 Freiberg, above n 772, at 47.  
782 Jacob J.  Finkelstein “The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, 
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty” 1973 46(2) Temple Law Quarterly 169, at 
198. 
783 In 1846, the Parliament in England enacted the Act for the Compensation the Families of Persons 
Killed by Accidents. At 198. 
784 With the enactment of Forfeiture Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23) in England, forfeiture for treason 
and felony was abolished. In the US, in 1790, the Act of April 20, 1970, Chapter 9, Section 24, 
abolished forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood, including treason and felony cases.   
785 Regina v. Woodrow, 88. 15 M. & W. 403 (1846), at [409-413] 




Offences”788, which do not require any mental element.789 So it was not surprising 
that after the abolition of the law of deodands and corruption of blood, the early 
statutory forfeitures such as admiralty (maritime) laws790 included cases where, for 
example, ships should be fortified without inquiry into the guilt of the owner for 
slave-trafficking, piracy and rum-running.791 Similarly, customs and revenue 
statutes792 allowed the forfeiture of, for example, land used in the operation of 
illegal tax-delinquent distilleries.793     
10.3 Forfeiture laws in the war on drugs: the US approach 
Despite this draconian character, the power of statutory forfeitures began to be 
regarded as “inadequate” in the fight against what were characterized as growing 
problems of the second half of the twentieth century, drugs and organized crime.794 
In the 1970s, in the US where the well-springs of both the problems arose and 
remedies were crystalized and became a model for countries to follow, a loud call 
for an attack on (as Naylor argues the exaggerated and mythical) 795 wealth of drug-
organized crime groups was issued. They were considered “as a particular danger” 
as they “threatened governmental process, depleted the public purse and subverted 
and nullified the political process through graft and corruption”.796 The fear was 
also instilled in the public that organized crime wealth could be used to take over 
legitimate business activities.797 The view grew in popularity that the existing 
confiscatory laws, which authorized only in rem actions against contraband or 
                                                 
788 Finkelstein, above n 782, at 198. 
789 Finkelstein, at, refers to decision of the court in the case Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 403 
(Exch 1846) as a landmark. The court ruled that “forfeiture may be incurred even in circumstances 
where there was no intention of fraud and the in the absence of the word “knowingly from the statute 
forfeiture”.       
790 See for example Navigation Acts of the mid-17th century in England remained in place in 
England, requiring that any ships importing or exporting goods from England ports fly under the 
England flag. If the Acts were violated, the ships or the cargo could be seized and forfeited to the 
crown regardless of the guilt or innocence of the owner.  
791 See for example, United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S.1, (1890). United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 
43 U.S. 209, (1844).  
792 For example, Act of July 13, 1866, Chapter. 184, Section. 14, (14 U.S stat.) did not limit the 
scope of seizure and forfeiture of the properties used for fraud to the guilty mind of the owner. So 
the property used for the commission of a crime could be forfeited in a civil action only if the lessee 
had the intention to commit the crime.           
793  See Cofeey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, (1886).  
794 Freiberg, above n 772, at 47. 
795 Naylor argues that “every rational assessment indicates that the sums of criminal money 
supposedly involved are grossly exaggerated". See Naylor, above n 270, at 18, 19 and 134.  
796 Freiberg, above n 772, at 48. 
797 Naylor, above n 270, at 34-5. 
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articles put to illegal use (instrumentalities of a crime),798 lacked deterrent 
efficiency, not being able to put criminal organizations out of business. President 
Nixon said, “as long as the property of organized crime remains, new leaders will 
step forward to take the place of those we jail”. 799 The demand for new weapons 
and tools which would allow the government to strike at the Mafia’s source of 
revenue rose.  
As a result, new legislation under Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act 1970 
known as RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970) was 
enacted to proscribe the use of dirty money (acquired and maintained through 
racketeering) for the legal acquisition or operation of a legitimate enterprise by 
organized groups. This legislation as well as the subsequent legislation,800 intended 
to be civil in nature, adopted the principles of antitrust laws and applied it to the 
problem of organized crime. In a radically innovative manner, it authorized civil 
actions against certain contraband or property, used in the commission of a narcotic 
crime or acquired from it, by imposing a lower standard of proof (balance of 
probabilities) and greater powers of investigations in criminal cases. But forfeitures 
could not take place until after the conviction of an offender.  
However, within a few years, these civil forfeiture laws were found to be 
unproductive because of their less extensive coverage and because they were 
“limited to persons convicted of participating in continuing criminal enterprises”.801 
The US Congress extended the reach of the forfeiture statutes to include the 
forfeiture of all proceeds traceable to the purchase of a controlled substance as well 
as any negotiable instrument or money intended to facilitate violations of the 
narcotics laws.802 It also “greatly expanded the potency and scope of forfeiture by 
authorizing in rem actions, which provide few of the constitutional guarantees that 
                                                 
798 For example, Contraband Seizure Act 1939 (US) and its amendment in 1950 restricted 
confiscation to instruments and properties used in drug trafficking.    
799 See United States Congress Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings, Ninety-first 
Congress, First Session (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1969), at 448-50.  
800 See for example Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act 1970 (US) or Organized Crime 
Control Act 1970 (US) which criminalized racketeering participation in commercial ventures and 
allowed the civil forfeiture of all interests held in violation of the law.  
801 Scott Alexander Nelson “The Supreme Court Takes a Weapon From the Drug War Arsenal: New 
Defenses to Civil Drug” 1994 26(1) St. Mary's Law Journal 157, at 159-160.  
802 In 1978, this amendment added subsection (a)(6) to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) to the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1970 (US). 
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are attached to a criminal indictment”:803 this amendment, which included what is 
known as the relation-back doctrine, provided that all right, title and interest in 
property which is “used  or intended to be used , in any manner or part, to commit 
or facilitate” the commission of a crime giving rise to forfeiture would vest in the 
government immediately when the crime is committed .804 While the main purpose 
of this expansion was to close a potential loophole that would allow escape form 
forfeiture through the sham transfer of such a property to a third party,805 it was 
criticised mainly for its harsh results of shifting the burden of proof to the 
accused,806 and of allowing the forfeiture of property with scant regard to the 
innocence or guilt of the owner of the forfeited property (forfeiting property on the 
basis of the fiction of guilty property, the common law concept of deodand).807  
                                                 
803 Nelson, above n 801, at 160. 
804 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1970, (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(h)).  
805 Levy shows that while the drug forfeiture laws was aimed at starving the drug organized groups 
of the profits of their crime, as soon as they came into effect, they were mostly used against “the 
little people. See Levy, above n 774, at 127. He also considered the forfeiture laws as “failure”, 
pointing out that although they were aim at preventing the criminal infiltration of organized groups 
into legitimate business, “very few indictments involved the charge that the accused used the 
proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise”.   
806 Under civil forfeiture, in order to confiscate a property, the government only needs to demonstrate 
that there is a probable cause to believe that a substantial connection exists between the property and 
the illegal activity (or guilty property). (for example, in United States v. One 1975 Ford F100 Pickup 
Truck, 558 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) the government claimed forfeiture of a truck by only 
showing probable cause that the truck was employed to facilitate concealment, possession, or 
transportation of cocaine). Probable cause may entirely be based on circumstantial evidence, hearsay 
or an anonymous informant’s tip (without being tested in court), and it can be met simply by lodging 
a complaint by the government. If the accused fails to prove the innocence of his property, or fails 
to prove he did not know his property was involved in illegal action, he will lose it. In other words, 
as Levy (above n 774, at 124) discusses, in civil forfeiture, forfeiture proceedings are against 
property not a person, so “the property which has no rights is accused of crime and convicted on the 
basis of a showing of probable cause”. This turns upside down the presumption of innocence _ 
property is guilty until the owner proves otherwise. Levi further argues and illustrates that such 
lenient burden of proof on the government empowers the government with “draconian forfeiture 
weapons” to seize and confiscate citizens’ property without observing their constitutional rights and 
without insuring that “guilt and innocent is fairly determined”.  
807 While the amendment recognized the “innocent owner defence” by allowing a party (owner) to 
plead that the crime took place “without the [his] knowledge or consent”, in practice, controversy 
arises on what constitutes an owner defence? Does the defence include a case where the owner knew 
about the illegal use of his property, but did not consent to it? Does a claimant need to demonstrate 
that the illegal use of his property took place without his wilful blindness? See United States v. One 
Single Family Residence Located at 6960 Miraflores Avenue, 995 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir 1993). 
Several courts ruled that the claimant “must demonstrate both that he lacked actual knowledge and 
consent, and that he did everything reasonably possible” to prevent misuse of the property (see for 
example US v. One single family residence (1988), 683 F.Supp. 783). Levy (above n 774, at 164-
165) argues that this reading was not satisfactory as it unfairly resulted in the rejection of the 
innocent owner defence of , for example, a women who forfeited her car because she permitted her 
son who had a criminal record for drug dealing to use the car. The son used the car for a drug 
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Despites the criticisms, the draconian expansion of the scope of forfeiture laws 
continued. An amendment was added, which allowed seizure and forfeiture of the 
“substitute” assets of an offender (value confiscation), in case the offender could 
get rid of the property subject to forfeiture.808 This amendment was criticized for 
raising the Eighth amendment problem of imposing excessive, cruel and unusual 
punishment,809 and for violating the constitutional provision against the doctrine of 
‘forfeiture of estate’.810 The establishment of money laundering offences, which is 
argued that it “was shaped not by a rational request for an effective way to deal with 
a well-understood problem but by a mix of myth, hyperbole, and delirium”,811 
greatly expanded the policy and scope of forfeiture by authorising in rem actions 
against any property involved in financial transactions that represent the proceeds 
of some form of unlawful activity, or involved in concealing and disguising the 
                                                 
transaction without his mom knowing or being consent to such an illegal use. But the car was 
forfeited.  
808 Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 (US), s 1153(a).   
809 The forfeiture of substitute assets does not strike some as being fair as it could include the 
forfeiture of innocents. Levi warns that such an amendment may make an honest shopkeeper forfeit 
his entire business “if he got mixed up in a single fraudulent scheme”. Levy, above n 774, at 116. In 
the case of money laundering, such a forfeiture law can have unfair and dramatic impact on, for 
example, “a securities lawyer who prepares a prospectus which his clients, investment promoters, 
use to raise $1.5 million from investors in 2004. Assume that the lawyer also allows his attorney 
trust account to be used to receive the funds and that he then transfers the funds to entities controlled 
by his clients. The government, claiming that the lawyer knew that the prospectus contained material 
omissions and misstatements, brings money-laundering charges, and a count seeking criminal 
forfeiture of $1.5 million, based on the lawyer’s transfers of funds he knew were obtained by 
securities fraud. Assume that most of the lawyer’s own assets are represented by his home, worth 
$2.0 million, which he purchased in 1995 with funds he earned through years of honest toil well 
before he ever met the clients alleged to have conducted the 2004 fraud. Nevertheless, because the 
lawyer transferred the $1.5 million in alleged tainted money to third parties—his clients’ entities—
the government can list the lawyer’s home in the indictment as a “substitute asset” subject to 
forfeiture up to $1.5 million and can, in the event of the lawyer’s conviction, seek the forfeiture of 
that home if the tainted $1.5 million is unavailable.” Richard F. Albert and Amy Tully “A Bad Fit—
Criminal Forfeiture of Substitute Assets, the Lis Pendens” 2005 234(27) New York Law Journal 1.   
810 Traditionally, there is a constitutional requirement of a connection or nexus between the crime 
and the property forfeited. Some are of the opinion that “the forfeiture of an equivalent value of 
substitute assets resembles "forfeiture of estate," particularly in the common case of the criminal 
whose property is traceable to illegal activity and whose illegal gains over time exceed the value of 
his current assets”. See for example opinion of the court in United States v. Ginsburg (1986), 773 
F.2d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 1986) (Ripple, J., dissenting) cited by D. J. Fried “Rationalizing Criminal 
Forfeiture” 1988 79(2) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 328, at 344-345.  
811 See R. T. Naylor Counterfeit Crime: Criminal Profits, Terror Dollars, and Nonsense (McGill-
Queens University Press, Montreal, 2014), at 98. Naylor argues that anti-money laundering regime 
in the US was shaped on the basis of some “erroneous or exaggerated beliefs“ about amount of 
money generated by organized groups, the durable nature and hierarchical structure of these groups, 
the purposes of these group to infiltrate into legitimate businesses and corrupt them, the financial 
motivation of these groups (as only motivation), and bankers’ desire to be “the devil’s apprentices” 
(“an opinion reinforced by widely repeated stories about the misdeeds of Swiss bankers in 
particular”). See R. T. Naylor “Criminal Profits, Terror Dollars and Nonsense” November 2007 
23(201) Crime and Justice International 27, at 28-29.     
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illegal origin of property.812 The most distinct feature of these anti-money 
laundering laws is their expansiveness; they include “over one hundred possible 
offenses including not only drug trafficking, but also such things as, fraud, 
espionage, and environmental crimes”813, crimes that do not have provisions which 
permit forfeiture of proceeds of those crimes.814    
10.4 Forfeiture of terrorist funds; a reversion to primitive conceptions 
There had already been steps taken to reform of US civil forfeiture laws due to their 
constitutional challenges and unfair consequences,815 but the attacks of 2001 
provided the US an ideal opportunity to push forward the globalization of the 
exaggerated assumption that there is a nexus between organized crime and 
terrorism.816 It was able to consequently expand its forfeiture strategy to include the 
so-called the financial war on terror,817 without regarding the differences between 
terrorist money which normally has legal origin and dirty money (proceeds) 
                                                 
812 Money Laundering Control Act 1986 (US). 
813 Scott Saltzer “Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It” 1995 
63 Tennessee Law Review 143, at 161.  
814 Money Laundering Control Act 1986 codified in Title 18 U.S.C.A. s 1956(c)(7).  
815 The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act was enacted in 2000 in order to make a number of changes 
to the US forfeiture laws. For example, the prosecution is required to establish, “by a preponderance 
of the evidence”, that the property is subject to forfeiture” (see 18 U.S.C. § 983 (b)(2)(A) (2000)). 
Prior to this amendment, the government could freeze a property on only probable cause (see note 
806). The amendment also allows the courts to “reduce or eliminate the forfeiture as necessary to 
avoid a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth if “the forfeiture is grossly 
disproportional to the offense” (See 18 U.S.C. § 983 (g)(4)(2000)). Prior to this amendment, there 
was no balance between forfeiture and gravity of an offence (see note 809). However, as Johnson 
argues, these amendments failed to fully solve the problems that arose from the prior the forfeiture 
laws. “[T]he Act fails to completely equalize the burdens of proof required by the government and 
innocent owners”. Also, “the amendment failed to adopt the proper inquiry under the Excessive 
Fines Clause and instead only uses a proportionality inquiry”. See Barclay Thomas Johnson 
“Restoring Civility: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More 
Civilized Civil Firfeiture Sytem” 2002 35(3) Indian Law Review 1045, at 1084.  
816 While Terrorist Financing Convention, which was initiated and drafted by G8, was made to instil 
the idea that terrorism and organized crime are similar in terms of making and moving money, so 
similar tools to anti-money laundering regime can be used to counter it, before 9/11 attacks, only 
few countries signed the Convention. The UN Security Council (obviously by a US push) adopted 
Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373 (2001)) which calls upon all countries to ratify the Convention and 
requires seizure of any funds directly or indirectly related to terrorism and terrorist groups. 
817 Naylor argues that the idea of war on terror “heartily endorsed both by media pundits and by the 
growing army of post-9/11 ‘national security experts’,” did not emerge suddenly from the fevered 
mind of some Republication Party spinmeister. It had been gaining converts for decades before it 
crystallized in the legislative and military aftermath of 9/11. The anti-mafia hysteria that had gripped 
the United States during the late nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries provided the images, 
the vocabulary, and even some of the important legal weaponry deployed in the anti-Islamic Terror 
campaign of the late twentieth and early twenty-first”. See R. T. Naylor Satanic Purses: Money, 
Myth, and Misinformation in the War on Terror (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2006), 
at 46.     
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connected to a crime committed. As a result, the USA Patriot Act (Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001)818 was adopted (or in the view of Naylor, “sold to 
the public as the necessary response”).819 The Act, which criminalizes provision of 
material support and resources for preparation or commission of terrorist acts or to 
terrorists or terrorist groups,820 was the result of the combination of two earlier 
strategies: the forfeiture strategy, which had been employed in the war on drugs, 
and the strategy which has been developed out of the experience of economic 
warfare during and since World War I,821 and which gives the government (the 
President) authority to seize any property or transaction by declaring those who 
control the property or engage in the transaction an “enemy” of the State.822 
The combination of these two strategies in the fight against terrorist financing 
resulted in the expansion of the scope of the forfeiture regime in an unprecedented 
manner. The Act allows the seizure and forfeiture of “all assets” of people who, on 
a balance of probabilities,  are shown to be connected, in any way, to terrorism; that 
is, the government can forfeit “all assets”, foreign or domestic, of any individual or 
organization engaged in planning or preparing a terrorist act, all assets “affording 
any person a source of influence over any such entity or organization”, all assets 
“acquired and maintained with the intent and for the purpose of supporting, 
planning, conducting, or concealing” a terrorist act, all assets “derived from, 
                                                 
818 Codified at 18 USC § 1 (2001). 
819 Naylor, above n 817, at 11. 
820 18 USC § 2339. 
821 Naylor (above n 817, at 10.) argues that this strategy began to be used to counter terrorist 
financing in the 1990s when “the Clinton administration started to apply the logic of asset freezes 
to designated groups rather than to countries”.       
822 The Trading with the enemy Act 1917, codified at 12 U.S.C. SEC. 95a–95b, gave the President 
the power to control over and impose restriction on trade between the U.S and foreign countries 
and/or nationals declared “enemy”. In other words, this law allowed the seizure of the assets and 
property of blacklisted individuals or entities, domestic and foreign, controlled by or involved in 
trade or financial relations with the ‘enemy’. The power of the president was extended by the 
enactment of the Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933. By the enactment of the 1977 International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, such power remains in force in times of war. Two decades later, 
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty ACT of 1996 (codified as amended at 28 USC 
§ 1605A), two lists of entities, designated foreign terrorist organizations and state sponsors of 
terrorism, were created. This law imposed restriction on financial transactions with these entities. 
For a review of history see Laura K. Donohue The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and 
Liberty (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2008) at 147-148; see R. T. Naylor Patriots 
and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting, and State-Sponsored Crime (M & S, 
Toronto, 1999).   
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involved in, or used or intended to be used to commit any act of terrorism”.823 The 
US forfeiture law also permits the forfeiture of any property collected or provided 
for terrorism without a need to prove the connection between the property and an 
actual terrorist act.824   
The main noticeable difference between these terrorist forfeiture provisions and  the 
earlier forfeiture laws is that unlike the provisions  on illegal drugs and money 
laundering in which the forfeiture is limited to the forfeiture of assets derived  from 
crime (proceeds of crimes) or assets used or intended to be used for commission or 
facilitation of crime, the terrorist forfeiture provisions do not require “any 
substantial connection between the property and terrorist activity nor any sense that 
particular property be linked to any crime at all”.825 So, if the government shows, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, a person or a group of persons are terrorists, 
all of their assets become forfeitable. Similarly, if it shows that assets are collected 
for a terrorist purpose, whatever that means, they are liable to seizure and ultimately 
forfeiture.  
In other words, what makes an asset forfeitable is not its use for the commission of 
a crime or its illegal origin, but its attachment to the terrorist-labelled identity or 
terrorist intent of the owner or holder. According to this approach, it is the identity 
or intention of an accused which taints all of his assets, and consequently makes 
them liable to seizure and forfeiture. This is the draconian reconstruction of the 
abolished ancient concepts of “deodand” (guilty objects) and “corruption of blood” 
according to which the forfeited objects did not need to be connected to an offence, 
but simply were confiscated because the crime was regarded “as a breach of the 
offender’s fealty to his lord”.826 Similarly to in anti-terrorist laws such as the Patriot 
Act, terrorism in any form (even a thought) seems to be considered under US law 
as a breach of the offender’s allegiance to the state which expresses zero tolerance 
for the presence of certain people and thoughts suspected of or labelled terrorism. 
But unlike the forfeiture of the corruption of blood which required a conviction, and 
unlike the forfeiture of deodand which required the occurrence of some type of 
                                                 
823 Patriot Act, s 806, codified at 18 USC § 981 (a)(1)(g). 
824 18 USC § 981 (a)(1)(h). 
825 Mary Michelle Gallant Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime: Economic Crime and 
Civil Remedies (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2005), at 106. 
826 Freiberg, above n 772, at 46. 
188 
 
wrongdoing, this terrorist forfeiture law allows the forfeiture of “all assets” of a 
person or a group of persons who, on a balance of probabilities, are demonstrated 
to be terrorists or to have a terrorist intent. These identity-based confiscation and 
intent-based confiscation rules have established one of the most draconian 
forfeiture regime in the history of liberal democracies. 
Even worse, the Patriot Act also provides another alternative (draconian) means to 
confiscate terrorist property. It greatly increases presidential authority to freeze and 
confiscate the assets and property of blacklisted individuals or organizations by 
declaring them foreign terrorists (similar to the concept of ‘enemy’), without 
granting judicial review of the forfeiture.827 While the owner of property may file a 
lawsuit, if he seeks the return of his property, the burden is on him to demonstrate, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the confiscated property is not a property 
of suspected terrorists.828  
10.5 Internationalization of the intent-based approach 
The US identity-based and intention-based confiscation approaches not only has 
become a model for much of what is commonly described as the Western world,829 
but also has crept into the international and regional conventions and agreements. 
The Terrorist Financing Convention, in its article 8, requires “the identification, 
detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of 
committing the offences set forth in article 2”.  
                                                 
827 Patriot Act, above n 818, s 106. 
828 At s 316 (a)(2). 
829 See for example Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) section 23 which allows forfeiture of any assets, 
collected, received possessed to be used for the “purpose of terrorism”. Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001(UK), section 1, permits civil forfeiture of cash and property intended for use for 
the purposes of terrorism, or property that represents the property of a proscribed organization, or 
cash or property that has been found by a court as “terrorist cash”, without a need for criminal 
prosecution. Criminal Code of Canada, section 83.14, allows a court to order, on a balance of 
probabilities, forfeiture of “property owned or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist group”, and 
property that has been used or will be used for the facilitation or commission of a terrorist activity, 
with no need for connection between the property and an actual terrorist act. Australian Charter of 
the United Nations Act 1945, Section 25, gives the Minister for Foreign Affairs authority to 
proscribe a person or an entity as terrorist, and to order seizure of the asset owned or controlled by 
the proscribed a person or a group. Section 20 of this Act creates offences for dealing in such a 
“freezable asset”, offences such as holding the asset, using the asset, allowing the asset to be used 
and facilitating the use of the asset. 
189 
 
The link to the flawed criminalisation of terrorist financing as an independent 
offence is thus firmly established. The offences set forth in article 2 include terrorist 
financing offences (collection and provision of funds) as well as terrorist offences. 
Emphasizing the criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence 
(which is, in its nature, a preparatory offence),830 the Convention in article 2 (3) 
does not require any connection between the funds collected or provided and any 
terrorist act; as pointed out above, the terrorist financing offences also rely  heavily 
on the intent of the accused.831 Reading these provisions together implies that the 
Convention obliges confiscation of any assets and funds that can be attributed to an 
imaginary terrorist act, as well as confiscation of assets used or intended to be used 
for the collection or provision of funds for terrorist purposes (intent-based 
confiscation).  
In dealing with the issue of terrorism financing, as discussed in chapter three, the 
UN Security Council also adopted an identity-based approach to round off the 
counter-terrorist financing regime that begins with criminalization. But, this 
approach was made and has been developed to “operate based on diplomacy and 
not due process”.832 The Resolution 1267 set up a committee, called the “Al-Qaida 
Sanctions Committee” and gave it a mandate to create and update (without a proper 
judicial process) a list of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated 
with al-Qaida and Taliban (“Al-Qaida Sanctions List”).833 Having regard to the 
information provided by the UN Member States and regional organizations,834 the 
committee, which consists of the Security Council Member States, is obliged to 
make a decision (by “consensus of its members”) on whether an individual or 
organization proposed is eligible to be included in the List or delisted.835 In 2009, 
the Security Council created an office of Ombudsperson “who reviews requests 
from individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the 
                                                 
830 See Hamed Tofangsaz “Rethinking Terrorist Financing; Where Does all this Lead?” 2015 18(1) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 112.   
831 Lehto, above n 14, at xxxiv. 
832 Cian Murphy EU Counter-Terrorism Law: Pre-Emption and the Rule of Law (Hart, Oxford, UK, 
2012), at 120. 
833 UN, S/RES/1267, 15 October 1999, at [6]. See the amendments to this resolution in UN, 
S/RES/1425, 20 December 2002. UN, S/RES/1455, 17 January 2003. UN, S/RES/1526, 30 January 
2004. UN, S/RES/1617, 29 July 2005. UN, S/RES/1735, 22 December 2006. UN, S/RES/1822, 30 
June 2008. UN, S/RES/1989, 17 June 2011.   
834 UN, S/RES/1390, 16 January 2002, at [5 (a)]. 
835 UN, above n 200, at [4]. 
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Al-Qaida Sanctions List of the Security Council's Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee”.836 However, the office of ombudsperson does not provide any judicial 
review. This matter will be explored in detail in chapter 12.3.  
The Resolution 1267 along with the subsequent resolutions requires all countries to 
freeze all financial assets of Bin laden, Al-Qaida and Taliban.837 Following the 
attacks of 11 September 2001, this approach became universal with the Security 
Council Resolution 1373, which addresses financing of terrorists and terrorist 
groups in a general way without adopting a list.838 While there is no agreement on 
the definition of terrorism, the UN Security Council asked all countries to adopt 
necessary measures, inter alia, to  
[f]reeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
persons [not limited to assets of Al-Qaida and Taliban] who commit, or attempt to 
commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; 
of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of 
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and 
entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities.839 
The Resolution has left it to Member States to draw up and establish a terrorist list 
other than the designated list created by Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. It has set 
up a committee, named the “Counter-Terrorism Committee” to monitor states’ 
compliance with this Resolution.840 There was subsequent endorsement and 
enforcement by the European Union, which will be discussed later. 
Similarly, the FATF recommends the adoption and implementation of measures to 
freeze funds or other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist 
organisations in accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the 
prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.841 It also recommends 
                                                 
836 UN, S/RES/1904, 17 December 2009.  
837 UN, S/RES/1267, 15 October 1999, at [4(b)]. UN, S/RES/1333, 19 December 2000. UN, 
S/RES/1390, (2002). UN, S/RES/1455, (2003). 
838 UN, S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001. 
839 At [1]. 
840 At [6]. 
841 Financial Action Task Force “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, the FATF Recommendations” (February 2012) 
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confiscation of “property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated 
for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations”, 
“without requiring a criminal conviction”, and “even in the absence of a link to a 
specific terrorist act or acts”.842 It also recommends “[c]ountries should consider 
adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated 
without requiring a criminal conviction (non-conviction based confiscation), or 
which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged 
to be liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with 
the principles of their domestic law”.843 
10.6 Conclusion 
The current (globalized) freezing and confiscatory measures have been greatly 
influenced by ancient English concepts of forfeiture. These concepts, which allow 
the forfeiture of property with scant regard to the innocence or guilt of the owner 
of the forfeited property (forfeiting property on the basis of the fiction of guilty 
property, the common law concept of deodand), have crept into the US confiscatory 
measures in the war against drugs and then into confiscatory measures in the war 
against terror. The US approach to confiscation and freezing of terrorist funds has 
found its way into the Terrorist Financing Convention, FATF recommendations and 
UN Security Council’s resolutions.    
The application of this approach accompanied by the vague definition of offence of 
terrorist financing has created draconian forfeiture measures. Previous chapters 
have shown how to impose liability, the terrorist financing offence largely relies on 
the mental element of the financer who proceeds with collecting or providing funds 
which may not necessary to be used for any terrorist act. In the absence of the 
necessity of a link between funds and an actual terrorist act, the basis of imposing 
forfeiture sanctions against property involved is questionable. It seems that the 
combination of the current forfeiture approach and the vague definition of the 
offence permits the seizure and forfeiture of property not because it will be used for 
preparation or commission of, or linked to, any criminal activities, but because it is 
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assumed to be used for terrorist purposes (whatever it means) or used by suspect 
terrorists or terrorist groups. Even worse, the UN Security Council, adopting the 
US approach, has created a mechanism to freeze, without due process and for an 
indefinite time, all the property of those who are designated, in a gross violation of 
due process, as terrorists, terrorist organizations and their financers. 
The following chapters engage in a closer examination of these seizure and 
forfeitures measures, identifying the regulatory problems that arises from such 
vague and arbitrary measures in the context of EU and ASEAN.  The EU has been 
chosen because it is a value-based community which has emphasis on the 
maintenance and promotion of human rights and rule of law. The approach of 
ASEAN countries towards criminalization and confiscation of terrorist financing is 
also subject to examination because it functions as a kind of counter model to the 
EU: it consists of countries which may not share the same democratic values as the 
EU and its Member States, but ASEAN states are encouraged (sometimes 
pressurised) by EU or other Western democratic states to take into account human 
rights and democratic values when dealing with issues such as terrorism.      
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Chapter Eleven: The EU’s approach towards the confiscation of 
terrorist funds 
11.1 Introduction  
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and subsequent terrorist 
attacks in Europe, regional security developments have become particularly 
important for European policy and security. The EU also insists on the adoption and 
implementation of the current counter-terrorist financing regime, which was 
provided by the Terrorist Financing Convention and the UN Security Council 
resolutions and which has been promoted by international organizations such as 
FATF. It should be also noted that many EU Member States have supported and are 
still supporting the creation and diffusion of the counter-terrorist financing regime. 
But the question is how the EU, as a value-based community, and its Member States 
which are subject to those value yardsticks, address the legal issues arising from 
imposing (i) criminal liability and (ii) consequently seizure and confiscation 
measures against the property of accused terrorist financiers on the basis of their 
mental state without linking their action, or mental state to any actual terrorist act.   
The EU’s approach is worthy of careful examination as the EU claims to have a 
strong commitment to fight against terrorism while maintaining fundamental 
principles, such as respect for the rule of law, good governance, fundamental 
freedoms and promoting human rights and democratic values.844 Any difficulties 
that the EU and its Member States have with the regime thus may throw light on 
the flaws of the regime argued for above. 
11.2 The EU regional approach 
As a regional organization, the EU has incorporated the current terrorist financing 
measures into its counter terrorist financing strategy, but in a piecemeal way. While 
the initial EU definition of terrorist financing is in line with the definition provided 
by the Terrorist Financing Convention,845 there are constant amendments pushed 
                                                 
844 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, C 326/17, (26 October 2012), art 2.  
845 Article 1(5) of “EU Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015  on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
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forward to bring EU laws in line with the FATF revised recommendations and UN 
Security Council resolutions. For instance, the latest proposal for a Directive on 
combating terrorism has pushed through provisions which require the EU Member 
States “to criminalize the provision of funds that are used to commit terrorist 
offences and offences related to terrorist groups or terrorist activities” including a 
new terrorist financing offence (financing of travelling abroad for terrorist 
purposes)846 introduced by the FATF’s revised Interpretive Note to 
Recommendation 5 on the criminal offence of terrorist 847 and UN Security Council 
Resolution 2178 (2014).848 This proposal has been adopted as an EU directive in 
March 2017.849  
Regarding the relationship between terrorist financing offences and its subsequent 
terrorist offences, the EU laws on terrorism have also provided similar provisions 
to those adopted by the Terrorist Financing Convention and the FATF.  It has been 
repeatedly emphasized that “it shall not be necessary that a terrorist offence is 
actually committed”.850 The emphasis has also been made that in dealing with 
terrorist financing offences, “it is sufficient that there is knowledge about the use of 
the funds for purposes furthering the terrorist activities in general without there 
being a need to be linked to for instance a specific already envisaged travel 
abroad”.851 Nevertheless, none of these EU legislative acts and proposals defines 
what constitutes ‘terrorist purposes’. This not only results in different 
interpretations, but also fails to satisfy the principle of legality. 
It is worth noting that the EU’s definition of terrorism is very broad including many 
criminal offences, and it has hard-to-infer mental elements. Terrorism according to 
                                                 
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC” define ‘terrorist financing’ as “the provision or collection of 
funds, by any means, directly or  indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences within 
the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism. 
846 At, art 11. 
847 Financial Action Task Force, above n 12, at 37. 
848 UN, S/RES/2178, 24 September 2014. 
849 EU Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending 
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. 
850 EU Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, Article 3 (3). 
851 Article 15 of Proposal for a EU Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism, (OM/2015/0625 final - 2015/0281). See also EU Directive 2017/541, above n 849. 
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the Article 1 to 4 of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA covers a list of violent 
acts852 which  
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed 
with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a 
Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing 
any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organisation.  
However, the EU has provided a narrower definition of terrorist groups. Unlike the 
Terrorist Financing Convention which does not provide any definition of terrorist 
groups, and unlike the very broad definition of terrorist groups recommended by 
the FATF853, the EU has defined a ‘terrorist group’ as 
a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and 
acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. ‘Structured group’ shall mean a 
group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence 
and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity 
of its membership or a developed structure.854  
Regardless of whether the concept of terrorism or a terrorist group in itself is vague 
and undefinable, the EU Member States, also, do not share a common 
understanding of what (or what not) precisely constitutes terrorism as a crime. For 
example, while the German Criminal Code only criminalizes financing of serious 
                                                 
852 According to EU Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, Article 1 (1), 
terrorist offences can include “attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death”, “attacks upon 
the physical integrity of a person”, “kidnapping or hostage taking”, causing extensive destruction to 
a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility”, “seizure of aircraft, 
ships or other means of public or goods transport”, “manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, 
supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as 
research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons”, “release of dangerous 
substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life”, 
“interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource 
the effect of which is to endanger human life”, “threatening to commit” any of the acts mentioned 
above.      
853 According to the FATF, the term terrorist group refers to “any group of terrorists that: (i) 
commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts; (iii) organises or directs others to commit 
terrorist acts; or (iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with 
a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the 
terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act”. See FATF, 
above n 13, at 122. 
854 EU Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, art 2 (1). 
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violent acts “endangering the state” (meaning commission of a criminal offense 
against life within the meaning of Section 211 or 212 of German Criminal Code or 
against personal freedom within the meaning of Section 239a or 239b of the 
Criminal Code),855 the United Kingdom’s definition also covers violent acts 
“designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”.856  
There are also noticeable differences in the definitions of a terrorist group provided 
by EU Member States. According to the Spanish Criminal Code, for example, a 
terrorist group is construed to be a stable group formed by one or more persons, for 
an indefinite time, in collusion and co-ordination to distribute diverse tasks or duties 
in order to commit felonies, as well as to carry out reiterated commission of 
misdemeanours”.857 Compare this with Greece’s definition of terrorist groups 
according to which funding “a terrorist group is not a crime unless that group 
consists of three or more people acting jointly in order to commit” a terrorist act.858 
When it comes to the confiscation of terrorist funds, following the US approach and 
the FATF Recommendations, the EU uses its anti-money laundering confiscation 
provisions to counter terrorist financing, without regard to differences between the 
proceeds of organized crime and terrorist funds. It requires its Member States to 
confiscate “either in whole or in part, of instrumentalities and proceeds or property 
the value of which corresponds to such instrumentalities or proceeds, subject to a 
final conviction for” criminal offences,  including terrorist offences covered by the 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating 
terrorism.859 Reading this provision in conjunction with the provisions on the 
criminalization of terrorist offences, which do not require a connection between 
terrorist offences and an actual terrorist act, implies an intent-based confiscatory 
regime in which people’s assets may be confiscated merely on the basis of what 
they (are presumed to) intend to do, rather than what they actually commit or plan 
                                                 
855 Section 89a (2) number 4 of the Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany 1971. 
856 Terrorist Act 2000 (UK), s 1(1). 
857 Article 571 and Sub-Section 2 of Section 1 of Article 570 bis of Spanish Criminal Code (1995). 
858 Financial Action Task Force Third mutual evaluation on anti-money laundering and combating 
the financing of terrorism, Greece (29 JUNE 2007), at [135]. 
859 Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the 
freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union, Article 
4. 1. See also Article 3 (1)(b) of Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 
on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property.  
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to do. But there is a noticeable difference between the EU laws and the US 
confiscation model. While in the US, “all assets” of a person engaged in terrorism 
can be confiscated regardless of whether they have been used or intended to be used 
for terrorism, the EU laws appear to require the confiscation of the assets (assumed 
to be) linked to terrorism or terrorist purposes; that is, it appears that there should 
be some kind of connection, although presumptive, between the confiscated assets 
and terrorism or terrorist purposes.  
11.3 Confiscation of terrorist funds at the EU national level 
Although the application of the EU laws and regulations on terrorism offences at 
the national level differs in many respects among EU Member States, especially 
with regard to the definition of the elements of the terrorism offences, some EU 
Member States appear to have adopted approaches similar to the US Confiscation 
model of countering terrorist funds (the intent-based model).    
For example, in the UK where a number of terrorism offences are set out,860 the 
collection or provision, possession and use of money or any property can be 
regarded as an offence if a person involved in any of these actions intends that the 
money or property should be used for the “purposes of terrorism”, or has reasonable 
cause to suspect that it may be used for such purposes.861 Where a conviction for 
any of these offences is secured, the court may order the forfeiture of any money or 
other property which, at the time of the offence, the convict “had in their possession 
or under their control, and which had been used for the purposes of terrorism, or, 
they intended should be used, or had reasonable cause to suspect might be used, for 
those purposes.”862 Similarly, entering into or becoming concerned in an 
arrangement which facilitates another’s retention or control of terrorist property is 
an offence; but, unlike above-mentioned offences, the burden is on the accused to 
prove that he “did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the 
arrangement related to terrorist property;863 if the accused fails to do so and is 
convicted of such an offence, the court may order the forfeiture of the money or 
                                                 
860 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), ss 11, 12, 13, 55, 56, 57, 58, 58A.  
861At ss 15, 16. 
862 At s 23 (1)(2)(3). 
863 At s 18.  
198 
 
other property to which the arrangement in question related.864 Departing from the 
conviction-based approach, the forfeiture order may be extended to  
any money or other property which, at the time of the offence, the person [the 
accused] had in their possession or under their control, and which (a) had been used 
for, the purposes of terrorism, or (b) was, at that time, intended by them to be used 
for those purposes.865 
Basically, what the prosecution needs to prove is that the accused had terrorist 
purposes when he became involved in those financing activities. If they can, not 
only is the property involved in those activities subject to forfeiture, but in addition, 
other property of the financer, which can be assumed to be used for terrorist 
purposes, can be unfairly and irrelevantly in danger of forfeiture if the prosecution 
alleges that those property could be used, or intended to be used for terrorism 
purposes. An example might be the forfeiture of other property (say a house) of a 
person who used his shop for supporting terrorism, simply because the property 
also might be used, or there is reasonable cause to suspect it might be used, for 
terrorist purposes. In other words, by proving that the financer had a terrorist 
propose when he was using his shop for fund-raising the prosecution could ask for 
the forfeiture of other property of the financer as it could be used for terrorist 
purposes.866 
English law also allows courts to order the forfeiture of a property not intended or 
suspected for use in terrorism when that property was “wholly or partly, and directly 
or indirectly,… received by any person as a payment or other reward” in connection 
with any offence mentioned above.867 Thus, for example, the payment made to an 
accountant for preparing accounts on behalf of a proscribed organisation is 
                                                 
864 At s 23 (5). 
865 At s 23 (4). 
866 In spite of such a law, in UK case R. v. Farooqi and Others, [2013] EWCA Crim 1649, the first 
attempt to forfeit the residential property of the Farooqi (an Islamic bookstall owner) failed. He 
received four life sentences for soliciting to murder (inciting two undercover police officers who 
regularly visited his family house to fight in Afghanistan), for dissemination of terrorist publications 
and for engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism. Although the judge (Sir Richard 
Henriques QC,) pointed out that the law allows the court to forfeit the house, he rejected to order 
the forfeiture of the convict’s home on the grounds that “it would make Farooqi's "wholly innocent" 
family homeless”.  Martin Evans “Terrorist is Allowed to Keep his Home as Bid to Seize Property 
Fails” (23 May 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/10852503/Terrorist-is-allowed-to-keep-his-home-as-bid-to-seize-property-fails.html>. 
867 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 23 (7). 
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forfeitable whether or not the money was intended or suspected for use in 
terrorism.868  
Forfeiture can be also issued in English law on conviction for specified offences, 
such as weapon training, possessing things and collecting information for the 
purposes of terrorism, training for terrorism, or any ancillary offence to these 
offences, or offences where a “terrorist connection” exists.869 Such a forfeiture 
order may be made against “any money or other property that was, at the time of 
the offence, in the possession or under control of the convict where it had been used 
for the purposes of terrorism, or it was intended for such use.870 In the same manner, 
property under the control or in the possession of a person convicted of supporting 
(this is not limited to the provision of money) a proscribed group can be forfeited 
if, on a balance of probability, it is shown that it has been used in connection with 
the activities of the group, or “the court believes that it may be used in that 
connection”.871 Therefore, for example, a rented flat in which the convict collecting 
information (which according to the language of this provision, can include 
watching a video) on making bombs for terrorist purposes can be put in jeopardy of 
confiscation through its use as a venue for these activities in spite of the landlord’s 
lack of knowledge thereof or consent that they occur.872  
Modelled on the drug trafficking cash seizure scheme, the English law also 
authorizes the seizure and forfeiture of “terrorist cash” (such as coins, postal orders, 
bankers’ drafts etc.) in a form of in rem civil forfeiture (without a criminal 
conviction).873 So, cash can be seized if law enforcement has “reasonable grounds 
for suspecting” that it is terrorist cash.874 However, this approach, in practice, can 
be problematic because unlike drug-derived cash which has a criminal background, 
terrorist funds have a criminal destination; so suspicious grounds for the seizure of 
such cash seem to rely more on fiction than on reasonableness. That is, these 
                                                 
868 UK Parliament “Explanatory Notes to Terrorism Act 2000” (2000) 
<http://www.banksr.co.uk/images/Statutes/T-W/Terrorism_Act_2000_Explanatory_Note.pdf>, at 
[33]. 
869 Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 23A.  
870 At s 23A (1).  
871 At s 111. 
872 Clive Walker Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford University Press, 
New York, NY, 2009), at 87. 
873 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), part 1 (2) of Schedule 1. 
874 At part 2 (1) of Schedule 1.  
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suspicious grounds for suspecting can be anything which may possibly raise 
suspicion that the cash can be used for terrorist purposes. Suspicious grounds can 
be “the country of destination, material on the person’s computer’s hard drive, … 
combat clothing in the luggage of the courier”,875 the failure to convince the law 
enforcement officials of the purpose and reasons for carrying the cash, having links 
with terrorists or terrorist groups, previous conviction of the owner. A court can 
order forfeiture of any cash, no matter how small the amount, when the court is 
satisfied, on a balance of probability, that it “is intended to be used for the purposes 
of terrorism”,876 without a requirement to identify a terrorist act which gives rise to 
the cash forfeiture. However, from a classic criminal law perspective, it is totally 
unacceptable (or draconian) to forfeit cash only on the basis of the evidence which 
points to the status of a person (whom he knows or is connected to, or where he 
travels to), instead of a wrongdoing he might do or he already has done.   
Similarly, in Italy, terrorist financing is no longer limited to the act of “financing 
associations”.877 It can cover any financing activity carried out for “purposes of 
terrorism” or “democratic order subversion”.878 While the terms “purpose of 
terrorism” and “democratic order subversion” are not defined, it is not required that 
the funds involved in such financing are used or allocated for an actual terrorist act 
or an act aimed at subverting democratic order.879 Therefore, a person who 
possesses, receives or provides assets or property to another person or an 
organization can be prosecuted and convicted for what may be assumed 
(understood) to be terrorist purposes or subversion. In terms of confiscation, it 
seems that Italy has expanded its preventive system of seizure and confiscation of 
mafia-type assets to counter the terrorist funds, without considering the fact that 
while mafia assets may be derived from illegal sources, terrorist funds have an 
                                                 
875 R. E. Bell “The Seizure, Detention and Forfeiture of Cash in the UK” 2004 11(2) Journal of 
Financial Crime 134, at 144.  
876 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), part 1 (1) of Schedule1. 
877 The concept of “financing associations” is not defined by Italian law; so, it is unclear whether it 
includes acts of collection, receipt or provision.  
878 By adopting the LD N.109/2007 of June 22, 2007, Italy has broadened the scope of terrorist 
financing offences to include financing of terrorist activities.  Financial Action Task Force Anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures; Italy (February 2016), at 136. 
879 While the Italian Penal Code is silent on this matter, Italian authorities point out to the FATF 
assessors that the offense of terrorist financing “refers to the alleged risk in order to prevent the 
result of financing, and anticipates punishability at a prodromal time. Moreover, the Italian Court of 
Cassation has stated that the [terrorist financing] offense punished … is committed, without it being 
necessary that material execution of the terrorist act be actually set up”. At 136. 
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illegal destination. A confiscation order can “target the assets of persons who (i) are 
linked to organised and non-organised crime; (ii) ‘habitually’ conduct criminal 
activities …; or (iii) are suspected of funding terror”.880 Such confiscation is not 
limited to the property or funds proven to be the “price”, “product”, “profit” or 
instrumentalities of a criminal act; as the FATF’s report indicates, it can include 
“assets or other property” for which the offender or the third party cannot justify a 
legal origin,881 and which, in the case of terrorist of terrorist financing, are assumed 
to be intended to be used by another person or an organization for terrorist purposes 
or subversion of democratic order. Therefore, the burden would be on the accused 
or the third party to prove otherwise. 
In a similar fashion, the Austrian Penal Code allows confiscation of any property 
that is at the disposal of a terrorist organization as well as confiscation of all 
property within the possession of a person who is convicted of being member of a 
terrorist group.882 A person is considered a member of a terrorist group when the 
person participates in the group’s activities solely by collecting or providing assets 
for the group with the knowledge that he promotes the association or its offences.883 
The definition of a terrorist group has been expanded to include not only a group 
that engages or aims at terrorist act, but also a group established for the purpose of 
terrorist financing.884 Although this law has been rarely applied as the prosecution 
needs to prove the elements of the terrorist organization,885 all property of a person 
who receives or collects or provides funds for another group would be in jeopardy 
if the convict fails to prove that his property and assets do not have illegal sources 
(“membership benefits”) or an illegal destination.  
On the other hand, some EU Member States allow confiscation of terrorist funds, 
but unlike the US model, in a very restrictive manner and in such a way as to restrain 
the abuse of the criminal law. For instance, in Germany, financing (collecting, 
                                                 
880 At 59. 
881 At 133. 
882 Financial Action Task Force Mutual evaluation report; anti-money laundering and combating 
the financing of terrorism; Austria (26 June 2009), at [209]. 
883 At [186]. 
884 Austrian Penal Code, s 278 (3). 
885 According to the Section 278b (3) of the Austrian Penal Code, a group is considered a terrorist 
group when the group is designed as an “union planned for a longer time of more than two persons 
aiming at” the commitment of terrorist offences or financing of terrorism.  
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receiving or providing of assets) of serious violent acts entangling the state886 does 
not constitute an offence if there is no explicit connection between the act of 
financing and a specific (or serious violent) terrorist act.887 For an act to be regarded 
as an offence, the assets involved also need to be substantial in the sense that they 
need to make “a greater than merely insubstantial contribution to the preparation of 
a serious violent act endangering the state”.888 Where these requirements are met 
and a conviction is obtained, a confiscation order can be made only against the 
assets generated by or used or intended for use in the commission or preparation of 
the terrorist financing offence or the terrorist act.889 The forfeiture cannot be 
directed at such assets if they, at the time of the commission of the offence, were 
owned or controlled by the third party who did not provide his assets for the support 
of the offence “with knowledge of the circumstances of the act”.890 On the other 
hand, the mere collection of funds for a terrorist organization891 is regarded as 
support of a terrorist organization.892 Unlike the offence of financing of violent acts, 
it is not necessary for the financial means to be used for the commission or 
preparation of a criminal act. The collection or provision of funds must be simply 
made “for an objective purpose for the terrorist organization and must be useful for 
it”.893 But as only intentional conduct attracts criminal liability according to German 
law, the prosecution should prove that the accused had the intention that the funds 
be used for support of a group whose aims or activities were directed towards the 
                                                 
886 A serious violent act endangering the state is defined as a criminal offense “against life … or 
against personal freedom” which is intended and able to impair “the existence or security of a state 
or of an international organisation, or to abolish, rob of legal effect or undermine constitutional 
principles of the Federal Republic of Germany”. See Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 1971, s 89a (1). 
887 At s 89a (2)(4). See also Financial Action Task Force “3RD follow-up report mutual evaluation 
of Germany” June 2014, at 14. 
888 Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation Report; Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism; Germany (Paris, 19 February 2010), at [209].  
889 Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany 1971, ss 73-74. 
890 At s 73(3). 
891 A criminal group in the German law is defined as “an organizational combination of at least three 
persons, designed to exist for a certain period of time, where - with subordination of the will of the 
individual to the will of the group as a whole - the members pursue common goals, while standing 
in such relation to one another that they feel themselves to be a uniform cluster”. According to 
Section 129a (1), a criminal group is considered a terrorist group when such a group’s aims and 
activities are directed at the commission of specific offences such as murder, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes or crimes against personal liberty. Terrorist organizations are, 
according to Section 129a (2), those whose purpose it is or whose activities are aimed, for example, 
at causing serious physical or psychological harm to another person, computer sabotage, destruction 
of structures and so on.  
892 At s 129a (5).  
893 Financial Action Task Force, above n 888, at [223]. 
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commission of violent acts.894 Consequently, forfeiture may be made against the 
assets proved to be intended for use of the purposes of the group, whether they are 
legal or illegal. This can include support for humanitarian purposes. A similar 
approach has been taken by some other jurisdictions such as Denmark.895  
Nonetheless, in Finland, contribution to a terrorist group may give rise to forfeiture 
only if the contributor is aware that his contribution could promote the “criminal 
activity” of the group.896 Similarly, in Switzerland, financing of a group does not 
constitute an offence and as a result, the money involved is not subject to forfeiture 
if the financing is not made to support the group “in its criminal activities”,897 or if 
the financing is carried out “with a view to establishing or re-establishing a 
democratic regime or a state governed by the rule of law or with a view to exercising 
or safeguarding human rights”.898 While this may put the prosecution in the difficult 
position of proving the criminal intention of the financer, it does at least guarantee 
the human rights of the accused and closes any possible abuse of fundamental 
rights. 
11.4 Ambiguity about the mental element and the question of liability  
Although there are noticeable differences among EU Member States in the 
criminalization and confiscation of terrorist funds, there is a growing trend towards 
utilising an intention-based criminalization and confiscation approach - an approach 
to targeting what is assumed to be terrorist funds based on the intention of the 
financer without linking them to an actual terrorist act (whether completed or only 
attempted). As mentioned above, at the EU level, this approach has been adopted 
to impose a criminal penalty in two ways. In the restricted way, practiced by states 
such as Germany and Finland, confiscation is limited to the funds and property 
                                                 
894 At [223]. 
895 Danish Criminal Code (as of 2004), s 114a. The FATF’s report points out that “Explanatory notes 
to Section 114a, which provide details not contained in legislation and are considered by the courts 
to carry a high degree of legal weight, make clear that it is a punishable act to provide funds or 
financial services to both the legal and illegal activities of a terrorist group. Intent is required in 
relation to the fact terrorist acts are part of the activities or aims of the group. Participation in or 
support to an organization that has both humanitarian and terrorist aims are covered”. See Financial 
Action Task Force “Third mutual evaluation on anti-money landing and combating the financing of 
terrorism; Kingdom of Denmark” 22 June 2006, at [222]. 
896 Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889, amendments up to 927/2012 included), Chapter 34a, s 4. 
897 Criminal Code of the Swiss Confederation 1937, art 260ter. 
898 At 260quinquies (3). 
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intended to be used for terrorist purposes. The broader manner, adopted by the UK, 
allows the expansion of confiscation to the convict’s other property which is not 
involved in financing but which is suspected might be used for terrorist purposes.  
Both these approaches depend on a mental element to impose confiscation. 
However, reliance on the guilty mind of offenders raises questions in terms of the 
justifiability of this approach, and the scope and formulation of the mental element. 
With respect to the justifiability of the approach, it should be recalled that from a 
classic criminal law perspective, it is controversial to impose guilt on a person (and 
consequently confiscation sanctions on his property) merely on the basis of what 
the person intends without a link to any criminal conduct. It is merely because, as 
the principle of mens rea implies, people “should be held criminally liable only for 
events or consequences which they intended or knowingly risked”,899 or punished 
for the commission or facilitation of actual criminal conduct not criminal thoughts 
or state of being (as principle of legality requires).  
As far as the structure of the offence is concerned, there is an uncertainty over the 
formulation of the mental element of the terrorist financing offence (the structural 
vagueness). In fact, according to the Terrorist Financing Convention, in order to 
establish an independent offence of terrorist financing, there is no requirement for 
any connection between the preparatory act of financing and the subsequent 
terrorist offence for which the financing occurs. Such a requirement would limit the 
crime of financing to the equivalent of an act of complicity in the terrorism itself or 
alternatively make it an attempt by the financer themselves to commit terrorism.  
However, we must recall again that according to the Convention, all that is required 
is the financer’s intention, that funds should be used for terrorist activity (purposes), 
or his knowledge, that the funds will be used for such purposes, and this is enough 
to make his act of financing criminal and his property forfeitable.  
The unanswered question is that if there is no need that the financer intend or know 
of any specific terrorist act, what exactly should a financer of terrorist activity know 
or intend to be criminally liable and be subject to confiscation sanctions. 
Unfortunately, both the Terrorist Financing Convention and EU legislation and 
                                                 
899 Ashworth, above n 499, at 75. 
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directives have failed to set out a clear definition of what constitutes the fault 
element of the offence. In spite of this ambiguity, the adaptation and 
implementation of this approach are emphasized as it is assumed that terrorist 
financing is as serious an offence as terrorism, which needs to be tackled 
(criminalized) independently900 but with heavy reliance on the offence’s mental 
element. This ambiguity has left the fault element of the offence of terrorist 
financing open to different interpretation. The possible mental elements read by 
jurisdictions into the definition of the terrorist financing offence will be discussed 
in next part. 
11.4.1 Terrorist intent and the challenge of human rights 
Before examining those mental elements interpreted into definition of the terrorist 
financing offence, it is necessary to note that as the Convention requires, adoption 
of any state of mind as a fault element of the offence and as a basis for the 
imposition of criminal liability, needs to be consistent with the relevant 
fundamental rights laid down in domestic and international human rights.901 
Generally speaking, the validity of any confiscation measure depends on its 
compatibility with the laws safeguarding an individual’s right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of property under the human rights law.902 The European Convention on 
Human Rights903 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,904 
for example, rigorously protect the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath 
lawfully acquired possessions. The main purpose of these laws, according to the 
European Court of Human Rights, is “to prevent the arbitrary seizures, 
confiscations, … or other capricious interferences with peaceful possession that 
many governments are - or frequently have been - all too prone to resort to”.905 
                                                 
900 This notion is based on the assumption reflected in the preamble of the Convention: “the number 
and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain”. 
901 The Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, art 17. “Any person who is taken into custody or 
regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this 
Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in 
conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable 
provisions of international law, including international human rights law”.  
902 Peter Alldridge Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal 
Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart, Oxford, 2003), at 113. 
903 See article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1952), Paris, 20.III.1952. 
904 (2000/C 364/01), art 17. 
905Marckx v. Belgium (1979), App No. 6833/74 (ECtHR), at [20]. 
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However, the right to property is not absolute. Both the Convention and Charter 
give states the right to interfere with one’s property under two circumstances: where 
it is precisely provided by law, and where it is necessary for the general interest.906 
These two requirements are well explained by the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
With regard to the former which flows from the criminal law principle of legality 
(no punishment without law), the European Court of Human Rights has laid down 
two requirements:  accessibility and foreseeability. The court ruled that:         
the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be 
able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable 
in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.907 
In relation to the necessary interference for the general interest, the question is 
whether and when in exercising their right to control the use of private property, 
states are acting in accordance with the general interest of its society. In order to 
manage disputes involving the property right of individuals and public interest, the 
European Court of Human Rights has commonly applied the proportionality 
principle.908 According to this principle, there should be a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed in, inter alia, the deprivation of 
property and the legitimate objectives perused to be realised by the deprivation.909 
In other words, legislation must strike “a fair balance between the demands of the 
                                                 
906 At the time of emergency “threatening the life of the nation”, states are also allowed to take 
measures derogating from their obligation to value the right to property, “to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law”. See the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 
15. 
907 The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (1979), App No. 6538/74 (ECtHR), at [49]. 
908 Article 52 (1) of the Charter of fundamental Rights of the European Union (above n 904) allows 
limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter on the conditions 
that they are “provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to 
the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others”. 
909 Pressos Compania Naviera SA and Others v. Belgium (judgment of 20 November 1995), 
Application no. 17849/91, at [38].  
207 
 
general interest of the community, which in the case of terrorist financing, is the 
prevention of the use of funds and property for terrorist activity, and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual defendant’s fundamental rights”.910 
In determining whether such a balance is held, the principle implies three tests: 
Whether (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right [reasonableness test]; (ii) the measures designed to meet the 
legislative objective are rationally connected to it [appropriateness test]; and (iii) 
the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective [proportionality test].911 
In applying these tests to counter terrorist financing measures, one must ask the 
following questions: (i) is financing of terrorism really “a matter of grave concern 
to the international community”, with regard to which regulatory measures limiting 
the fundamental rights need to be adopted to prevent movements of funds intended 
for terrorist purposes912 (reasonableness test)? (ii) is the designation 
(criminalization) of terrorist financing as an independent offence, although 
preparatory in its nature, suitable or appropriate to achieve the given goal 
(appropriateness test)?; (iii) and does the imposition of liability and confiscation 
sanctions on the basis of guilty mind of the accused result in an excessive burden 
on the individual (proportionality test)?  
Regardless of whether the counter-terrorist financing regime can survive the first 
two tests (reasonableness and appropriateness test), the proportionality of its 
measures depends very heavily on the mental element to the definition of terrorist 
financing offence. As mentioned above, this mental element would be the main 
basis for imposing criminal liability and sanctions in the absence of a requirement 
to link financing to an actual terrorist act. In order for any mental element to pass 
the test of proportionality, its consistency with the protected human rights needs to 
be tested. In fact, any formulation of the offence should not be upheld as being 
                                                 
910 John and others v. Germany, (ECtHR , Judgment 30 June 2005), Applications nos. 46720/99, 
72203/01 and 72552/01, at [93]. 
911 De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing 
(1990) 1 AC 69, at [80]. 
912 The Terrorist Financing Convention, above n 6, Preamble. 
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consistent with protected right to the peaceful enjoyment of possession if it, 
although necessary and suitable, does not precisely indicate the scope of 
confiscation which might be imposed on those involved in financing.   
A mens rea requirement cannot be justified as being proportionate if it fails, due to 
its vagueness, to make a distinction between the innocent and guilty. In other words, 
legislation which persues an aim in the general interest of preventing only those 
funds and property from being used for terrorist activity, will be in the violation of 
the protected right to property if it results in depriving individuals of funds and 
property which are not proved to be used, or are not intended to be used for such 
activity. It is because it could not proportionally and reasonably enhance the aim 
thereof (failure of proportionality test).  
In the absence of a requirement to link the preparatory act of financing to the actual 
terrorist act, three possible forms of mens rea could be determined for the offence 
of terrorist financing: awareness of circumstances, general knowledge a terrorist 
act, and knowledge of the identity of the recipient(s) of funds. As will be illustrated 
below, it seems that none of these fault elements can meet the requirements of the 
proportionality principle for two reasons: either they are vague about what should 
be confiscated due to the fact that there is no actual terrorist act with regard to which 
a confiscation sanction is imposed; or they impose liability and penalty without any 
kind of guilty mind on the part of the accused (financing of a person or an 
organization).  
11.4.2  Confiscation on the basis of awareness of circumstances 
In the absence of a requirement to link a preparatory terrorism offence to an actual 
terrorist act, as noted in chapter 7.4.2.1, an Australian court in the case of R v Lodhi 
ruled that awareness of a circumstance can be a sufficient ground for imposing 
liability; that is, the fault element of such offences can be demonstrated in respect 
of the act of preparation or facilitation without a need to prove that the accused 
intended to facilitate or contribute either a specific act or general terrorist act.913 
The court regarded the accused’s conduct (collection of maps, seeking information 
about a price list of chemicals and possessing materials containing general 
                                                 
913 R v Lodhi 2006, 199 FLR 364. 
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information about making explosives) as a series of linked actions which convinced 
it that the accused knew all three acts would lead to “one continuing uninterrupted 
course of conduct centring upon and enterprise to blow up a building or 
infrastructure”.914  
As discussed, the Lodhi court’s reading of the fault element (awareness of 
circumstance) attracted criticism for stretching out the boundaries of criminal 
liability beyond the principles of criminal law.915 It would also provoke criticism if 
it had been used as a basis for confiscation. In other words, if a person is convicted 
of a preparatory terrorism offence where there is not any actual terrorist act and 
where the gravity, nature and the scale of that terrorist act is not clear even to the 
accused, what exactly should be confiscated?  
While in a case like Lodhi, the convict’s involvement in any terrorist act need not 
to be proven, any of his property could be in danger of confiscation if the 
prosecution can link it to any (unproven) terrorist act assumed by the prosecution 
to be the target of the convict. Even if the law contains a defence (as the English 
law does)916 which allows the accused to prove, by providing evidence, that the 
seized or confiscated property was not intended or could be used for terrorism, the 
problem is identifying the terrorist act in regard to which the accused should provide 
such evidence to prevent the confiscation. That is, the imposed liability under this 
mental element is too vague to allow for any sort of meaningful rebuttal. A 
confiscation order can be issued where the accused may deny (as Lodhi did but 
received 30 years imprisonment for) his involvement in preparation for a terrorist 
act, and where the prosecution is exempted to prove that terrorist act, and where 
such an act is not planned or even clear to the accused.  
This mens rea seems to be ambiguous in its scope in the sense that it does not meet 
the accessibility and foreseeability requirements of the right to property provisions, 
and it does not provide sufficient safeguards against the unjust confiscations or 
capricious interferences with peaceful possession. However, its use has been 
                                                 
914 At 44. 
915 McSherry, above n 497. 
916 Terrorism Act 2000, article 18 (2). It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under 
subsection (1) to prove that he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the 
arrangement related to terrorist property. 
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justified on the basic that it is an efficient tool to the end of ensuring security and 
prevention of (fictional) subsequent harm.917 But at what price? 
11.4.3 Confiscation based on general knowledge of a terrorist act    
Where the actual knowledge or intention of a financer need not be linked to a 
specific terrorist act,918 also as noted chapter 7.4.2.2 , in R v Khawaja919 ‘general 
knowledge of a terrorist act’ has been regarded by a Canadian court as a sufficient 
fault element to trigger criminal liability for the facilitation of or contribution to 
terrorist activity. This means that “it is unnecessary that an accused be shown to 
have knowledge of the specific nature of terrorist activity he intends to aid, support, 
enhance or facilitate, as long as he knows it is terrorist activity in a general way.”920  
As mentioned in chapter 7.5.2, this fault element as a basis for imposing criminal 
liability is justified as an efficient tool to include cases where a terrorist cell may 
not know the specific nature of the terrorist act the actual perpetrator is going to 
carry out until the last moment.921 It is also justified as it appears to satisfy minimum 
standards of knowledge since it requires some type of material or actual connection 
between the act of preparation or facilitation and the subsequent crime. But there 
are two sources of uncertainty as to the breadth of such a fault requirement.  
First, it imputes guilt to those who are remotely and indirectly connected to a 
terrorist act and who do not have any intention to finance or facilitate any terrorist 
act or do not know how their conduct will serve terrorism. Under the construction 
of this requirement, the property of whoever engages closely or remotely, directly 
or indirectly, in the preparatory act can be confiscated in the same manner. For 
example, a restaurant owner who knows that certain customers are using his 
restaurant to plan a terrorist act can be held criminally liable for financing a terrorist 
act the same as those who are directly involved in the facilitation of that terrorist 
act.922 As discussed in chapter seven, the court may not accept the accused’s 
argument that he did not have any particular intention to finance the terrorist act, 
and that his main purpose was to gain money from his business. The court may find 
                                                 
917 Lynch and Williams, above n 551, at 19. 
918 Canadian Criminal Code, art 83.02. 
919 2006 CanLII 63685 (ON SC), at [39]. 
920 At [32]. 
921 At [31].  
922 Davis, above n 570, at 305.  
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that whatever his purpose was, he knowingly made his restaurant available to be 
used for planning a terrorist act.923 Consequently, similar to the property of those 
directly involved in planning for the terrorist act (if any property involved at all), 
the restaurant is also forfeitable. 
Second, the breadth of the mental element is also worrying as it may impose liability 
on innocent conduct not carried out for the commission of any terrorist act unless 
otherwise proven. For instance, let us imagine that A and B decide to commit a 
terrorist act about which C knows, but disagrees. If C engages in fund-raising with 
A and B for non-criminal purposes, but a portion of the funds collected ends up 
being used by A and B for the preparation or facilitation of the terrorist act without 
C’s knowledge, C seems to be criminally liable as all elements of the offence exist: 
C knowingly engaged in collecting funds that were used or were intended by A and 
B to be used for the preparation of the terrorist act; C had a general knowledge that 
a terrorist act may occur by A and B. This can consequently result in unfair and 
unsound confiscation of C’s property involved in the fund-raising, or in English 
law, his other property and assets assumed that they could be used for terrorist 
activity if C fails to prove - in the sense of providing some evidence to disturb the 
inference of his knowledge - that his property or assets were not intended to be used 
or could be used for the preparation or commission of the terrorism act. 
11.4.4 Identity-based confiscation    
As argued in chapters eight and ten, cutting off the financial resources of terrorists 
and terrorist organizations is a further and lately much-used method of addressing 
terrorist financing, adopted by the UN Security Council resolutions924 and 
recommended by the FATF.925 According to this method, referred to in this thesis 
as ‘identity-based confiscation’, the knowledge that the recipient of the funds 
                                                 
923 At. 
924 See for example paragraph 1(d) of Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373 (2001)) which  require all states 
Members to “[p]rohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from 
making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services 
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or 
facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly 
or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of 
such persons.” 
925 Financial Action Task Force, above n 841, at 82. 
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collected or provided is a terrorist or terrorist organization triggers criminal 
liability, and makes the funds and property involved forfeitable.  
Unprecedentedly and inconsistently with principles of criminal law,926 this 
formulation does not require any additional requirement that there should be 
knowledge (or a specific intent) on the side of the financier that, for example, the 
funds are substantial enough in value or effect to enhance the ability of the group 
to commit a terrorist group. However, there are multiple legal and human rights 
challenges targeting such a fault element. Firstly, in contrast with principle of mens 
rea, it imposes criminal liability and confiscatory sanctions on the basis of whom  
accused financers know or associate with, not on the basis of another’s criminal act 
to which they know or intend their act may contribute. 
Practically speaking, this knowledge requirement - convicting a person for the 
provision of funds to a group on the ground that he or she knows the group is 
designated group or it is involved in criminal activities - causes some concerns in 
terms of sweeping up both guilty and non-blameworthy mental states. For instance, 
a taxi driver could be liable for giving a ride to a member of a terrorist group, if the 
driver knows that he is the member of the group. Similarly, a hotel owner could be 
held liable for providing lodging to a member of a terrorist group. As a result of the 
imposition of liability under this knowledge requirement, the car and the hotel is 
forfeitable without the existence of any malicious intent or knowledge that the 
provision of the services could contribute to the preparation or contribution of a 
terrorist act, and where the provision of these services may not sufficiently 
substantial to the preparation or contribution of any criminal act.927  
Finally, this intent requirement not only has a chilling effect, violating the right to 
freedom of expression, on those who seek to provide material resources to “the non-
violent humanitarian and political activities” of designated groups,928 but may also 
result in the imposition of confiscation without existence of guilty mind on the side 
of the financer. Such a sanction violates the right to property as it does not meet the 
proportionality test. That test requires that the measure limit the fundamental right 
                                                 
926 See chapter 8.2. 
927 United States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, (M.D. Fla. 2004) at [300]. 
928 Humanitarian Law Project v. United States, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir 2003) at [385]. 
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to property in accordance with the general interest only if it proportionally and 
reasonably enhances the aim of the measure, which is, in this case, the prevention 
of funds and property only from being used for the commission or preparation of 
terrorist in which the adopted measures limiting the fundamental right to property 
in accordance with the general interest should proportionally and reasonably 
enhance the aim of the measure, which is, in this matter, the prevention of funds 
and property only from being used for the commission or preparation of terrorist 
activity, not humanitarian purposes. 
11.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have examined the approach of EU and some of its Member States 
to penal measures introduced by the Terrorist Financing Convention and 
recommended by FATF to counter terrorist financing. As noted, the EU was chosen 
for two reasons. First, the Convention and FATF’s recommendation are greatly 
supported by the Western states, some of which are EU Members. And secondly 
and more importantly, it enabled examination of how the EU, a value-based 
community with a strong commitment in preservation and promotion of democratic 
values and human rights, addresses the regulatory problems which arises from the 
implementation of the counter-terrorist financing measures are explained in 
previous chapters.   
The adoption and implementation of the existing counter-terrorism measures by 
both EU and its Member States seems to throw up similar and familiar problems.  
First and foremost, it is not clear what exactly constitutes (or does not constitute) 
terrorism, a terrorist act or a terrorist group. The Member States of the EU have 
different understanding and definitions of terrorism, and their definitions are vague 
and broad. As far as the principle of legality is concerned, this raises a concern that 
in determining terrorist financing offenses, there are multiple possible definitions 
of terrorism that can be used as grounds to impose liability or forfeiture sanctions.   
In terms of the conceptualization of terrorist financing as an offense, EU Member 
States have incorporated into their law the vague definition provided and promoted 
by the Terrorist Financing Convention, and FATF’s recommendations. That is, 
financing of terrorism, which includes financing of terrorist acts, terrorists, and 
terrorist organizations, is an independent offense without a requirement to link the 
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act of financing to an actual criminal act for which the financing acts may be carried 
out. This means that the offense relies heavily on the mental element of the terrorist 
financing offense. A financer’s intention or knowledge alone can make the financier 
criminally liable and taint the funds or property collected, provided or possessed by 
the financer. But the question is what that intention or knowledge refers to. In the 
absence of any connection between an act of financing and a subsequent criminal 
act, a financer must have “terrorist purposes” to be liable and subject to forfeiture 
sanctions. In other words, the financer should intend or know that the funds, 
collected, provided or possessed by him or her, will be used for terrorist purposes.  
However, neither EU and nor its Member States have defined this term. In the 
absence of an effort to clarify what exactly constitutes the mental element of the 
offence, I have examined three possible forms of mens rea (awareness of 
circumstances, general knowledge of a terrorist act, or knowledge of the identity of 
the recipient(s) of funds) determined by courts outside the EU jurisdictions. My 
purpose in examining these mental elements was to find out whether there is any 
interpretation of the mental element of the offence that can resolve the structural 
ambiguity inherent in the definition of the offence. As the analyses in this chapter 
have shown, these mental elements are vague in the sense that they do not provide 
guidance as to where the criminality of funds or property which are regarded as 
terrorist funds and which are subject to confiscation are derived from. They are also 
unjustifiable as they have detrimental consequences in a way that would result in 
the imposition of liability on the innocent or well-intentioned accused (financers 
such as donors or humanitarian activists), and consequently result in the potential 
violation of rights to property by depriving the accused of his or her funds and 
property on the basis of the fiction of guilty property even when it is not proved to 
be used, or intended to be used, for commission or preparation of any criminal 
activity.  
In the following chapter, I will examine the EU’s and it Member States’ response 
to the mechanism created and developed by the UN Security Council to freeze all 
the property of those suspected of being terrorists, terrorist groups and their 
supports for an indefinite time and in a gross violation of due process rights.
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Chapter Twelve: The EU’s approach to freezing of assets of 
designated individuals or organizations  
12.1 Introduction  
Confiscation is usually preceded by a preliminary measure, the freezing of the asset 
or funds. Yet, in regard to terrorism, the freezing of assets of a person or a group on 
the basis of a suspicion (not conviction or charges) that they engage in terrorist 
activities or associate with terrorists has become the common practice of many 
jurisdictions due to the binding nature of the UN Security Council’s resolutions, 
and an end in itself. It is not clear whether the Security Council found it necessary 
to create a freezing regime that imposes freezing sanctions for an indefinite time on 
such a seemingly flimsy basis because the confiscation measures established under 
the counter-terrorism laws have proved insufficient or impractical. Regardless of 
whether this the case or not,929 it seems that the Security Council has shifted the 
focus of the fight against terrorist financing from a preventive approach, which 
seeks to counter terrorism within the sphere of criminal law by criminalizing all 
preparatory acts which may result in facilitation and contribution to terrorism, to a 
primitive, identity-based approach which seeks to incapacitate persons or groups, 
suspected of involvement in terrorism, by freezing all of their assets without 
imposing guilt on them. However, the adoption and development of this approach, 
copied from the US approach and supported by the US and many Western states,930 
seems to be the logical destination of the thinking that underpins the terrorist 
financing offence - the prevention of financing terrorism on the basis of mere 
association with suspect terrorists or terrorist groups even when there is no 
connection between an act of financing/financers and any terrorist act or terrorists’ 
or terrorist groups’ criminal activities.     
                                                 
929 The English Judge, Lord Rodger, commented that the measures adopted by these Security 
Council resolutions can be found in the Terrorist Financing Convention. But the reason that the 
Security Council adopted such resolutions is that by September 2001, only few states had ratified 
the Convention. Indeed, the resolutions “imposed on all states the selected obligations which would 
otherwise have bound them only if they had eventually decided to ratify the Convention”. See R (Al-
Jedda) V Secretary of State for Defence (2008), AC 332, at [161]. 
930 See Chapter 10.5. 
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The diffusion of this method of dealing with the criminal issue of terrorist funds has 
been pushed through at national and regional level at the cost of the complete 
suspension of the fundamental principles of criminal law. This chapter examines 
the response of the EU to this approach. For the same reason as that mentioned in 
previous chapter which discussed the EU’s and its Member States’ approach to the 
criminalization of terrorist financing, the EU has been chosen because it is a value-
based community which places a great emphasis on the human rights and 
democratic values.  
This chapter very briefly explores the EU’s response to the Security Council 
resolutions on freezing terrorist funds. Then, it points out the challenges that the 
adoption and implementation of this approach have created in the EU in terms of 
its compatibility with the human rights values reflected in the European Convention 
on Human Rights or the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
It further argues why the EU approach is not legally justifiable by examining it 
against some of the fundamental values and principles, protected by the EU, namely 
the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality, the right to due process and 
the right to property.     
12.2 The EU response to the Security Council UN Resolutions  
The EU has adopted a mix of legal instruments to oblige its Member States to 
implement the Security Council (identity-based) freezing measures.931 The EU 
responded to Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), which 
require States to freeze the assets of Bin Laden and Al-Qaida and other designated 
and listed individual and entities associated with them, by incorporating the 
Security Council list into its own framework through the Regulation 881/2002.932 
The incorporation of a person or entity into the implemented UN list does not need 
to be accompanied by the imposition of any charges or conviction. In fact, while 
                                                 
931 Freezing funds, according to article 1 (2) the Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 
December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a 
view to combating terrorism, means “the prevention of any move, transfer, alteration, use of or 
dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, 
ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, 
including portfolio management”. 
932 The Regulation 881/2002 was amended several times by the Council Regulation (EU) No 
1286/2009 of 22 December 2009, and by the Council Regulation (EU) No 754/2011 of 1 August 
2011, and by Commission Implementation Regulation (EU) 2016/13 of 6 January 2016.  
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the EU Commission seems to have had power to make independent decisions on 
listing and delisting,933 the EU Commission has faithfully adopted and updated its 
list in accordance with the UN list. Article 2 of Regulation 881/2002 requires the 
freezing of “all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned or held by”, 
the listed persons and entities. “No funds” and “no economic resources” should be 
made available, directly or indirectly to these people and entities. These provisions 
are directly applicable in European national legal systems without the need of 
transposing them into domestic legislation.  
In terms of responding to Resolution 1373 (2001), which requires states to adopt 
independent measures against those whom states consider to be terrorists, the EU 
has taken a similar approach to its implementation of the Al-Qaida Sanction list. 
The EU has adopted Common Position 2001/931 leading to the establishment of a 
list (an autonomous EU list), which incorporates groups and persons suspected of 
being “involved in terrorist acts”. ‘Involvement in terrorist acts’ has a broad 
meaning. It includes association with terrorists. According to Article 2 (1) of the 
Common Position, ‘persons and entities involved in terrorist acts’ means   
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or who participate in, or 
facilitate, the commission of terrorist act[;] groups and entities owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by such persons; and persons, groups and entities acting on 
behalf of, or under the direction of, such persons, groups and entities, including 
funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by such persons and associated persons, groups and entities. 
The list of person and entities ‘involved in terrorist acts should be drawn up and 
reviewed  
on the basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates 
that a decision has been taken by a [national] competent authority”, [denoting a 
                                                 
933 The latest amendment to the listing procedure of the UN designation list requires the EU 
commission to take a decision to list a person or entity designated by the UN Sanction Committee 
on the basis of a statement of reasons provided by the UN sanction Committee. The commission, 
then, communicates the decision to the listed person or entity and provide them a chance to “express 
his, her or its views on the matter.” If any observations are submitted, the Commission may review 
its decision. Those observations shall be forwarded to the UN Sanction committee. See article 7 (a) 
of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 
881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities 
associated with Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban.   
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judicial authority or an equivalent competent authority]934, … irrespective of 
whether [the list] concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a 
terrorist act, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act[,] based 
on serious and credible evidence or clues, or condemnation for such deeds.935   
While it seems that such a procedure involves some form of “judicial check”, “there 
is no certainty of this”.936 What is certain is that there is a need for a decision to be 
taken by a national authority. In practice, a person or entity can be listed merely on 
the basis of information or clues obtained from “the sphere of intelligence or 
investigation”.937 In addition, the basis on which an investigation is instigated or 
suspicion is raised seems to vary from one state to another due to differences in the 
national perceptions of terrorist threats, and differences with regard to the definition 
of a ‘terrorist act’ or ‘terrorist group’.938 Consequently the Common Position 
requires “the freezing of the funds and other financial assets or economic resources 
of the persons, groups and entities listed”.939 Under the Regulation 2580/2001, the 
EU Council, “acting by unanimity”, has also designated a list of individuals and 
groups suspected of committing, or attempting to commit, participating in or 
facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism; legal persons or entities owned 
or controlled by such designated persons, groups or entities; or persons or entities 
                                                 
934
 A Competent Authority” here does not mean an appeal or review body. It is an investigative 
body authorised by a state to investigate on suspected individuals or groups. “An investigation may 
well be authorised by a court or an investigative judge, but depending on how a state's system is 
constructed, it can also be envisaged that investigations are ordered by a prosecutor. It is even 
possible that the investigation is an intelligence operation ordered by a senior security official which 
is not designed to result in the collection of evidence or prosecution.” See Iain Cameron “European 
Union anti—terrorist blacklisting” 2003 3(2) Human Rights Law Review 225, at 235. 
935 Article 1 (4) of the Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific 
measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP). A “clearing house and "Working Party on 
implementation of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism", composed of the representatives of the ministries of justice and internal affairs 
of the EU Member States, has been established and charged with evaluate the information provided 
by states (national competent authority) to decide whether a suspected person or organization is 
involved in terrorism. After the examination, the Council adopts the list through a unanimous 
Council decision. 
936 Imelda Tappeiner “The Fight Against Terrorism. The Lists and the Gaps” 2005 1(1) Utrecht Law 
Reveiw 97, at 106. 
937 At. 
938 The EU, in the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, (above n 935, art 1-2), has defined 
‘terrorist act’ and ‘terrorist group’. But, the EU Member States have not transposed the definition 
into their national law. As illustrated above, this has resulted in a disparity in their definition of 
terrorism, and probably the standard against which terrorist suspects’ action are judged.  
939 At art 2. 
219 
 
acting on behalf of or at the direction of such person and entities.940 Article 2 of the 
Regulation allows the freezing of all funds, other financial assets and economic 
resources owned or held by listed person or entities.  
12.3 Human rights challenges and introduction of amendments - is it enough?  
Although reaching an agreement to establish a regional asset-freezing system may 
be regarded as a notable achievement in the fight against terrorism, in practice, the 
implementation of the measures, with regard to both the implemented UN list and 
the autonomous EU lists, poses serious questions of human rights compatibility. In 
spite of the operation of articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which established the principles of due process within the EU, the asset-
freezing regimes (autonomous EU list and implemented UN list) did not provide 
for a right for listed persons or groups to be heard, a right to access to effective 
judicial review or a right to enjoy the possession or use of their property. As soon 
as a person or group was placed into one of the designated lists, states could freeze 
all of the assets of the listed person for an indefinite time, without imposing any 
charges or conviction that he was involved in terrorist activity or association with 
terrorists, or his assets were used, or intended to be used, for criminal activity. The 
EU’s General Court, in early cases, did not find these asset freezing sanctions “an 
arbitrary, inappropriate or disproportionate interference with the fundamental rights 
of the persons concerned”.941 They repeatedly held that “freezing of funds is a 
temporary precautionary measure which, unlike confiscation, does not affect the 
very substance of the right of the persons concerned to property in their financial 
assets but only the use thereof”.942 In addition, they refused to review the legality 
of the sanctions, imposed against persons and entities listed in the implemented UN 
list, because they found themselves incompetent to review or challenge the UN 
                                                 
940 The Regulation 2580/2001, above n 931, art 2(3).  The EU Council established a list of persons 
and entities with regard to article 2(3) of the Regulation 2580/2001. See Council Decision of 27 
December 2001 establishing the list provided for in Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view 
to combating terrorism (2001/927/EC). 
941 Kadi v Council and Commission (2005), Case T–315/01, at [251].  
942 At. See also Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission (2005), (Case T-306/01), at [320]. Sison v Council (2007), Case T-47/03, at [101]. 
Fahas v Council (2010), Case T‑49/07, at [64]. 
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Security Council resolutions.943 However, the severity of the sanctions - the 
freezing of all the assets of listed persons for an indefinite period- led the courts to 
acknowledge (and scholars to argue) that these sanctions are quasi-criminal in 
nature, and need to be regarded as “either judicial or subject to judicial review”.944  
Eventually,  the European Court of Justice, in its decision on Kadi’ the leading 
case,945 noted that the EU “is based on the rule of law”.946 It held that “respect for 
human rights is a condition of the lawfulness… [of EU laws], … and that measures 
incompatible with respect for human rights are not acceptable in the 
Community”.947 It continued that  
the obligations imposed by an international agreement [UN resolutions] cannot 
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that 
respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to 
review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by 
the Treaty.948           
Although it ruled that EU courts are competent to review the lawfulness of asset 
freezing measures, no court has upheld a challenge or examined the nature of assets 
freezing regime against the accepted principles of criminal law ruling 
criminalization and confiscation proceedings. In this regard, the European Court of 
Justice, in Kadi’s case, recognised that in fulfilling their international obligations, 
legislatures, at the domestic or EU level, enjoy “a wide margin of appreciation, with 
                                                 
943 See Kadi v Council, above n 941, at [215]. With regard to the question of whether EU courts are 
competent to review the listing and freezing measures adopted against persons and groups listed in 
the EU autonomous list, the Court of First Instance had found itself competent to assess the 
lawfulness of the measures as they were adopted in compliance with the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 which calls for the adoption of necessary measures to combat terrorist financing 
without specifying persons or entities who should be subject to the measures. See for example 
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of the European Union (2006) Case T-
228/02, at [100].    
944 Kadi v Commission (2010), Case T-85/09, at [150]. (referring to the opinion of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights). For scholars’ views see also Christina Eckes EU Counter-
Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case of Individual Sanctions (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK, 2009); Cameron, above n 934. Or, Andrew  Hudson “Not a Great Asset: The 
UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights” 2007 25(2) Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 203. 
945 See Murphy, above n 832, at 132. 
946 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation. v. Council of the European 
Union (2008), joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, at [281].  
947 At [284]. 
948 At [285]. 
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regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the 
consequences of enforcement are justified in the public interest for the purpose of 
achieving the object of the law in question”.949   
Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice, in Kadi, found the procedure deployed 
to list and freeze the assets of the targeted persons concerned in this case to be in 
violation of due process rights because it lacked a mechanism whereby the targeted 
persons could be informed of the reasons or the basis of which they had been listed 
and their assets had been frozen.950 The court also upheld that the deployed 
procedure was in the breach of right to effective judicial protection as “it was 
adopted without furnishing any guarantee enabling the listed persons concerned to 
put his case to competent authorities”.951  
The court, therefore, set an administrative guideline, which has been incorporated 
into the EU laws.952 This guideline consists of two parts: listed persons must be 
informed of the reasons adduced against them; and listed persons must be able to 
make known their view on those reasons.953 The court (as well as the new 
amendment to the EU laws) emphasized that there is no need to communicate those 
reasons to listed persons, or to hear the listed persons’ views on the reasons, before 
they are entered in the list, and before the freezing sanctions are imposed against 
them.954  
Unlike the UN listing and freezing procedures which do not provide for a 
mechanism for a judicial or impartial review of the sanctions,955 to retain the right 
                                                 
949 At [360].  
950 At [360]. 
951 At [369]. 
952 See Council Regulation No. 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 of 22 December 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities associated with Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban.  
953 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation. v. Council of the European 
Union (2008), joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, at [348]. With regard to listing and freezing 
procedure used to establish and update the EU autonomous list, the Court of First Instance in the 
case Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of the European Union (2006) 
Case T-228/02, at [172], ruled that “a statement of reasons” on the basis of which a person or entity 
is listed must be communicated to the listed persons or entities. 
954 See Council Regulation No. 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 of 22 December 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities associated with Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, art 
7a (2). 
955 In 2009, the Security Council the Council authorized the establishment of an Office of the 
Ombudsperson to assist the Security Council in delisting requests. The Ombudsperson can intervene 
222 
 
to judicial review, EU courts have found themselves competent to “review of the 
conformity of the system of sanctions … with the system of judicial protection of 
fundamental rights laid down by the EC Treaty”.956 The General Court, in another 
case, however, held that this does not mean that courts can “substitute their 
assessment of the facts and circumstances justifying the adoption of such measures 
for that of the Council”.957 In fact, it has made it plain that a review for conformity, 
which seems to be an administrative review, should be limited to “checking that the 
rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, 
that the facts are materially accurate, and that there has been no manifest error of 
assessment of the facts or misuse of power.”958  
12.4 Is it legally justifiable?  
While the attempts of the EU courts to change the procedural rules for listing and 
imposing freezing sanctions should not be understated, it is naive to believe that 
such changes would remove all barriers to the establishment of a well-funded, 
human rights-consistent regime. In this part, it will be argued that the regime, 
                                                 
on behalf of the listed persons, but her/his decision does not override the Security Council’s 
decisions on listing or de-listing. The Ombudsperson does not provide judicial review of listing 
decisions. It simply gathers “information of relevance to the delisting request” and distributes them 
to the Sanction Committee. Then the Committee makes decision, by consensus, on the delisting 
request on the basis of the information provided by Ombudsperson.  The former Special Rapporteur 
on promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 
Martin Scheinin, expresses doubts as to the adequacy of the Ombudsperson office. He identifies “10 
key objections”:  (i) the mandate of the Ombudsperson did not confer a power to overturn decisions 
of the Committee; (ii) the Committee therefore continued to act as judge in its own cause; (iii) 
delisting required a consensus within the Committee; (iv) the Ombudsperson lacked a power of 
recommendation; (v) disclosure of information to the Ombudsperson or the Committee was subject 
to the unfettered discretion of States; (vi) the Ombudsperson’s authority to disclose sensitive 
information to the petitioner was similarly at the discretion of States; (vii) there was no requirement 
that the petitioner be informed of the identity of the designating State; (viii) neither the 
comprehensive report, nor the Ombudsperson’s conclusions, could be disclosed to the petitioner; 
(ix) the Committee was under no obligation to provide reasons for its decision; and (x) the office of 
the Ombudsperson lacked the authority to grant appropriate relief where human rights were violated. 
See UN, A/67/396, 26 September 2012. 
956 Kadi v Commission (2010), Case T-85/09, at [117].  
957 Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of the European Union, above n 953, at [159]. In terms 
of reviewing measures adopted against persons listed by the UN Security Council, The European 
Court of Justice, in Kadi v Commission (2013), Joined Cases C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 
P, at [118-9], ruled that “in the event that the [listed] person concerned challenges the lawfulness of 
the decision to list or maintain the listing of his name …, the review by the Courts of the European 
Union must extend to whether rules as to procedure and rules as to competence, including whether 
or not the legal basis is adequate, are observed”. This means that courts need to determine whether 
the decision to list a person “is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis”, and whether the reason 
for adoption of that decision in itself is “substantiated”.    
958 At [117]. 
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targeting suspect terrorists, terrorist groups, their supporters and their property 
without any legal proof as to whether and how they and their property are linked to 
a criminal activity (the same basis used under the terrorist financing offence for 
imposing criminal liability and confiscation sanctions), is a gross violation of due 
process and human rights values.          
12.4.1 Ambiguity in the nature of the regime and challenge of presumption 
of innocence 
Firstly, the regime offends a key principle of criminal law, the presumption of 
innocence. Under this regime, targeted persons or entities are suspected (not 
charged with or convicted of) of being involved in terrorism on the basis of 
information and evidence obtained from the instigation of investigations or 
intelligence. These persons or entities must be listed (labelled and announced) as 
terrorist, and all their assets should be frozen. Although the evidence adduced to 
enable the listing of persons is not tested in any independent, impartial judicial 
court, any listed persons or entities seeking delisting should submit evidence to the 
body (the Security Council, national authorities or the EU council) which listed 
them to prove that they are not terrorists or terrorist supporters.  
The European Convention on Human Rights and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights human rights state that “everyone charged with a criminal offence should be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”.959 Since the establishment 
of the regime, there has been a continuing debate as to whether the sanctioning 
measures imply an accusation of a criminal kind under human rights laws. The 
measures have been designed in a way so as not to be indicative of criminal 
sanctions; that is, they are not classified as a criminal offence or criminal charge in 
any jurisdiction; they are designed as precautionary, temporary measures which 
pursue preventive purposes; they do not impose any punishment in the criminal 
sense of the word.960  
                                                 
959 Article 6 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Article 28 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, above n 904. 
960 To determine whether a measure has a criminal nature, the European Court of Human Right looks 
into the domestic classification of the measure, the nature of the offence, and severity of punishment 
that may be imposed. See Engel and others v. the Netherlands (1976), Appl. no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 
5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72. It seems the freezing sanction cannot meet any of these criteria. See 
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However, in practice, they have the effect of a criminal sanction: they impose the 
stigma of being a worst type criminal (a terrorist) on targeted persons; they deprive 
the targeted persons of access to all of his assets and property for indefinite time (in 
some cases longer than the punishment provided for the commission terrorist 
offences);961 they have a profound impact on the social and financial life of not only 
the target persons but those who have relationship with them.962 
One may ask that if this stigmatization and loss of livelihood is not a criminal matter 
and does not have a punitive nature, then what kind of character does it have? Is it 
possible to argue that a certain group of citizens are excluded from the protection 
of human rights? Can the human rights laws be read to mean that everyone 
suspected of being a terrorist or a terrorist supporter should remain, and be 
announced to be, a criminal suspect until authorities decides otherwise? Irrespective 
of how these questions are dealt with, the fact is that the sanctioning regime “strips 
the individual of protections that are key to the safeguarding of the rule of law”.963    
12.4.2 Principle of legality 
As discussed in Chapter 1.4.1, under the principle of legality, a person’s rights can 
be restricted only under clear statutory language. The asset-freezing regime violates 
this principle. The main challenge that the regime (or any counter-terrorism regime 
which aims at setting up universal measures against terrorism) faces is, in the 
absence of a universal consensus on the nature, definition and scope of the offence 
of terrorism (as discussed in chapter five), what evidence may raise a suspicion that 
a person or an entity is a terrorist or a terrorist supporter? On the basis of what 
                                                 
Melissa Hazelhorst van den Broek, Monique, and Wouter de Zanger “Asset Freezing: Smart 
Sanction or Criminal Charge?” 2010 27(72) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 18.  
961 Kadi was listed and his assets were frozen for 10 years. See Kadi v Commission (2013), Joined 
Cases C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P.  
962 In Chafiq Ayadi v Council (2006), Case T-253/02, at [97], the sanctioning measures had “the 
effect of denying an individual all income or public assistance and, ultimately, any means of 
subsistence for him and his family”. He was refused by the Irish authorities a taxi-driver's licence as 
it would have been regarded as provision of financial services to him. In the case Ahmed Ali Yusuf 
and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission (2005), Case T-306/01 R, 
Yusef, Swedish citizen, was listed by the UN Sanction Committee, and all of his assets were frozen 
by Swedish government. The family rendered destitute. His social assistance was frozen. No one 
was allowed to help them, and he was removed by Kista employment office from the list of job 
seekers. The Swedish authorities raised doubt that the payments made to the applicants by the 
Swedish authorities might be unlawful. It took a while for the authorities to find a way to give them 
some social benefits to survive.    
963 Murphy, above n 832, at 144. 
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definition should a person’s actions be judged? And what should the listed persons 
do, or how should he behave, to dispel the suspicion that he is a terrorist or a terrorist 
supporter?  
While these questions have been left unanswered, the UN Security Council has 
ruled that a person or entity can be targeted as terrorist suspect if they are suspected 
of   
participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of 
acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in 
support of; supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; 
recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, Usama bin 
Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof. 964 
No definition of ‘terrorist act’ and ‘terrorist group’ is provided. Similar to the 
offence of terrorist financing, there is no need to link a person’s action to an actual 
terrorist act. It is not also clear what level of association with a terrorist group may 
give rise to the suspicion that the targeted person is criminal-minded. Association 
with such a terrorist group for humanitarian purposes may not prevent a person or 
entity from being blacklisted.965 So, in this situation, it is not clear on what basis a 
state may regard a person or entity as terrorist and proposes their listing in the UN 
designated list, and it is, also, unclear on what basis the UN’s Sanctions Committee 
may list, or refuse to list, that person. For example, in the Yusef case, three Swedish 
citizens were placed in the UN Sanction list on the basis of the information that the 
US provided. All of their assets were frozen.966 There was a great argument between 
the US and Sweden as to whether the listed persons did meet the requirements of 
being regarded as terrorist supporters. While the US authorities and the Sanction 
Committee considered there was sufficient evidence to suspect them of being a 
terrorist, Sweden’s intelligence agency was not convinced. Two of the targeted 
persons were delisted after a long diplomatic struggle between the US and Sweden. 
                                                 
964 UN, S/RES/1882, 30 June 2008. See also UN, S/RES/1617, 29 July 2005. 
965 The new EU directive, in its introduction, excludes from the scope of the terrorism-related 
offences covered by this directive “provision of humanitarian activities” to terrorist groups only if   
such provision is made by “impartial humanitarian organisations recognised by international law”.  
See EU Directive 2017/541, above n 849. 
966 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the EU and Commission of the EC 
(2006), Case T-306/01. 
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A similar approach has been taken in establishing and updating the autonomous EU 
list. A person may be listed not only for being suspected of committing, or 
attempting terrorist acts, but also for having a connection with or being in 
association with a terrorist or a terrorist group. While the EU has provided 
definitions of ‘terrorist act’ and ‘terrorist group’, the definitions have not been 
transposed by the Member States into the domestic law probably due to the 
differences in the national perceptions of terrorist threat. So, it is reasonable to 
believe that a person or entity is placed (by the request of a State Member and a 
unanimous decision of the Council) on the autonomous EU list in accordance with 
national authorities’ perception of a terrorist threat, not with regard to the definition 
of terrorism provided.967 Insistence on keeping the Kurdish militant group, the 
PKK, in the autonomous EU list is a good example. The group renounced its 
military struggle against Turkey in 2013 and has been lawfully operating for a few 
years. Its armed wing in Syria is receiving recognition and help from the US and 
other Western help in its fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). But it is still on the 
EU list. 
 The obvious conclusion, as Murphy says, is that  
even if the sanctions system is viewed as an extraordinary preventive counter-
measure, it still breaches key rule of law principles. First, the absence of any clear 
rules on why any particular individuals or entities are targeted by either the UN or 
EU sanction list is a breach of the principle of legality. The presence of multiple 
[and vague] definitions of terrorism, and the apparent application of none of them 
is a clear breach of this cornerstone of the constitutive aspect of the rule of law. 
Problems with the constitutive aspect of the rule of law have consequential effects 
for the rule of law’s safeguarding aspect. If the relevant rules are vague and are not 
applied then the individual cannot know what rules they are subject to.968         
12.4.3  Due process 
The rule of due process requires that “in the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him”, everyone is entitled to be treated 
fairly, efficiently and effectively by, inter alia, being heard and having access to an 
                                                 
967 Murphy, above n 832, at 140. 
968 At 140. 
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independent and impartial tribunal. The rights to due process also place limitations 
on laws and legal proceedings to safeguard these rights. In the case of almost all 
anti-transnational crime measures, the rule of due process requires the freezing 
procedure to be limited by two requirements: the freezing of assets should be 
connected to a criminal investigation; and the investigation should be related to the 
commission, preparation, or proceeds of, of crime (as mentioned, this requirement 
is not applicable to the offence of terrorist financing defined by the Convention and 
developed by FATF).969 This procedure is justifiable as “prior to bringing of 
criminal proceedings against an individual, the state may wish to freeze their assets 
to prevent their dispersal or use for criminal activities”.970 However, the terrorist 
asset-freezing regime is remarkably inconsistent with this procedure. In other 
words, by being classified as a temporary, precautionary and administrative system 
of sanctions, notwithstanding its criminal effects, the assets-freezing regime grossly 
violates all standard of due process rights, even civil due process standards.  
Firstly, the person can be listed and subject to freezing sanctions on the basis of 
information (not necessarily a criminal investigation) which raises a suspicion that 
the person is involved in terrorism or in association with terrorists (suspicion by 
association). There is no need for a link between the person’ activity and any 
terrorist act. There is no mechanism to turn the freezing sanctions into confiscation, 
or no timeframe to lift the sanctions.  
According to the new amendments to the EU laws, the listed person should be 
informed of the reasons based on which he is listed and his assets are frozen. He is 
entitled to communicate his views on the reasons to the body (national authorities, 
the EU Council, the UN Sanction Committee) which blacklisted him. Assuming 
that there was an agreed set of rules and standards on the definitions and 
determination of ‘terrorist involvement’ and ‘terrorist association’, can this be 
regarded as the ‘right to be heard’? While it is inaccurate to say that after hearing 
the persons’ view on the reasons, these bodies (national authorities, the EU Council, 
the UN Sanction Committee) would not be able to reach a fair and impartial 
decision, it is unfair and in violation of due process not to allow the targeted person 
                                                 




to be heard by an impartial and independent judicial body where the rules of 
evidence and procedure are applied.971 
One may argue that by recognizing that national or EU courts are competent to 
review the legality of the listing and restrictive measures, the listed persons and 
entities are given the right to fair hearing and right to access to an effective remedy. 
But, it should be remembered that such a review is an administrative review limited 
to checking whether the listing and the imposition of freezing measures have 
complied with the procedural safeguards set out, and whether such a decision “is 
taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis”.972 This means that the court simply and 
merely reviews whether the reasons for listing and freezing are convincing enough 
to continue suspecting that the targeted person is a terrorist or terrorist associate, 
and suspecting they may use their assets for terrorist purposes. This by no means 
implies that a court would determine whether the listed person has committed, or 
attempted to commit, terrorist activity. This also does not mean that a court will 
determine whether (how much of) the assets of the targeted persons were involved 
in, or intended to be used for, terrorist activity.  
Finally, what is the point of seeking judicial review if such a review is ineffective? 
That is, if a national or EU court annuls the restrictive measures adopted by the UN 
Sanction Committee, the targeted person will remain on the UN terrorist list 
because such annulment is not binding on the Security Council (the Sanction 
Committee). While the court may order the unfreezing of the assets, a state may, 
depending on the constitutional powers of its executive, issue an executive order 
overruling the court’s decision.973 If it does not do so, it will breach its international 
obligations. In addition, Judicial review does not seem to offer effective and 
permanent protection as there is always a possibility of being re-listed on the basis 
of a new investigation or allegation made against the person who has obtained 
through judicial review the annulment of listing and sanctions. For example, in the 
                                                 
971 Jeans-Francois Thony and Cheong-Ann Png “FATF Recommendations and UN Resolutions on 
the Financing of Terrorism; A Review of the Staus of Implemention and Legal Challenges Faced by 
Countries” 2007 14(2) Journal of Financial Crime 150, at 160. 
972 Kadi v. Commission (2013), Joined Cases C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, at 119. 
973 Sidney Yankson “Starving Terrorist of Their Financial Oxygen - At All Costs?” 2010 13(3) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 150, at 158. 
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Case of People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, 974 despite three successive 
annulments, the targeted entity was re-listed three times on the basis of new 
allegations provided by different states (France and the UK). It took over 10 years 
for the entity at issue to be removed from the autonomous EU list.     
12.4.4 Right to property  
The legality of the asset-freezing regime can also be challenged in relation to the 
right to property. As far as human rights laws are concerned, the validity of any 
measure interfering with one’s property depends on its compatibility with the law 
protecting human right to property. As mentioned before, the individual right to 
property can be limited in accordance to the general interest of a society under 
restricted circumstances. In order to be lawful, a measure adopted must strike a 
balance between the pursuit of a general interest and the limitations that the measure 
imposes on the rights of an individual. Where the lawfulness of a measure is 
examined, under the principle of proportionality, the answer to the each of the 
following questions should be in the affirmative: Is the purpose of the measure 
sufficiently important to justify its imposition? Is the measure adopted in pursuit of 
the ground of “public interest” rationally connected to it? Are the measures used to 
impair individuals’ rights no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective? 
In the context of the suppression of terrorist funds, there is no doubt that allocation 
or use of funds or property for the preparation or commission of terrorist acts is 
blameworthy and should be subject to limitation of course if there is a requirement 
that imposes the proof of such connection. However, no such requirement has been 
laid down by Terrorist Financing Convention or the asset-freezing regime. In 
addition, the asset-freezing regime, which is pre-emptive in nature focusing on 
minimising or eliminating the risk that terrorist suspects or supporters may use their 
assets for terrorist activity, hardly survives the second and third tests.  
The question which needs to be tested is that, if the dangerous nature of a person 
poses such a risk, whether the freezing all of his assets “rationally” and 
appropriately eradicates the risk of his assets being used for terrorist acts? In 
                                                 




defining what counts as “rationally”, EU courts, with regard to another system of 
restrictive measures of an economic nature, held that  
measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives 
legitimately pursued by the legislation … when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, (whether the 
measure is the least intrusive in the circumstances and that struck a fair and 
appropriate balance between all affected interests), and the disadvantages caused 
must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.975 
The main controversy here is whether the freezing of all assets of a person, 
suspected of (not convicted of, or charged with) being involved in terrorism or 
connected with terrorists, for an indefinite time is the only and the “least onerous” 
and restrictive measure that could be deployed to eliminate the risk? It is hard to 
believe that this measure is the only and the least intrusive means of protecting the 
public interest. Finding alternative tools to deal with the problem at issue is not the 
subject matter of this research. It is enough to say that the freezing regime as it 
exists at the current time, seems to be a reversion to the condemned primitive 
freezing and confiscation measures deployed by fascist totalitarian regimes against 
a group of people suspected by the regime of posing risk to the economic and 
political stability of the regime.976  
Lastly, there is no guarantee that the regime could pass the third test 
(proportionality) at all times. As mentioned before, the main purpose of the 
establishment of the right to property is to prevent the arbitrary and capricious 
interference with peaceful possession “that many governments –frequently have 
been – all too prone to resort to”.977 The right to property can be limited in the 
general interest of the society. But the serious concern whether there is any 
                                                 
975 The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex 
parte: Fedesa and others (1990) EUECJ R-88/146. See also, Huang v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (2007) UKHL 11, 2 AC, 167, 187, at [19].  
976 For example, the Nazi regime in Germany regarded the Jews as the followers of an abhorrent 
religious, economic and political doctrine, who seek to dominate the non-Jewish world. The regime 
considered the jaws’ dominance harmful based on the assumption that their dominance on financial 
system caused the German defeat in the World War One. The regime applied various tools including, 
inter alia, freezing and confiscation sanctions on all Jews to eliminate their risk. See Martin Dean 
Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933-1945 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2010).     
977 Marckx v. Belgium, App No. 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979), at [20]. 
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guarantee that the asset-freezing measures will not be used unlawfully and cruelly 
against a specific (non-guilty) group of people? In the absence of an agreed and 
clear definition of ‘terrorism’, terrorist involvement’ and ‘terrorist association’, 
giving so much power to the executive (the UN Sanction Committee, states, 
intelligence agencies) to determine who are terrorists or terrorist supporters, without 
any proper supervision, is very dangerous. There is potential for the measures to 
turn into weapons against those the executive wishes to suppress by labelling them 
as terrorists and choking off their lives by freezing all of their assets. 
12.5 Conclusion  
The approach of the EU to adopting and implementing the assets-freezing regime 
created by the UN Security Council relies on the logic that underpins the terrorist 
financing offence - imposition of sanctions on people and their property without 
linking them to any actual terrorist act and/or on the basis of their mere association 
with suspect terrorists or terrorist groups. It has been shown that although these 
measures are regarded as precautionary and administrative measures, they impose 
the same stigma and sanction as a criminal law may do: listing and labelling people 
as terrorists or terrorist groups and freezing all of their assets for an infinite time 
and without a proper judicial due process.  
Not surprisingly, the EU has faced human rights challenges in adopting these 
measures due to their incompatibility with its protected values and rights such as 
right to be heard, right to access to effective judicial review, or right to enjoy 
possession or use of property reflected in the European Convention on Human 
Rights or the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Even the 
introduction of amendments to the EU policies on the asset-freezing measures, 
followed by EU courts’ decisions, has not alleviated the draconian impacts of these 
measures.  The EU’s amended version of the regime cannot be legally justified as 
its rules are in a gross violation of EU values and principles such as principles the 
presumption of innocence, principle of legality and the rule of due process and right 
to property.    
The following chapter analyses an example of a different kind: the response of 
ASEAN to the terrorist financing. It should be noted the EU has expressed great 
interest in developing and strengthening its relationship with ASEAN, and has 
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stressed that any cooperation or political dialogue with the ASEAN should contain 
an essential element clause, promoting human rights, and rule of law, democratic 
principles and good governance.978 But the irony is that the EU in many of the 
respects mentioned in this and previous chapters has failed to adhere to its own 
values and principles which it seeks to promote.    
                                                 
978 European Commission, A new partnership with Southeast Asia, COM (2003) 399/4, Brussels. 
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Chapter Thirteen: ASEAN’s legal response to terrorism financing  
13.1 Introduction  
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) makes a good comparative 
case study because it is a different kind of regional regime where individual rights 
and values are not claimed to be as important as in the EU. Its members regard each 
other with political suspicion; they are (unlike the EU) mostly developing states, 
but still have a problem with terrorism. It should be noted at the outset, however, 
that ASEAN or Member States have not created a unique or very different counter-
terrorist financing regime as they are subject to strong pressure from the West to 
diffuse a harmonized counter-terrorist measures on the model in the Terrorist 
Financing Convention as enhanced by the FATF.  
This chapter discusses how ASEAN and its Member States have conceptualized 
terrorist financing as an independent offence and how they implement confiscatory 
measures where there is no link between acts of financing or funds and a terrorist 
act - the idea that underpins the counter-terrorist financing regime. Their response 
to the structural and definitional ambiguities inherent in this concept and to the 
human rights issues and legal problems arising from the implementation of the 
regime is interesting because of the heavy pressure from Western States and the EU 
to take into account human rights, and rule of law, democratic principles and good 
governance in this process of implementation.979 The chapter very briefly explores 
the response of ASEAN, as a regional community, and then given its limited impact 
examines the approach of four of its Member States (Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines) to terrorist financing.    
13.2 ASEAN’s response to terrorism 
Terrorism has received special attention from ASEAN since 1970s when terrorism 
was regarded and classified as a transnational crime. In 1997, the ASEAN 
Declaration on Transnational Crime called for the establishment of “clear and 
effective regional modalities” to combat transnational crimes such as piracy, money 
laundering, drug trafficking and terrorism, “especially on the aspect of information 
                                                 
979 European Commission, A new partnership with Southeast Asia, COM (2003) 399/4, Brussels. 
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exchange and policy coordination”. In 1999, ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime was adopted to establish an institutional framework for 
ASEAN cooperation and coordination on transnational crime. With regard to 
terrorism, the 2002 Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to 
Combat Transnational Crime set out steps to be taken and measures to be 
implemented in order to enhance regional cooperation and coordination in the fields 
of information exchange, legal matters, law enforcement matters, training, 
institutional capacity-building and extra-regional cooperation.980 The measures set 
out by the Work Programme have become the main framework for almost all of 
ASEAN’s responses to terrorism.               
In 2001, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Declaration cites terrorism 
as “a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of 
ASEAN”, which must be addressed through regional and international cooperation. 
The Member States agreed, under the Declaration, to undertake the following 
practical measures: strengthening their national laws and legislation on terrorism, 
calling for signing and ratification of all anti-terrorist conventions, enhancing 
                                                 
980 With regard to “information exchange”, a database of national laws  and regulations on terrorism 
and international treaties and agreements was to be established by the ASEAN Secretariat; the 
Secretariat was called upon to “explore ways for ASEAN to cooperate with ASEANAPOL [ASEAN 
Association of Heads of Police] and relevant international organizations concerned with terrorism 
matters to further facilitate sharing of information and analysis of critical intelligence information 
such as “modus operandi” and offences involving terrorist activities”; ASEAN Member States were 
required to exchange information on security practices, on technologies to detect and deter terrorist 
attacks, and on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movements and funding. With regard to 
legal matter, the Member States were called on to work towards the criminalization of terrorism, 
and to “provide information among each other and to the ASEAN Secretariat on the progress of their 
efforts to enact domestic legal instruments”; it was to be established whether there was a possibility 
of developing  “multilateral or bilateral legal arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, 
prosecution, extradition exchange of witness, sharing of evidence, inquiry and seizure in order to 
enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among ASEAN Member” States; ASEAN 
Secretariat was required to work and study on “a regional operational convention or agreement on 
terrorism”,  and “on a bilateral or multilateral mutual legal assistance agreement or arrangement to 
enhance cooperation in combating terrorist acts and deliberating on various aspects of the issue in a 
comprehensive manner including its definition and root causes. With regard to law enforcement 
matters, the ASEAN Secretariat was made responsible for providing coordination and cooperation 
“in law enforcement and intelligence sharing on terrorism on terrorism” affecting Member States; 
Member States were encouraged to make proposal “on training programme/conferences ; ASEAN 
Secretariat was required to assist Member States in strengthening their national mechanism to 
combat terrorism. with regard to extra-regional cooperation, “ASEAN Secretariat was made 
responsible for conducting “a study on how ASEAN programmes/projects could 
complement/support UN resolutions”; ASEAN Secretariat was made responsible for looking into 
“the possibility of inviting [and involving] the Plus Three Countries – China, Japan and the Republic 
of Korea – and other dialogue partners” in the war against terrorism. 
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“information/intelligence exchange”, strengthening “cooperation at bilateral, 
regional and international levels in combating terrorism”, and deepening 
cooperation among their law enforcement agencies.  
In July 2002, the ASEAN Regional Forum also endorsed a statement on a set of 
financial measures to counter terrorist financing.981 The Statement committed 
Member States to enhance cooperation on the international exchange of 
information. They also agreed to implement relevant UN Security council 
resolutions, particularly the Security Council Resolution 1373, which as we have 
seen involves making lists of terrorists and freezing all their assets and their 
associates’ assets.  
In response to the Bali attacks, the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh issued the 
2002 ASEAN Declaration on Terrorism. In it, the Member States reiterated their 
determination and commitment to adopt measures outlined in the Declaration on 
Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. At the 2004 Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting 
on Counter-Terrorism, Member States were asked to take more practical measures 
to counter terrorism. These measures included “the development of appropriate 
skills among prosecutors and judges to ensure sufficient legal expertise exists to 
deal with terrorists”,  having “a sufficiently broad range of offences in national law 
to prosecute and punish those responsible for committing or supporting terrorist 
acts, while respecting democratic values, human rights and due process of law”, 
having  sufficient legal tools “to confiscate  the proceeds of crime, obtained through 
illicit activities being used to fund terrorist activities”, and ratification of UN anti-
terrorism conventions and resolutions.982  
In January 2007, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Convention on Counter-terrorism. 
The Convention does not provide a generic definition of terrorism or terrorist group. 
It does make provision for a number of criminal offences, prohibited under the anti-
terrorist convention, such as hijacking, hostage taking and bombing, which Member 
States agreed to be treated as terrorist acts.983 The Convention requires the ASEAN 
                                                 
981 ASEAN, ARF Statement on Measures against Terrorist Financing 30 July 2002, 
http://asean.org/?static_post=arf-statement-on-measures-against-terrorist-financing-30-july-2002-
3. 
982 ASEAN, Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism Bali, Indonesia, 5 February 
2004 Co Chairs’ Statement.  
983 See Article II of ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (13 January 2007). 
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Member States to ensure that these offences, especially when they are “intended to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation 
to do or to abstain from doing any act, are under no circumstances justifiable by 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
other similar nature”. The Convention also requires Member States to cooperate to 
prevent the commission, facilitation, financing, of terrorist acts, and to prevent the 
movements of terrorist and terrorist groups. Fair treatment and conformity with 
international human right law are also promised.    
Besides these regional efforts, a significant number of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and declarations have been agreed or made between ASEAN and other 
regional institutions or states,984 among ASEAN Member States,985 and between 
ASEAN Members States and other countries, such as EU and or states such as USA, 
Japan, and Australia. Following the same pattern as the ASEAN counter-terrorism 
cooperation, these agreements re-affirm the importance of a framework for 
cooperation to prevent, disturb and combat international terrorism and terrorist 
financing through exchange of information, relationships amongst the their law 
enforcement agencies, training and consultations, and strengthening border control. 
To sum up, ASEAN appears to have made a strong formal commitment to establish 
a comprehensive counter-terrorism regime. However, there is not much actual work 
done at the ASEAN level to deal with issue of terrorist financing, except for some 
provisions in the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, which emphasizes 
cooperation in the suppression of terrorist financing.986 Real action is confined to 
legislative activity by Member States, which varies significantly.  
13.3 Individual ASEAN Member States approaches to approaches to counter-
terrorism financing  
Individual ASEAN Member States have created and developed, and are still 
developing, their counter-terrorist financing regime with the help and support, and 
                                                 
984 See for example, 14th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, “the Joint Declaration on Cooperation 
to combat Terrorism”, 27 January 2003. ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to 
Combat International Terrorism, 1 July 2004. ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to 
Combat International Terrorism, 1 August 2002.  
985 See for example, 2002 Trilateral Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of 
Communication Procedures (adopted on 7 May 2002 by Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia). 
986 Article VI of ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. 
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under the guidance, direction and supervision, of international organizations such 
as FATF or The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (a FATF-style regional 
body for the Asia/Pacific region). 987 A significant attempt is being made by these 
international organizations to diffuse and promote the existing counter-terrorist 
financing regime established by the Terrorist Financing Convention, FATF 
recommendations and UN resolutions. This diffused regime, which in many 
respects, is the duplication of the US counter-terrorism law, provides a wide range 
of legal tools in the fight against terrorist financing.  
Criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence is considered by 
the regime as the first and the most important step in countering terrorist financing. 
However, this conceptualization (terrorist financing as an autonomous crime) 
suffers from ambiguity. As already mentioned, financing of terrorism in its nature 
and according to general rules of criminal law, is a preparatory act which obtains 
its criminality from its connection with a terrorist act for which the financing is 
carried out. However, such a connection is not required to establish an independent 
offence of terrorist financing, otherwise terrorist financing would come close to the 
concept of complicity or an inchoate crime. In the absence of such connection, the 
main difficulty, as noted above, is identifying where the criminality of the offence 
originates from. As noted in chapters seven and eight, the offence relies on its 
mental element, targeting people who commit the offence for terrorist purposes. 
However, the term terrorist purposes is not defined. Similarly, as noted in chapter 
eight, the mental element of the offence of financing individual terrorists or terrorist 
groups is ambiguous; what complicates the application of the offence is the 
ambiguity over the definition of terrorism, terrorist acts, terrorists and terrorist 
groups (chapter five). These ambiguities also make the application of the seizure 
and confiscatory measures problematic as it is not clear what property should be 
subject to confiscation sanctions (chapter ten and eleven). In addition, the asset-
freezing regime adopted and developed by the UN Security Council as described in 
                                                 
987 Jason Sharon argues that anti-money laundering policies, which later was expanded to include 
terrorist financing, have been diffused in developing states “through the direct effects and indirect 
effects of power, rather than through rational learning, in response to brute material pressure, or to 
address local policy problems”. He argues that International organizations such FATF have directly 
or indirectly shaped the circumstances and fates of developing states in this area.” “Direct coercion, 
mimicry, and competition” are three mechanisms used to diffuse the measures. See Jason  Sharman 
“Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Launderng in Developing States” 2008 
52(3) International Studies Quarterly 635, at 653.   
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chapter twelve is defective as, in addition to suffering from the definitional 
ambiguities explained above, it has resulted in arbitrary effects, labelling people 
suspected of being involved in terrorism or financing terrorist without a proper due 
process, and targeting all their assets for a potentially infinite time.   
The following section briefly assesses four ASEAN Member States’ (Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) laws on terrorist financing in order to 
discover how these states have conceptualized terrorist financing as an offence, and 
in the absence of any requirement to link funds with an actual terrorist act, on what 
basis they impose liability on the accused and freeze and confiscate their funds and 
property. It also examines whether they provide any definition of ‘terrorist 
purposes’. It examines their approach to freezing of the assets of those listed as 
terrorists in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions, to determine 
whether they afford the listed persons and entities with their fundamental rights 
protected by international human rights laws the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. This examination does not take into account the motive of individual 
ASEAN Member States in adopting and implementing, or resisting implementation 
of the whole or parts of these measures.988 
13.3.1 Singapore 
There is a strong will in Singapore to fight terrorism and terrorist financing. While 
Singapore has not been the victim of any violent attacks in recent years, it is situated 
in a region where several separatist movements, guerrilla warfare and insurgency 
have been taking place.989 To prevent any possible threat that may endanger its 
citizens, sovereignty and its infrastructures, Singapore seems to have adopted a very 
broad definition of terrorism and terrorist financing.  In terms of defining terrorism 
                                                 
988 States may adopt the measures for different reasons. For example, it has been discovered that the 
key motive behind Myanmar’s adoption and implementation of anti-financial crime measures is to 
weaken the position of opposition groups and strengthen the power of the central government “over 
potentially disloyal groups”. See Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones “Regulatory Regionalism and Anti-
Moneylaundering Governance In Asia” 2015 69(2) Australian Journal of International Affairs 144, 
at 155.  
989 There is an Islamic militant group, called the Jemaah Islamiyah, in the region whose objective is 
to establish an Islamic state which comprises Malaysia Singapore and Indonesia, Brunei and the 
southern Philippines. The group was accused of planning to bomb US and other local targets in 
Singapore. See Government of Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs “White Paper; the Jemaah 





and terrorist acts, under the Singaporean law, ‘terrorist act’ means “the use or threat 
of action” where the action involves serious violence against citizens, endangers a 
person’s life, involves damage to property, involves the use of explosives, involves 
environmental damage, poses a serious risk to health and safety of the public, 
disturbs any public infrastructures, from public computer system, public 
transportation, financial services to public security or national defence.990 Although 
this definition does not include all the acts criminalized under the counter-terrorism 
conventions (such as hostage taking), similar to the definition provided by Terrorist 
Financing Convention, such use or threat of action should be carried out with the 
intention to coerce a government or international organization to do or refrain from 
doing any act, or intimidate a population. 
Singapore’s Terrorism (Suppression OF Financing) Act (2003) also defines 
‘terrorist’ as a person who “commits, or attempts to commit”, or participate in or 
facilitates the commission of, any of these acts.991 ‘Terrorist group’ means “any 
entity owned or controlled by any terrorist or group of terrorists and includes an 
association of such entities, and any entity” designated by the UN or the government 
as a terrorist group.    
With regard to the definition of terrorist financing, the laws on terrorist financing 
do not require connection between the act of financing and an actual terrorist act. 
In vague language, the law criminalizes a broad range of acts as terrorist financing 
offences with a heavy (but particularly vague) reliance on the mental state of these 
offences. Under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, a person is 
criminally liable if he or she directly or indirectly collects or provides “property” 
or “financial and other related services”, 
intending that they be used, or knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe 
that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying 
out any terrorist act, or for benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out 
such an activity; or knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that, in whole 
or in part, they will be used by or will benefit any terrorist or terrorist entity.992 
                                                 
990 Terrorism (Suppression OF Financing) Act 2003 (Singapore), s 2(1). 
991 At s 2 (1). 
992 At s 4.  
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Similarly, use and possession of property “for the purpose of facilitating or carrying 
out a terrorist act” also triggers liability.993 Dealing in (or entering into any financial 
transaction related to) property of terrorists constitutes a terrorist financing offence 
if the financer (facilitator) “knows or has reasonable grounds to believe [that the 
property] is owned or controlled by or on behalf of any terrorist or terrorist 
entity”.994 A person will be punished (by a maximum of five years imprisonment) 
for failing to disclose the information about any of these terrorist financing 
offences.995  
The provision is worded broadly enough that there is no need that the financer 
intend or know of any specific terrorist act. It is thus vulnerable to all the criticisms 
of the convention offence. It is not clear exactly what a financer of a terrorist act 
should know or intend to be criminally liable. How can a person finance a terrorist 
act when he does not know about or intend a specific terrorist act? What, again, is 
the definition and scope of ‘terrorist purposes’? With regard to the financing of 
terrorist groups and terrorists, although these laws aim at cutting off all possible 
financial resources of terrorists and terrorist groups, these laws do not distinguish 
the guilty and non-guilty mental states. What if a person, who knows the recipient 
is a terrorist group, engages in financing for lawful or humanitarian purposes, such 
as furthering the lawful activity of a group? Does knowledge of the identity of a 
person or a group justify criminalization of any association with such a person or 
group?   
With regard to forfeiture measures, based on this vague mental state, property can 
be seized and consequently confiscated. That is, in Singapore, property is 
forfeitable if a court is satisfied, on a balance of probability, that the “property is 
owned or controlled by or on behalf of any terrorist or terrorist entity, or [the] 
property that has been or will be used, in whole or in part, to facilitate or carry out 
a terrorist act”.996 Under this provision, property which belongs to, or is controlled 
by, the person who finances terrorism or a terrorist organization can be forfeited if 
it is intended to be used for terrorist purposes. In the absence of an actual terrorist 
                                                 
993 At s 5.  
994 At s 6. 
995 At ss 8 and 9. 
996 At s 21. 
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act, the main concern is how a court may order forfeiture of property when it is not 
clear whether (and how much of) the property forfeited would or could be used for 
the commission or preparation of a terrorist act. The same issued is raised: whether 
such forfeiture is fair and precise enough to distinguish a guilty from a non-guilty 
mind?     
With regard to the implementation of the UN Resolutions, Singapore’s law provides 
that all assets of persons or groups who become designated by the UN Sanction 
Committee are frozen immediately by Singaporean authorities, for an indefinite 
time until they are delisted by the Sanction Committee.997 Although Singapore has 
not yet established an independent terrorist list pursuant to the UN Resolution 1373, 
Singapore has empowered itself to list a person or a group designated by other states 
and freeze all their assets.998 No judicial review would be required. Instead, the 
Singaporean authorities (the Ministry of Home Affairs) (not a judicial body) would 
assess whether the information provided by a designating state supports the 
suspicion that the designated person or group is involved in terrorism. However, in 
the absence of intentional agreement on the definition of terrorism, and with regard 
to differences in the perception of terrorist threats, it is not clear based on what 
standards or definition the information provided would be assessed. What is 
obvious is that such an assessment would be carried out in a way to comply with 
the fundamental rights respected and protected by the international human rights 
laws and ASEAN Human Rights declaration, rights such as right to be heard, right 
to be presumed innocent, right to access to judicial review and right to property.  
13.3.2  Malaysia 
Similarly to Singapore, Malaysia has criminalized terrorist financing in accordance 
with the Terrorist Financing Convention and the FATF recommendations. Any 
provision or collection of property and funds for terrorist purposes is illegal.999 Any 
involvement with the property of terrorists and terrorist groups attracts criminal 
liability. No definition of terrorist purposes is provided. But, the definition of 
‘terrorist act’ includes broad classes of acts. In addition to those acts regarded by 
                                                 
997 Monetary Authority of Singapore (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations 2002 (Singapore), ss  
7 and 8.  
998 The United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulation 2003 (Singapore), ss 7 and 8.  
999 The Penal Code of Malaysia, Sec.130N, 130O, 130P and 130Q.   
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Singaporean Law as terrorist acts, the Malaysian definition of terrorist act includes 
aviation offences such as hijacking.1000 In comparison with Singaporean definition, 
it also has an additional mental state requirement. Such terrorist acts should be 
carried out “with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause” and intimidating the public or coercing a government or intentional 
organizations to do or prevent from doing an act. However, there is no need for an 
act of financing to be linked to any of terrorist acts. So, again, the offence relies 
heavily on the mental element of the offence (terrorist purposes).  
In terms of forfeiture, any property which proved to be “terrorist property” is subject 
to forfeiture. ‘Terrorist property” is defined very broadly and includes  
proceeds from the commission of a terrorist act; property that has been, is being, 
or is likely to be used to commit a terrorist act; property that has been, is being, or 
is likely to be used by a terrorist, terrorist entity or terrorist group; property owned 
or controlled by or on behalf of a terrorist, terrorist entity or terrorist group, 
including funds derived or generated from such property; or property that has been 
collected for the purpose of providing support to a terrorist, terrorist entity or 
terrorist group or funding a terrorist act.1001  
It is not clear when there is no terrorist act, how a court may determine that the 
suspected property “is likely to be used to commit a terrorist act”. What if the 
property owned or controlled by a terrorist suspect or a financer is not intended to 
be used for terrorist purposes (using for personal matters such a house where the 
terrorist’s family live in)? The law expands the scope of forfeiture, seemingly 
allowing civil forfeiture of suspected property. That is, when “there is no 
prosecution or conviction … for terrorism financing offence”, a court can order 
forfeiture of the property if it is satisfied, on the balance of probability, that the 
property is “the subject matter of or was used in the commission of … a terrorism 
financing offence”.1002  In the case of a bona fide third party’s (claimant’s) having 
interest in the forfeited property, a court should be satisfied that the claimant did 
not participate or engage in the offence with regard to which the property is 
                                                 
1000 At s 130B (1). 
1001 At s 130 B (1). 
1002 Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 
2001 (Malaysia), s 56 (1). 
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forfeited;  the claimant should also lacked, at the time of the commission of the 
offence, “knowledge [,] and was not intentionally ignorant [,] of the illegal use of 
the property, or if he had knowledge, did not freely consent to its  illegal use”; and 
he “did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of the 
property”.1003 Under such requirements, a person’s house which is used, for 
example, by one of his family member for terrorist purposes is at risk of being 
confiscated if he fails to prove that he was diligent enough to take necessary steps 
in accordance to this law.  
In the same draconian manner to the Singaporean approach, Malaysian law 
empowers the executive authorities (Ministry of Home Affairs) to blacklist, and 
order the freezing of assets of, those who are suspected of being terrorists or terrorist 
groups or terrorist financers, without using a judicial procedure and without 
respecting their fundamental human rights.1004 In other words, the Minster of Home 
Affairs may declare a person or a group to be a terrorist or terrorist group merely 
on the basis of information he receives “from a police officer”. As soon as he 
declares a person or a group as terrorist, all their assets are frozen, and provision of 
“any financial or other related service” to it is prohibited.1005 Although the listed 
persons are allowed to ask the minister to delist them, the question is how they may 
defend themselves when they do not know why and on what grounds they have 
been listed. With regard to the UN Sanction list, the law allows the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to make an order that the persons and groups listed by the UN 
Sanction Committee are designated as terrorists, and their assets are frozen.1006 It 
has been alleged that Malaysia has deployed these executive measures against the 
political opponents of the governments.1007  
                                                 
1003 At s 61. 
1004 At s 66B.  
1005 At. 
1006 At s 66.C. 
1007 For example, the designation of “Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia” as a terrorist organization was 
construed “as a bid by Mahathir[‘s government] to crack down on Muslim oppositions”. The 
government claimed that the group had been plotting a number of attacks in Malaysia. However, no 
charges were pressed against them. See J.N.  Mak “Malaysian Defense and Security Cooperation: 
Coming out of the Closet” in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds) Asia-Pacific Security 
Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2004), at 149. See 
also  James Cotton “Southeast Asia after September 11” in David Martin Jones (ed) Globalization 
and the New Terror: The Asian Pacific Dimension (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2004), at 192.      
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13.3.3  Indonesia 
Until 2013, Indonesian law prohibited only the financing of terrorist acts.1008 By the 
enactment of new legislation, the scope of the terrorist financing offence is 
expanded in order to be in line with the Terrorist Financing Convention and the 
FATF recommendations. According to the current legislation, financing of 
terrorism is an act of providing, collecting and loaning funds with the intention, or 
in the knowledge, that they will be used for a terrorist act, or by a terrorist individual 
or a terrorist organization.1009 While no definition of ‘terrorist organization’ or 
‘terrorist’ is given, Indonesian law provides a very broad definition of ‘terrorist act’, 
using undefined terms. A person commits a terrorist act when the person 
intentionally uses violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread 
atmosphere of terror or fear in the general population or to create mass casualties, 
by forcibly taking the freedom, life or property of others or causes damage or 
destruction to vital strategic installations or the environment or public facilities or 
international facilities.1010 
This definition is also expanded to include offences related to explosive, aviation 
security, explosive and firearms, biological weapons.1011 Unlike the Singaporean 
law in which a terrorist act does not include activities undertaken by military forces 
of a State in the exercise of their official duties,1012 any act which meets the criteria 
of the Indonesian definition of ‘terrorist act’ is punishable even if it is carried out 
by “military or police”.1013 However, the law does not define critical terms such as 
“widespread atmosphere of terror or fear”, “mass casualties”. The law also does not 
clarify that in the absence of commission or preparation of an actual terrorist act, 
what constitutes the mental element of terrorist financing offence. 
In terms of seizure and forfeiture, the law uses ambiguous language. To freeze 
suspicious funds, the law provides two parallel and competing mechanisms. 
                                                 
1008 Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of 
Terrorism as a Law (Indonesia), art 11.  
1009 Law No 9 of 2013 on Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Funding (Indonesia), art 4. 
1010 Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of 
Terrorism as a Law (Indonesia), art 6. 
1011 At ss 8,9 and 10.  
1012 Terrorism (Suppression OF Financing) Act (2003) (Singapore), s 2 (3). 
1013 Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of 
Terrorism as a Law, art 6 and 7. 
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According to the first mechanism, a national authority (a prosecutor, a judge or an 
investigator) may order the seizure of funds when it is known, or it ought to have 
been known, that they are used for the crime of terrorism.1014 Under the second 
mechanism, an authority may seek a freezing order from the Central Jakarta District 
Court.1015 However, it is not clear if an authority can directly order the seizure of 
suspended funds, why he or she needs to resort to the second mechanism, and seek 
a court order. While the suspected funds remain frozen only for 30 days, it is not 
clear how and under what circumstances the freezing would turn into confiscation 
and whether confiscation of suspected funds should be followed by a conviction for 
a specific offence (Criminal codification) or it can be granted in the absence of any 
conviction (civil confiscation). 
In terms of issuing a list of terrorist suspects and ordering the freezing of their assets 
in according with the UN Resolutions 1267 and 1373, the law empowers the “Chief 
of the Indonesian National Police” to submit an  application  to the Central Jakarta 
District Court, requesting the inclusion of those identified by the Police as terrorist 
suspects.1016  The Court then decides on each case within 30 days on the basis of 
the information and evidence provided by the Police.  In the case of the court’s 
permission to include the suspect in the list, all assets of the listed persons will be 
frozen. The listed persons have right to object the decision by providing reasons for 
the objection to the Police. In case the Police deny their objection, the persons can 
bring “civil lawsuits” in the Central Jakarta District Court.1017 This procedure of 
listing and freezing was criticized by FATF as it did not result in immediate listing, 
and freezing of assets of, those listed by the UN Sanction Committee.1018 After five 
years of being on the FATF’s list of “high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions”, 
in 2015, Indonesia adopted an “inter-ministerial joint regulation”, which allows the 
authorities to freeze the assets of those listed by the UN Sanction Committee within 
three days after they are listed by the Committee.1019 The assets remain frozen as 
                                                 
1014 At art 22 and 23(1).   
1015 At art 23(2). 
1016 At art 27. 
1017 At art 29. 
1018 Financial Action Task Force “Public Statement” (24 October 2014) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/documents/documents/public-statement-oct2014.html#indonesia>. 
1019 U.S. Department of State Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern - Indonesia; Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Vol 2 Money Laundering and Financial 
Crimes (2016), viewed at 12/06/2016. See also Haeril Halim “PPATK Freezes Extremist-Related 
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along as the persons are in the UN Sanction list.1020 Practically, the joint regulation 
deprives the listed persons of their right, given by the law, to object their freezing 
sanctions.   
13.3.4 The Philippines 
Until 2011, the Philippines applied the general principles of criminal law in 
criminalization and confiscation of terrorist financing;1021 that is, terrorist financing 
was regarded as complicity in a terrorist offence or an inchoate offence. So, not 
only was there a requirement to link the act of financing to a specific terrorist act, 
but also, financing of an individual or a terrorist would not be regarded an offence 
if it was not carried out for the commission or preparation of a terrorist act. 
Confiscation was also limited to the funds and property proven to be used, or 
intended to be used, for the commission of an actual terrorist act. However, by the 
enactment of the Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2011, the Philippines 
established an independent offence of terrorist financing in exact accordance with 
the FATF recommendations and the Terrorist Financing Convention.1022  
In addition, the Philippines provide a very broad definition of ‘terrorist act’. In 
addition to adoption of the generic definition of terrorism provided by the Terrorist 
Financing Convention, classes of acts, such as piracy, rebellion and insurgency, 
coup d'état and hijacking are also considered terrorist acts when they are “sowing 
and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the 
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand”.1023 
Unlike the definition offered by the Terrorist Financing Convention based on which 
a terrorist act should be aimed at intimidating a population “or” compelling a 
government or an international organizations, under the Philippine definition, the 
cause of fear should be the consequence of an act, and it should be intended to 
coerce the government “to give in to an unlawful demand” (whether it is a personal, 
material, financial or political demand). However, there is no need to connect the 
                                                 
Accounts” The Jakarta Post (online ed, Jakarta, 21 April 2015) 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/21/ppatk-freezes-extremist-related-accounts.html. 
1020 For example, in April 2015, Indonesia froze 20 bank accounts claimed to belong to “Al-Qaeda 
and Taliban-affiliated terrorist groups operating in Indonesia”. See Halim, above n 1019.   
1021 See Section 5 of the Human Security Act of 2007, Republic Act No. 9372 (the Philippines). 
1022 The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2011, Republic Act No. 10168, (the Philippines), s 
4. 
1023 At s 3(J). 
247 
 
funds collected or provided to any terrorist act.1024 No definition of ‘terrorist 
purposes’ is, nonetheless, provided.  
Despite this ambiguity, freezing and forfeiture can be granted not on the basis of 
the link between the suspected funds and an actual terrorist act, but based on an 
assumption (fiction) that they may be used for terrorism. The law permits the civil 
forfeiture of funds and property that  
are in any way related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism; or (b) property 
or funds of any person, group of persons, terrorist organization, or association, in 
relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that they are committing or 
attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating the 
commission of financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism.1025 
This low standard of proof (probable cause) seems to allow the prosecution to 
request the seizure and forfeiture of the funds and property based on circumstantial 
evidence such as hearsay or an anonymous informant’s tip,1026 or based on a mere 
listing by the UN sanction Committee,1027 without a need to prove the actual guilt 
of the accused, or the actual criminal use of the funds and property.1028 This also 
shifts the burden of proof to the accused to prove that the suspected funds or 
property were not intended to be used for a terrorist act, which is not proven or 
planned at all.  
With regard to implementing the UN resolutions, executive authorities are 
empowered to issue freezing orders with regard to the property and funds of persons 
and entities listed by the UN Sanction committee or by other jurisdictions in 
accordance with the Resolution 1373. The funds remain frozen “until the basis for 
                                                 
1024 At s 4. 
1025At s 11.  
1026 At. 
1027 At. 
1028 Property or funds frozen in accordance with the UN resolutions can be forfeited, in a form of in 
rem civil forfeiture if they are “found to be in any way related to financing of terrorism or acts of 
terrorism committed within the jurisdiction of the Philippines”. The Philippine authorities 
emphasises that “a mere listing by the UNSC would likely be sufficient to establish preponderance 
of evidence and this to forfeit proceeds of listed individuals/entities”. See also Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering “Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism; 
Republic of the Philippines” (2009) http://www.apgml.org/documents/search-
results.aspx?keywords=philippines, at [275]. 
248 
 
the issuance thereof shall have been lifted”.1029 However, if the frozen funds are 
“related to financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism committed within the 
jurisdiction of the Philippines”, the funds will be the subject of civil forfeiture.1030 
The listed persons are allowed to “file with the Court of Appeals a petition to 
determine the basis of the freeze order”.1031 However, it is not very clear that, if a 
person or entity listed by the UN Sanction Committee succeeds in obtaining their 
delisting, whether the government would delist the persons or entities and unfreeze 
their assets at the cost of violating its international obligations. 
13.4 Conclusion  
ASEAN Member States, have been encouraged and pushed to incorporate the 
provisions from criminalisation of terrorist financing and for seizure/confiscation 
of suspect property into their law, and they have albeit in some cases tardily, 
reluctantly and partially, done so. While ASEAN lacks a cohesive counter-terrorist 
financing regime, individual ASEAN Member States have developed, and are still 
developing, their counter-terrorist financing regime in accordance with the Terrorist 
Financing Convention and the FATF’s recommendations.  The laws and policies of 
four ASEAN Member States (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) 
on criminalization of terrorist financing and confiscation of terrorist funds have 
been examined in this chapter. The legal issues that arise from the implementation 
of these laws and policies in these ASEAN Member States have been discussed. 
The adoption and implementation of the existing counter-terrorism measures by 
ASEAN and its Member States seem to face similar problems to the ones discussed 
in previous chapters.   
It has been found that, first and foremost, it is not clear what exactly constitutes (or 
does not constitute) terrorism, a terrorist act or a terrorist group. The ASEAN 
                                                 
1029 At [276]. The assets of the Rajah Solaiman Movement were frozen after being listed by the UN 
Sanctions Committee. It should be noted that the designation of this group the Committee was the 
result of a request by the Philippine government.  
1030 The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2011, Republic Act No. 10168 (the Philippines), s 
11. Following the UN designation of the Philippine Branch of the International Islamic Relief 
Organisation, the Philippine authorities submitted an application to the Court of Appeals requesting 
the freezing of the funds of the designated organization. The Court within a day issued a freezing 
order. The frozen funds were forfeited after few months.  See Asia/Pacific Group on Money 




Member States’ understanding of terrorism varies. Their definitions are vague and 
broad. As far as the principle of legality is concerned, this raises a concern that in 
determining terrorist financing offenses, there are multiple possible definitions of 
terrorism that can be used as grounds to impose liability or forfeiture sanctions.  
In terms of the conceptualization of terrorist financing as an offense, the ASEAN 
Member States, examined by this chapter, have incorporated without considerable 
change the vague definition provided and promoted by the Terrorist Financing 
Convention and FATF’s recommendation into their law. Terrorist financing is 
criminalized by these states, as an independent offence in the way that the 
Convention requires or FATF recommends - no need to link the act of financing to 
an actual criminal act for which the financing acts may be carried out. Therefore, 
having terrorist purposes is the main basis for imposing liability. As far as I could 
ascertain, the term “terrorist purpose” has not been defined by any court or authority 
of these states. This is also the basis for the seizure and forfeiture of funds and 
property regarded to be used for terrorist purposes. The consequences of such a law, 
as discussed in close detail in previous chapters, will be the violation of human 
rights and democratic values if it is implemented as it is made. 
With regard to the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on 
freezing the assets of those listed as terrorists by the Sanction Committee, the 
ASEAN Member States seem to comply with the obligations imposed by the 
Security Council resolutions.  However, their compliance can result in the violation 
of the fundamental rights and due process protected by international human rights 
laws under the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.   
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Chapter Fourteen: Conclusion  
 
This thesis has set out to examine two penal measures adopted by the Terrorist 
Financing Convention, and developed by the FATF and the UN Security Council 
to counter terrorist financing, namely criminalization, and allied seizure and 
confiscation measures. The main purpose of these measures is to prevent terrorist 
attacks before they are actualized; the main concept upon which these measures rely 
is that terrorist financing can be suppressed without connection to any actual 
terrorist act. The body of this thesis has examined how this concept has been applied 
through international law in the Terrorist Financing Convention and how it has been 
implemented in domestic law of states parties. It has spelled out the implications of 
reliance on this vague concept to criminalize terrorist financing and confiscate 
terrorist funds in terms of their compatibility with the rule of law (especially values 
of legal certainty), the principles of criminal law and human rights. This chapter 
sums up the key findings of the thesis and draws some general conclusions.  
14.1 The phenomenon of terrorist financing  
The thesis began with the examination of the nature and characteristics of terrorist 
financing as a transnational phenomenon. It explored that terrorist financing is 
deemed to include activities that result in financing a terrorist act or an individual 
or a group involved in terrorist activities. In other words, terrorist financing, under 
a broad interpretation, comprises of a wide range of activities, including raising, 
moving or resorting funds, which aim at facilitating, or contributing to, terrorist 
activities.  
What distinguishes terrorist financing from other (organized) crimes is that terrorist 
financing, in many cases, is not involved in criminal activities; that is, terrorist 
activities, individual terrorists and terrorist groups can be funded by legitimate 
sources and through legal and normal financial processes. Therefore, a heavy 
reliance on the assumption that there is a close connection between terrorist 
financing and criminal activities such as organized crimes, thus making it justifiable 
and reasonable to legislate to criminalize terrorist financing based on analogies with 
those crimes, is not entirely apt.  
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Nevertheless, this assumption (crime-terrorism nexus) underlies the approach of the 
FATF’s policy makers who wish and have attempted to resolve the problem of 
terrorist financing by analogy with their existing solutions to organized crimes and 
money laundering. Chapter four of this thesis discusses how this assumption has 
been built by the FATF into the criminalization of terrorist financing by calling on 
countries to criminalize terrorist financing as a predicate crime of money 
laundering.1032   
The emphasis on this inaccurate assumption can be said to have reinforced the 
diffusion of the approach that was developed through the Terrorist Financing 
Convention: the criminalization of terrorist financing as an independent offence. 
This approach to countering terrorist financing was unsuccessfully objected to 
during the negotiations on the draft of the Convention due to the preparatory nature 
of terrorist financing and due to the inconsistency of this approach to existing 
notions of criminalization.1033 Nonetheless, the emphasis on the assumption that 
terrorist financing is closely and heavily involved in criminal activities so it can be 
distinctively categorised, has, over time, apparently convinced states that terrorist 
financing is a distinct criminal activity (a predicate crime to money laundering) 
which can and should be criminalized even when there is no link between terrorist 
financing and an actual terrorist act for which financing is carried out.  
14.2 The criminalization of terrorist financing 
As this study showed, the criminalization of terrorist financing is accompanied by 
two serious difficulties: 1) what is terrorism and what are terrorists or terrorist 
groups, the financing of which should be addressed, and 2) how should an 
independent offence of terrorist financing, a preparatory offence in its nature, be 
drafted so as not to be too narrowly defined as an inchoate crime or complicity, thus 
limiting the scope of the offence. With regard to the definition of terrorism, the 
international community has not reached a consensus on the nature, structure and 
elements of these terms (terrorist acts, terrorist groups and individual terrorists) 
because the concept of terrorism is elusive and subject to different understandings. 
                                                 
1032 Financial Action Task Force, above n 13, at 37. 
1033 See chapter 3.2.1. 
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This probably raises an issue as to whether and how the counter terrorist financing 
measures can be applied when there is such a big gap.  
While the drafters of the Convention reached an agreement on a general definition 
of terrorism, the definition falls short of certainty and clarity; they have left vague 
all of those controversial aspects of terrorism, which have hindered reaching an 
agreement on a convention on terrorism. As a result, states have used their own 
definitions of terrorism, which may vary from one state to another and which may 
be different from the definition that the Convention provided. In addition, the 
drafters of the Convention failed to define “terrorist group” so they deleted the 
financing of terrorist groups from the scope of the Convention. However, this gap 
has been unjustly filled by the UN Security Council’s asset-freezing regime in 
which suspects may become designated by the consensus of members of a 
committee, established by the Council, as individual terrorists or terrorist groups 
without any judicial review. When they are designated, all of their assets are to be 
frozen by the state members for an indefinite time. 
While reaching a consensual agreement on the definition of terrorism, its nature and 
elements could provide a solid platform for countering terrorist financing, the 
Convention seems to imply that such a definition is not necessary as terrorist 
financing can be criminalized without a link to terrorism. This raises two questions: 
1) does this formulation of the offence satisfy the values of the rule of law 
(especially those of legal certainty) which require the predictability, learnability of 
law, fair notice, equality before the law, freedom from official arbitrariness, the 
dignity and efficiency of citizen self-direction under law?1034 2) Is such an approach 
to criminalization (criminalizing financing acts without connecting them to any 
terrorist act) justifiable in terms of the basic notions and principles of 
criminalization? 
To answer the former, the thesis examined the structure and each elements of the 
offence extensively. It has been found that the offence poses two types of vagueness 
in the sense that it does not provide clear “standards for its exercise”1035 or any 
                                                 
1034 Summers, above n 22, at 1216. 
1035 Atiyah and Summers, above n 18, at 74. 
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“methodological tools”1036 for its interpretation; the offence is structurally vague as 
it does not offer guidance as to where the criminality of the offence is derived from, 
or what is the basis of criminal liability when there is no connection between acts 
of financing and commission or preparation of a terrorist act. It has been argued that 
the structural vagueness of the offence has led to confusion over the certainty and 
determinacy of the meaning and application of each elements of the offence, which 
is called ‘definitional vagueness’. It is illustrated that the actus reus of the offence 
which consists of “collection” or “provision” of “funds”, may include innocent or 
lawful acts. Even if these acts involve criminal activities such as drug trafficking, 
the contribution of these funds to terrorism cannot be inferred from the nature of 
those acts. In addition, it has been showed how, in the absence a requirement to link 
financing or funds to terrorist activities, the actus reus of the offence can be 
interpreted very broadly so as to include collection and provision of almost anything 
to such an extent as to infringe some basic rights such as free speech. The US’s 
approach has been extensively examined in this regard. Even if the actus reus is 
interpreted to include financing of specific items of certain value (e.g. German’s 
interpretation of the Convention), the thesis shows that there is still the potential for 
citizens to become deprived of the basic rights, such as deprivation of free speech 
in the US, for being involved in the collection or provision of a narrower category 
of things regarded as funds. 
The thesis argues that the relative indeterminacy of the actus reus means that greater 
attention is paid to the mental element of the offence. In other words, when the 
criminality of financing cannot be inferred from the actus reus of a financer, then 
that criminality comes to rely heavily on the mental element of the financer. This 
depends on what mental element is required when a terrorist act is neither 
committed nor attempted as a consequence of the funding. The Convention states 
that it suffices that the financer has the intention that funds should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used for terrorist activities.  
Seeking to determine the potential meaning(s) of the mental element of the offence, 
the thesis has examined the mental element in two circumstances within which 
financing can take place: financing of a terrorist act and financing of a terrorist 
                                                 
1036 Wolff, above n 16, at 556. 
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group. The examination of such mental element in the context of financing a 
terrorist act has shown that relying on the mental state of a financer, without linking 
it to an actual terrorist act, significantly expands the concept of criminal 
responsibility beyond the scope of not only completed substantive offences but also 
the traditional inchoate offences. It has the potential to impose liability on a suspect 
who is remotely or indirectly are linked to a terrorist act or on someone with an 
unclear criminal intent. It may also result in an unfair and unjustifiable reversal of 
the burden of proof as it is vague what state of mind the prosecution should prove 
and with regard to what criminal terrorist act a suspect financer should adduce 
evidence to escape liability.  
The expansion of this mental element to include the offence of financing terrorist 
groups, added to the definition of the offence by the UN Security Council and 
FATF, has proved to be even more problematic and controversial. In other words, 
if offence requires that a financer knows or intends the funds he or she collected or 
provided will be used for a terrorist activity, in the absence of the commission or 
preparation of such an act, it is not clear what exactly the financer needs to know 
or intend to be criminally liable. Is it enough if a financer knows the identity of the 
recipient of funds as a designated group or a group which involves in terrorist 
activities? What if the financer knows the recipient is a terrorist group, but intends 
to further the lawful purposes of the group? Does it require recklessness? Does 
having “terrorist purposes” on the part of the financer, required by the FATF, 
suffice? It has been illustrated that mere knowledge of the identity of the recipient 
of funds should not suffice for the offence as it sweeps up both guilty and non-
guilty mental states into the scope of liability. It also imposes liability on well-
intentioned financers who seek to provide resources to non-violent humanitarian 
and political activities of a group. Multiple legal challenges would also target any 
other intent requirements (recklessness or specific intent), including arguments 
based on vagueness, overbreadth and the requirement of the presumption of 
innocence. The application of “terrorist purposes”, left undefined, is as a mental 
requirement that could result in the creation of a whole new class of political crimes. 
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14. 3 Why does the Terrorist Financing Convention get the scope of this offence 
so wrong?  
Examining how such criminalization goes so wrong in comparison to liberal 
principles of criminalization allows us to draw a conclusion as to whether terrorist 
financing can be justifiably kept as a stand-alone offence. Limiting the scope of this 
normative analysis to a comparison with the principles of liberal criminal law, the 
thesis tested the offence against four principles of criminalization acknowledged by 
Anglo-American criminal law, namely the principle of harm, the wrongful 
requirement, the remoteness requirement, and the rule of law standard.  It showed 
how the offence, in its current form which requires the criminalization of terrorist 
financing without linking it to any actual terrorist act, fails to meet the minimum 
requirements of these principles which requires some degree of connection between 
an act nominated for criminalization and the substantive offence for which they are 
carried. This leaves no doubt that the offence, in its current form criminalized 
independently and in the absence of a link to terrorist activity, should not be 
diffused internationally and embedded in domestic law, if there is still a 
commitment to adhere to these values and principles.  
14.4 Seizure and confiscation of terrorist funds 
To discover whether and how other terrorist financing measures can be affected by 
the poorly-defined and vague offence and the notion on which it is based, the thesis 
then turns to an analysis of the linked measures adopted by the Terrorist Financing 
Convention and the UN Security Council providing for obligations to seize and 
confiscate terrorist funds. In a similar way to the imposition of criminal liability for 
the commission of the terrorist financing offence, these freezing and confiscation 
measures rely on the notion that terrorist funds do not necessarily have to be linked 
to any specific terrorist activity. So, the accused’s knowledge or intention that his 
or her funds or assets will (or could) be used for terrorism plays a decisive role in 
determining what should be frozen or confiscated. But, when there is no any 
terrorist act committed or attempted, this leaves unanswerable the question of what 
or how much the accused should know or what exactly he or she must have intended 
to be exposed to a confiscatory sanction. It also leaves unanswerable when there is 
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no link to any terrorist act, which of her or his assets should be regarded as terrorist 
funds.  
The implications of this approach to confiscation of terrorist funds have been 
examined in the context of the practice in the EU, a valued-based community which 
expresses a strong commitment to fight against terrorism while maintain 
fundamental principles and democratic values. The outcome is far from convincing. 
Relying on the vague formulation and structure of the offence defined by the 
Terrorist Financing Convention, and on the FATF’s interpretive guidance on how 
to implement the sanction, the EU and many of its Member States permit the 
imposition of confiscatory sanctions when the accused has “terrorist purposes”. 
But, no definition for “terrorist purposes” is provided. It has been shown how the 
bagginess of  the EU’s and its Member States’ approach (as well as the practice of 
some jurisdictions outside the EU) to confiscating terrorist funds may have 
detrimental consequences in terms of violation of the rule of law and rights to 
property; they may result in the deprivation of the accused of his or her funds and 
property on the basis of the fiction of guilty property (the common law concept of 
deodand), even when they are not proved to be used, or intended to be used, for 
commission or preparation of any criminal activity.  
Similarly, the EU’s adoption of the UN Security Council’s asset-freezing measures, 
based on the same notion (freezing all of the assets of those designated as terrorists 
or terrorist groups without linking them to terrorist activities), has been shown to 
be inconsistent with human rights values such as principle of presumption of 
innocence, principle of legality and the rule of due process and right to property.   
14.5 Final Remarks 
There is a strong commitment from liberal Western states and inter-governmental 
organizations backed by them to push states to harmonise their domestic laws with 
the counter-terrorist financing regime adopted by the Terrorist Financing 
Convention, and developed by the UN Security Council and the FATF. As Chapter 
13 on the ASEAN’ approach to terrorist financing shows, the Terrorist financing 
regime is diffused through international law rapidly and is embedded in domestic 
non-western national laws in the same way as it is in Western states. However, the 
notions on which the regime is based, the regulatory problems that arise from its 
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implementation, and the reasons why it goes so wrong have not been well 
addressed. This research sought to closely and exhaustively examine two penal 
counter-terrorist financing measures (criminalization and confiscation), which 
involve criminal law in the fight against terrorist financing. It is not unfair, to 
conclude that the measures fail because of the indeterminate nature of the concepts 
they rely on, to meet basic requirements of accepted notions of criminalization, thus 
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Activities Act 2001 (Malaysia). 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (United Kingdom). 
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Criminal Code (Canada). 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Australia). 
Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany 1971. 
Criminal Code of the French Republic. 
Criminal Code of the Republic of Austria1974. 
Criminal Code of the Swiss Confederation 1937.  
Criminal Code of the Swiss Confederation 1937. 
Criminal Law Act 1977 (United Kingdom). 
Forfeiture Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23) (United Kingdom). 
Land Transport (Enforcement Powers) Amendment Act 2009 (New Zealand), 
Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism as a Law (Indonesia). 
Law No 15 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the 
Eradication of Terrorism as a Law (Indonesia). 
Law No 9 of 2013 on Prevention and Eradication of Terrorism Funding (Indonesia). 
Misuse of Drugs Acts 1977 (United Kingdom). 
Model Penal Code (United States). 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations 2002 
(Singapore). 
Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (United Kingdom). 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 
2004 (South Africa). 
Serious Crime Act 2007 (United Kingdom). 
Suppression Act 2002 (New Zealand). 
Terrorism (Suppression OF Financing) Act 2003 (Singapore). 
Terrorism Act 2000 (United Kingdom). 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (New Zealand). 
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The Human Security Act of 2007, Republic Act No. 9372 (the Philippines). 
The Penal Code of Malaysia, Sec.130N, 130O, 130P and 130Q. 
The Terrorist Financing Suppression Act of 2011, Republic Act No. 10168, (the 
Philippines). 
The United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulation 2003 (Singapore). 
Theft Act 1968 (United Kingdom). 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (India). 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 1994 (Unites States). 
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